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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial scandals in developed countries such as the USA and the UK have highlighted the 
need for greater transparency and credibility in order to protect shareholders and stakeholders 
alike. It has been argued that the audit committee (AC) is a key mechanism for achieving this 
transparency and protecting shareholders’ interests. While there have been numerous attempts 
to investigate AC practice and effectiveness in developed countries, little is known about how 
these committees operate in developing countries such as Libya. Therefore, this research aims 
to: (1) explore the current role of ACs in the Libyan banking sector, (2) investigate the factors 
that affect their performance and (3) identify actions to enhance their effectiveness. 
 
To achieve these aims, the study employed a combination of quantitative (questionnaire 
survey) and qualitative (semi-structured interviews) methods to understand how five groups of 
actors within Libya's banking sector (i.e. board and AC members, executive managers, and 
internal and external auditors) perceive the role and practice of ACs. The questionnaire survey 
was designed to collect initial data, while follow-up interviews sought to gain an in-depth 
understanding of all relevant aspects of the subject. In total, 218 survey responses were 
analysed, and 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior directors and 
managers. 
 
Although the findings broadly support agency theory’s assumption that ACs play a vital role, 
they also indicate that ACs in the Libyan banking sector are not performing to a satisfactory 
standard; they play too limited a role in monitoring financial statements and enhancing the 
external audit process, and their effectiveness is too dependent on the strength of their 
relationship with the internal audit department. Institutional theory provides one possible 
explanation for this: ACs may be primarily designed to create legitimacy outside the 
organisation rather than to protect the interests of shareholders. The findings also show that a 
number of factors variously enable (e.g. independence, financial expertise and size) or inhibit 
(e.g. weak board governance and Government intervention) AC effectiveness. Finally, a 
number of actions were identified that could be taken to enhance the effectiveness of these 
committees (e.g. the proposal to strengthen the accounting and auditing profession in Libya). 
 
The study contributes to the ongoing debates about the AC’s role by being the first to 
investigate how this role is performed in Libyan banks, which are in the early stages of 
implementing corporate governance. It addresses an information gap by providing new 
evidence from a developing country regarding the AC’s role in corporate governance and 
discussing the impact of fourteen enabling and inhibiting factors on AC effectiveness. Finally, 
it is the first step towards identifying ways of enhancing the effectiveness of these committees 
and encouraging regulators and shareholders in Libya to pay greater attention to corporate 
governance mechanisms, including ACs. 
 
 
 
P a g e  | iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
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“Exalted are You; we have no knowledge except what You have 
taught us. Indeed, it is You who is the Knowing, the Wise”  
(Quran, 2:32) 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
It has long been recognised that audit committees are central to good corporate governance 
(CG). From the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (1985) and the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA) (1988) to the Cadbury Committee (1992) and the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (BRC) (1999), numerous bodies have recommended that listed companies should 
establish an AC in order to protect the interests of shareholders. Mangena and Pike (2005) 
observe that the AC is widely acknowledged as an important element in the CG process, while 
Vera-Munoz (2005) and Turley and Zaman (2014) note that recent years have seen a much 
greater emphasis being placed on AC effectiveness. Song and Windram (2004), Rezaee (2009) 
and Liao and Hsu (2013) all identify the main roles of the AC as being to ensure responsible 
CG, to review the firm’s financial reporting and to provide a channel of communication 
between the board, external auditors and internal auditors in order to protect the interests of 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
Recent episodes of corruption and collapse in a number of major corporations have revealed 
weak control mechanisms (Suchan, 2004; Stewart, 2006) and highlighted the need for greater 
transparency to protect shareholders and stakeholders alike (Glaum et al., 2004; Fearnley and 
Beattie, 2004). Western governments have responded with initiatives such as the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) and the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2003), which set out governance 
mechanisms to help boards of directors and shareholders improve the management of firms 
and prevent collapse. Fichtner (2010) suggests that the Enron collapse in particular led 
regulators and governments throughout the developed world to pay renewed attention to the 
AC as one of the key governance mechanisms. Similarly, Rustam et al. (2013) observe that 
recent corporate scandals have resulted in the creation of CG guidelines which give a prominent 
role to ACs. 
 
However, while these are the expectations that surround ACs in developed countries, the weak 
institutional framework for CG in developing countries (Boubakri et al., 2005) means that ACs 
in these countries operate in a very different environment. In Nigeria, for example, Okpara 
(2011) found a number of constraints that hinder the implementation and promotion of CG, 
including weak or non‐existent law enforcement mechanisms and lack of transparency and 
disclosure. This is likely to have an impact both on practice in these committees and on their 
effectiveness as mechanisms of CG. Other studies, meanwhile, have argued that governance 
characteristics such as board independence, size and meeting frequency may affect the level of 
P a g e  | 2 
 
commitment ACs in developing countries display towards their oversight responsibilities 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Braswell et al., 2012).  
 
From early investigations into why voluntary ACs are formed (Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993; 
Wild, 1994) to recent explorations showing the links between AC characteristics and audit 
quality (Mangena and Tauringana, 2008; Bronson et al., 2009; Engel et al., 2010; Zaman et al., 
2011; Bierstaker et al., 2012; Turley and Zaman, 2014), the vast majority of studies have 
focused on developed countries such as the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia. However, the 
research findings from these countries are not necessarily applicable to developing countries, 
which may have a very different economic and political context (Barghathi et al., 2017). 
Shibani and Fuentes (2017) assert that no single governance model can cover all societies, 
cultures and companies because of national variations in social structure and culture. Mangena 
and Chamisa (2008) argue that these national differences make it necessary to examine 
governance structures country by country, but so far, few investigations have focused on ACs 
in the context of developing countries (e.g. Al-Moataz, 2003; Bett and Tibbs, 2017; Chanda et 
al., 2017). Among the few studies that have been conducted in these countries, Soliman (2003) 
found ACs in Egypt to be largely ineffective in their oversight of the public banking sector, 
while Al-Moataz (2003) identified a similar lack of effectiveness among ACs in Saudi Arabia.  
 
1.2 Research Motivations and Problems 
Researchers have described CG in developing countries as generally weak (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004). Many of these countries lack the institutional 
framework necessary for effective CG (Boubakri et al., 2005); for example, many have an 
ineffectual legal system (Nganga et al., 2003; Owusu and Vaaland, 2016). This is the case in 
Libya, which is still in the early stages of implementing CG (Magrus, 2012; Iswaissi and 
Falahati 2017) and where CG regulation remains inadequate (Larbsh, 2010; Abdou, 2015). 
Apart from the weak legal system, however, ACs in Libya also face a variety of other 
challenges, including state interference in the board appointment process, a general lack of 
knowledge about CG, and a lack of training among directors (Larbsh, 2010; Magrus, 2012). 
This environment affects both the practice and the effectiveness of ACs, but lack of research 
means that neither the nature of this impact nor the current status of ACs in Libya are fully 
understood. This is therefore the focus of this research. 
 
As the Libyan economy moves towards privatisation, with the accompanying broadening of 
ownership and expansion of foreign investment (Abdo and Aldrugi, 2012; Masoud, 2014a), it 
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has become a matter of urgency to review and improve the ways in which CG operates in 
Libyan firms, particularly the AC mechanism (Larbsh, 2010). In order to assess the 
effectiveness of Libya’s ACs, more must be understood about their composition, systems and 
structure and whether they are given sufficient resources to perform their function (Morgan, 
2010). In the absence of an institutional Libyan CG framework (Larbsh, 2010; Magrus, 2012), 
and given the dearth of research on AC practice in developing countries (Al-Moataz, 2010), 
and the clear deficit of research on the practice of CG in the Libyan banking sector (LBS) 
(Zagoub, 2016), this research thus addresses a significant information gap; it seeks to explore 
the current role of ACs as mechanisms of CG in this sector, to investigate the factors that affect 
their performance and to identify actions to enhance their effectiveness. 
 
Up-to-date information on these issues is especially crucial because of the sector’s importance 
within the Libyan economy (Alrshah, 2015); it is both the main artery of economic 
development and central to attracting foreign investment (Hawashe, 2016a). The sector faces 
numerous obstacles, including a lack of support from the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and a 
lack of trained staff (Zaed et al., 2016), but one of its greatest challenges is the high level of 
Government intervention. Researchers (e.g. Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017) have expressed 
concern that Government interference in the appointment of board members could have an 
adverse effect on banks and their CG if it impacts on the decisions and performance of the 
board, including the selection of AC members, especially given that the banking environment 
is already weakened by inadequate and ineffective regulation, unprofessional boards and 
underperforming directors (Abdou, 2015; Zagoub, 2016). 
 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
This research analyses the main roles played by ACs in CG in Libya’s banking sector, one of 
the most important sectors of the country’s economy, and explores those factors that enable or 
inhibit ACs in their performance of these roles. To achieve this, the following objectives were 
specified:  
1. To explore the current role of audit committees in the Libyan banking sector. 
2. To investigate the factors that affect the effectiveness of audit committees in this 
sector. 
3. To identify ways of enhancing the effectiveness of audit committees in this sector. 
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1.4 Research Questions  
These aims and objectives led to the following main questions: 
1. What role do audit committees currently play in the Libyan banking sector? 
2. How do these committees perform their role?  
3. What factors impact on the effectiveness of audit committees in this sector? 
4. How do these factors affect the role of audit committees? 
5. What can be done to enhance the effectiveness of audit committees in this sector? 
 
1.5 Methodology and Methods 
The study used a combination of a quantitative questionnaire survey and qualitative semi-
structured interviews to boost data quality and minimise the risk of bias (Esteves and Pastor, 
2004). Data were first gathered from the questionnaire responses. This was supported by the 
data gathered from the semi-structured interviews, which were used to gain a better 
understanding of the research questions and to confirm and further explore the questionnaire 
survey findings. 
 
Following Saunders et al., (2009), the questionnaire, which underwent several drafts, began 
with a brief summary outlining the project and the purpose of the instrument. In the main body 
of the instrument, the survey questions, which were developed following an extensive literature 
review, all employed five-point Likert scales. These scales are widely used in social science 
research (Jafarabadi and Pakdaman, 2016). 
 
Since the target population for this study is relatively small, the questionnaire was distributed 
to the entire population rather than to a selected sample. A list of 400 potential respondents 
was prepared following a search of the banks’ websites and telephone conversations with 
Central Bank of Libya officials. This list comprised four board members, three AC members, 
seven executive managers, seven internal auditors and four external auditors from each of 
sixteen of Libya’s seventeen commercial banks (the excluded bank does not have an AC). 
These five groups are the most familiar with AC practice, have the means and right to monitor 
firms, and are widely regarded as the foundation stones upon which a bank’s monitoring 
mechanisms are built (see Rezaee, 2009; Ittonen et al., 2010; Waweru et al., 2011).  
 
The majority of questionnaires were distributed by hand, with the remainder being sent by 
email. When the majority of email questionnaires had not been returned after two months, they 
were re-sent, prompting some recipients to return their questionnaires. Many of those 
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approached were initially reluctant to participate, claiming that they were too busy or did not 
understand the research topic. It was necessary to reassure these individuals that they could ask 
for further clarification of the questions at any time. In the end, 246 of the 400 distributed 
questionnaires were returned, 28 of which were rejected because they were incomplete. This 
left 218 for analysis, representing a response rate of 54.5%. Fewer questionnaires were received 
from board and AC members because these groups tend not to have permanent offices in the 
banks or attend regularly. The data were analysed using SPSS. 
 
As interviews – particularly semi-structured interviews – can be especially useful in assisting 
the researcher in accessing results that cannot be reached through statistical or other 
quantitative approaches (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Ritchie et al., 2013), twenty interviews 
were also conducted with the five groups (four per group) listed above to obtain richer insights 
into the role of ACs. The interviewees, who were all senior employees in this sector, were 
selected using the snowball method, with interviewees being asked to propose the names of 
other suitable candidates. A large sample was selected in the belief that collectively, it would 
possess the knowledge and experience necessary to answer the research questions. Care was 
taken to choose individuals from a range of banks in order to enhance the credibility of the 
findings. 
 
The interviews, which took place after the questionnaire survey to allow the collection of more 
in-depth opinions, were all conducted face-to-face. The interview transcripts were thematically 
coded and sorted using NVivo software (Zamawe, 2015), which made it possible to handle a 
very large amount of data and achieve high-quality coding, increasing the reliability and 
validity of the results (Patton, 2015). 
 
1.6 Significance of the Research 
The main significance of this research lies in the fact that by exploring the current role of ACs 
in the Libyan banking sector and investigating the factors that affect their performance, it may 
aid regulators, shareholders and board members in the banking sector in their efforts to enhance 
the effectiveness of these committees. Recent episodes of corporate corruption and collapse 
have highlighted the dangers of weak control mechanisms, prompting theorists, researchers, 
regulators and governments around the world to call for renewed attention to be paid the AC 
as a key governance mechanism and for corporations to make the committee a central part of 
their efforts to improve CG. However, little is known about how ACs operate in the Libyan 
banking sector, which is still in the early stages of implementing CG. In order to assess whether 
P a g e  | 6 
 
these committees are performing their function effectively, more must be understood about 
their composition, systems, structure and resources. 
 
The research is also important because of the fact that it addresses an information gap in the 
accounting literature by investigating AC effectiveness in a developing country, a context 
which is still poorly understood. In broader terms, by offering a different perspective and new 
evidence from a country with its own unique business environment, culture, religion and 
regulatory framework, it may enhance our understanding of the concept of CG and the role of 
ACs. The vast majority of studies have focused on the AC’s effectiveness in developed 
countries, but little is known about how these committees operate in developing countries such 
as Libya. As such, it is the first study to explore the role of ACs in the Libyan banking sector, 
the factors that affect their performance and measures for enhancing their effectiveness since 
the sector embarked on the process of implementing CG. It may offer a useful foundation for 
future investigation, for example of how ACs operate in other sectors within the Libyan 
economy or within other developing economies. 
 
The study makes a significant contribution to the accounting literature with its discussion of 
the impact that fourteen enabling and inhibiting factors have on AC effectiveness in the Libyan 
banking sector. Finally, it takes the first steps towards identifying ways of enhancing the 
effectiveness of ACs in the sector; it is unique in identifying the impact of the weakness of the 
accounting and auditing profession on AC effectiveness and the first to explore the suggestion 
that this effectiveness might be improved by raising standards among the country’s accounting 
and auditing professionals. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Study 
The study consists of nine chapters. The current chapter offers an overview of the study. It 
starts by providing insight into the research and explaining the research problem before 
presenting the research objectives and research questions. It briefly discusses the methodology 
and methods, and research significance before concluding with a summary of the structure of 
the thesis. 
 
Chapter Two presents the background to the study. It discusses Libya’s accounting and auditing 
profession and stock market, the structure of the banking sector and its recent shift towards the 
application of Islamic law, and the key legal/regulatory steps in the development of CG in 
Libya. 
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Chapter Three presents an outline of the literature regarding CG. It focuses particularly on the 
concept and principles of CG, the main theories that have been used to interpret and explain 
CG, and the main mechanisms of CG. There is a particular focus on agency theory and 
institutional theory, which form the theoretical underpinning of the current study. Agency 
theory sees the AC as playing a practical monitoring role, while institutional theory sees the 
AC’s role as largely symbolic.  
 
Chapter Four sheds light on the literature in relation to ACs. It discusses the concept of the AC, 
the committee’s role in CG, and the factors (both enabling and inhibiting) that affect AC 
practice before presenting the conceptual framework of the research. 
 
Chapter Five describes the methodology and methods that were employed. The main data 
collection method was a quantitative questionnaire survey. This was followed by qualitative 
semi-structured interviews. The chapter discusses the selection of the study population and 
sample, the design and distribution of the questionnaire and the analysis of the questionnaire 
data before going on to describe the profile of the interviewees, how the interviews were 
conducted and how the resulting data were analysed. 
 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight present and discuss the findings gathered from the questionnaire 
and semi-structured interviews and compare these findings with the results of the literature 
review. Chapter Six presents the findings relating to the first and second research questions; 
that is, the present role of ACs and how they perform this role in Libya’s banking sector. 
Chapter Seven covers the third and fourth research questions; that is, what the respondents 
perceived as the main enabling and inhibiting factors affecting AC practice. Chapter Eight 
presents the results relating to the fifth question: what actions can be taken to enhance AC 
effectiveness. 
 
Chapter Nine summarises the findings of the study and discusses their contribution and 
implications. Finally, it considers the limitations of the research and suggests areas for future 
investigation. 
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Chapter 2. Development of Corporate Governance in Libya 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the development of CG in Libya. It starts 
by giving an insight into the emergence and current status of the country’s accounting and 
auditing profession before explaining the role played by the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) in 
fostering economic growth and the implementation of CG. The structure of the country’s 
banking sector is then described. The remainder of the chapter summarises the key 
legislative/regulatory steps that led up to the Central Bank of Libya’s (2010a) Corporate 
Governance Code before discussing how some of the main CG mechanisms (i.e. the board of 
directors, sub-committees and disclosure practices) are treated within this legislation.  
 
2.2 The Accounting and Auditing Profession 
When the modern state of Libya was established in 1951, the country’s economy was based on 
the limited productivity of a traditional agricultural sector (Younes et al., 2013). This all 
changed with the discovery of oil in 1959, which transformed Libya from a poor to an extremely 
wealthy country (Falola et al., 2012). It was through their involvement in Libya’s oil industry 
that western oil companies, especially those from the UK and the USA, introduced their 
accounting practices – and their attitudes to accounting – into the Libyan environment. These 
companies positively affected the development of accounting first in Libyan oil companies and 
then in other companies (Masoud, 2016). Early practice was also shaped by Libyan students 
who had studied abroad, particularly in the USA and the UK. This period saw the enactment of 
the Libyan Commercial Law (1953) requiring companies to prepare an annual report including 
an income statement and balance sheet (Masoud, 2016). The law served as an acknowledgement 
of the importance of the accounting and auditing function; accordingly, as oil exports increased 
during the 1960s, the Government took steps to improve the accounting education being offered 
by Libyan universities (El-Firjani et al., 2014).  
 
The next major step in the development of the accounting profession came in 1973, when the 
Government issued Law No. 116. This was the first legislation to focus specifically on the 
accounting and auditing profession (Laga, 2013). It sought to raise standards by setting out the 
responsibilities of and a code of behaviour for accountants and auditors, and by requiring 
accountants to be registered. Finally, it laid the groundwork for the creation of the Libyan 
Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA) (El-Firjani et al., 2014). 
 
Despite this and other attempts at regulation, however, and notwithstanding the existence of the 
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LAAA (Masoud, 2016), the accounting profession in Libya has not yet achieved its central 
objective of developing accounting practice (El-Firjani et al., 2014). For example, auditing 
practice remains undeveloped, making it difficult to report corporate misconduct (Zakari and 
Menacere, 2012). The Government has sought to address this weakness, for example by issuing 
the Banking Law in 2005 and requiring all firms with a capital of over one million Libyan 
Dinars to be listed on the Libyan stock market, where they are expected to follow the 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) (El-Firjani et al., 2014). However, such progress as 
has been made is largely down to the Central Bank of Libya, which has sought to foster good 
accounting practice through its issuance of CG rules and guidelines (Larbsh, 2010). At the 
moment, the accounting and auditing profession itself does not enjoy high status, mostly due to 
the perceived weakness of the LAAA (Masoud, 2017). This state of affairs is unlikely to change 
without a thorough overhaul of the profession’s regulatory systems to bring them into line with 
those in developed countries. 
 
2.3 The Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
Realising that a stock market was crucial to encourage investment, speed up its privatisation 
programme and broaden the property base in Libya, the Libyan Government established the 
LSM in principle in 2001 with the issuance of Act No. 21/2001 (Masoud, 2014a). The act 
required all public and private organisations to register in the stock market with a view to being 
listed (El-Firjani et al., 2014). However, the stock exchange did not officially open until 2006, 
when the Government issued Decision No. 134/2006 (Aljbiri, 2012). In October 2008, a 
collaboration contract was finalised between the LSM and the London Stock Exchange 
allowing groups of trainees from the LSM to work in London (Saidane, 2010). In the years 
since then, the LSM has become increasingly active internationally, joining the International 
Organisation for the Protection of the Investor, and the Executive Committee of the Deposit of 
Africa and the Middle East (Alameda) (Edweib et al., 2013). Its continuing aims are to boost 
the privatisation process, enhance finance availability and facilitate the granting of credit, 
encourage investment and ensure the disclosure and transparency of financial and economic 
information (Edweib et al., 2013).  
 
In 2007, the LSM issued its own Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. The code 
covers key areas including the responsibilities of the board of directors, the establishment of 
sub-committees such as the audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee 
and watchdog committee, and disclosure and transparency. At some point in the first four 
months after the expiry of the financial year, all companies listed in the stock market must 
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publish their annual reports. These reports must include information on investment income, 
overdrafts and interest on loans, proposed and paid dividends, pension and compensation 
payments and the remuneration and turnover of external auditors (Masoud, 2014a). The 
Corporate Governance Code also stresses that information accompanying the annual financial 
statement should include a statement on whether the company has followed the code, a list of 
its sub-committees and their responsibilities, the names of the members of these committees, 
and details of all remunerations and bonuses they receive (LSM, 2007). Ishmel’s study (2010) 
revealed that shareholders are generally satisfied with these annual reports. Thus, the LSM has 
had a significant impact on the level of disclosure and transparency in the annual financial 
reporting of listed companies. Edweib et al. (2013) conclude that it has played a significant role 
in enhancing economic growth, that its strategy for attracting investors is effective and that it 
has created a climate that is conducive to investment. 
 
2.4 The Libyan Banking Sector 
The banking sector is one of the most important sectors of the Libyan economy (Alrshah, 2015) 
and one of the major financiers of projects and institutions, because of the adoption of public 
sector enterprises in the implementation of development plans (Shernanna, 2012). Between 
2002 and 2010, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) implemented a range of measures to improve 
the banking sector to bring it into line with the Government’s new policies and better facilitate 
economic development (CBL, 2010b). These included the issuance of a voluntary corporate 
governance code in 2005 (made mandatory in 2010), the restructuring of commercial banks, 
and the transfer of ownership of some public sector banks to the private sector. In addition, new 
private banks were established and foreign investors and foreign banks were allowed to enter 
the sector (CBLa, 2010). 
 
The banking sector in Libya consists of the CBL, seventeen commercial banks (see Figure 2.3) 
and four specialised banks (CBL, 2016). 
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Figure 2.1 The Libyan Banking Sector 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Libya (CBL) (2016)  
 
 
 
2.4.1 Central Bank of Libya (CBL) 
The CBL, which was established in 1956, is Libya’s supreme monetary authority. The main 
purposes of the CBL are to maintain monetary stability in Libya and to ensure the continual 
growth of the economic system in accordance with the general economic policy of the state 
(CBL, 2008). The law establishing the CBL provides for its independence and gives it the 
authority to oversee all of Libya’s banks with a view to ensuring the integrity of their financial 
position and performance and protecting the rights of depositors and clients (CBL, 2008). Gait 
(2009) notes that this is one of the CBL’s main responsibilities; El-Firjani et al. (2014) also 
observe that it is the CBL’s job to closely monitor the banking sector. Over the past two 
decades, the CBL has made significant efforts to attract more foreign investment by permitting 
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foreign banks to open branches and agencies in Libya (Hawashe, 2016a). The functions of the 
CBL may be summarised as follows (CBL, 2008): 
• Issuing and regulating banknotes and coins in Libya; 
• Maintaining and stabilising the Libyan currency internally and locally; 
• Maintaining and managing the official reserves of gold and foreign exchange; 
• Regulating the quantity, quality and cost of credit to meet the requirements of economic 
growth and monetary stability; 
• Taking appropriate measures to deal with foreign or local economic and financial 
problems; 
• Acting as a banker to the commercial banks; 
• Supervising commercial banks to ensure the soundness of their financial position and 
protection of the rights of depositors and shareholders; 
• Acting as a banker and fiscal agent to the state and public entities; 
• Advising the state on the formulation and implementation of financial and economic 
policy; 
• Supervising foreign exchange; 
• Carrying out any other functions or transactions normally performed by central banks, as 
well as any tasks charged to it under the law of banking and currency and credit or any 
international convention to which the state is a party; 
• Managing and issuing all state loans. 
 
2.4.2 Commercial Banks 
Commercial banks are the most significant financial institutions in Libya in terms of role, size, 
geographical spread and the range of services provided to customers (Hawashe, 2016a). In the 
move towards privatisation and openness (Abdo and Aldrugi, 2012), the Central Bank of Libya 
has over the past two decades implemented a series of reforms to allow the establishment of 
private, domestic commercial banks and the opening of branches by foreign banks (Hawashe, 
2016a). Consequently, the sector now consists of seventeen banks (sixteen of which are 
targeted in this study), which are variously owned by the state, the private sector, or joint-
owned by some combination of the state, domestic and foreign investors (Libyan-foreign). 
Collectively, the commercial banks operate a total of 494 branches all over Libya (see Table 
2.1). As of 2013, they held total assets of 98.4 billion Libyan dinars (£46.8 billion) (CBL, 
2013). 
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Table 2.1: Ownership Structure of Libya’s Commercial Banks 
 
Source: Central Bank of Libya (CBL) (2016)  
 
 
2.4.3 Specialised Banks 
There are four specialised banks in Libya. These were established to finance particular 
activities: The Agricultural Bank grants agricultural loans, the Development Bank funds 
investment in industry, the Alrefi Bank grants loans to job seekers, and the Eddekhar Bank 
provides mortgage lending for all citizens (Hawashe, 2016b). Article 65/2 of the Libyan 
Banking Law (2005) defines a specialised bank as an institution whose main purpose is to 
finance and grant credit for specific activities and whose basic activities do not include the 
acceptance of demand deposits. As they do not operate according to the profit principle, their 
activities differ from those of commercial banks. Since specialised banks do not have audit 
committees, they are excluded from this study. 
 
No Bank Ownership 
Number of 
Branches 
State 
Owned 
Private 
 
Mixed Ownership 
State 
Owned 
Domestic 
Investors 
Foreign 
Investors 
1.  Al-Jumhouria State 146 100%     
2.  Sahara Mixed 49   55% 26% 19% 
3.  National Commercial State 68 100%     
4.  Al-Wahda Mixed 76   81%  19% 
5.  North Africa State 53 100%     
6.  Commerce & Development Mixed 30    50% 50% 
7.  Alwaha State 10 100%     
8.  Aman Mixed 23    60% 40% 
9.  United Mixed 12    60% 40% 
10.  Arab Commercial Private 3  100%    
11.  Asaray  Private 3  100%    
12.  Alejma’a Alarabi Private 12  100%    
13.  Mediterranean Private 4  100%    
14.  Alwafa Private 3  100%    
15.  First Gulf Mixed 1   50%  50% 
16.  Libyan Foreign  State 1 100%     
17.  Nuran Bank Mixed 1    50% 50% 
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2.4.4 The Islamic Banking System in Libya 
Deriving from the Qur’an and Sunnah (Javaid and ul Hassan, 2013), the primary objective of 
Islamic law (Sharia) is to guarantee safety and justice for Muslims by protecting their religious, 
personal, wealth and property rights (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015). In terms of finance 
specifically, Sharia places particular obligations on banks and other financial institutions, 
including forbidding the charging of interest and trading under uncertainty (Abdo and Wakkas, 
2011). As a result, these institutions have had to develop special, Sharia-compliant financial 
products and services to serve the needs of Muslim customers (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). As 
this market develops, Islamic financial services are playing a growing role in the international 
economy; worldwide, there are currently more than 600 Islamic banks and more than 700 
Islamic investment funds with over 2 trillion dollars in assets. Furthermore, many non-Muslims 
are now using the products provided by Islamic financial institutions and Islamic windows in 
traditional banks (Masiukiewicz, 2014). 
 
In Libya, the move towards Islamic banking began with Libyan Banking Law No. 1/2005, 
which allowed for the creation of some Islamic banking services and products as a category of 
licensed activities (CBL, 2005). However, prior to 2011, the Libyan Government showed little 
support for Islamic banking. It was not until after the 2011 revolution that the National 
Transitional Council issued Law No. 46/2012, which amended the 2005 Banking Law to 
include a detailed chapter on Islamic banking and allow the establishment of Islamic banks 
(Baej and Worthington, 2014). This was followed in 2013 by the issue of Law No. 1/2013 
prohibiting all interest charges (Riba) (Stela and Abdulsalam, 2016). With the strong support 
of most segments of society (Abdulsaleh, 2017), the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) then began 
the process of transforming the conventional banking system into an Islamic banking system, 
establishing Sharia committees and opening windows within existing banks and new branches 
to provide dedicated Islamic banking services (Elkrghli and Yahya, 2018), mainly Murabaha 
and Musharaka financial products (Abdulsaleh, 2017). However, at the time of writing, the 
move to an entirely Islamic banking system has not yet been accomplished (Zway, 2017), and 
many banks remain in the early stages of transition (Elkrghli and Yahya, 2018). There are 
several reasons for this, including a lack of relevant experience and inadequate staff training, 
Libya’s lack of an Islamic financial market, and the unstable political and economic situation 
(Abdulsaleh, 2017; Zway, 2017; Elkrghli and Yahya, 2018). These challenges notwithstanding, 
Baej and Worthington (2014) are optimistic that the transition will eventually be completed 
now that it has the support of the CBL, regulators, banks, academics and society as a whole.  
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Masoud (2014b) expects that Islamic finance will ultimately play a prominent role in the long-
term economic growth of Libya by increasing the gross domestic product (GDP), while other 
supporters of Islamic banking argue that an effective Islamic banking system will attract both 
domestic and foreign investment (Eldlimi et al., 2013) and thereby restore liquidity levels. 
However, in the absence of any information from the Central Bank of Libya regarding the 
current extent of Sharia application in the Libyan banking sector, it is too early to assess what, 
if any, impact Islamic finance is having on the banking sector and its practice, including CG 
and audit committees. The issue is therefore not considered in this research.  
 
2.5 Development of Corporate Governance and Audit Committees in Libya 
This section identifies the key legislation that has shaped the development of CG in general in 
the Libyan context before focusing specifically on boards of directors, sub-committees 
(including ACs) and disclosure practice. 
 
2.5.1 Historical Development 
The development of CG in Libya has passed through several stages since the end of the British 
mandate and the arrival of Libyan independence in 1951. The first stage of this development 
was the issuance of the Libyan Commercial Law in 1953. This contained numerous provisions 
covering many of the key principles of CG, including board structure, the responsibilities of 
the board and the fundamental rights of shareholders. This law was technically superseded by 
the revised Commercial Code (No. 23/2010), which was announced in 2010. However, this 
new code, which was developed to address a number of shortcomings in the 1953 law, is not 
yet in force because the Government has not yet issued the executive regulations. 
 
The next major step was in 1973, when the Government issued Law No. 116, which deals with 
the organisation of the accounting profession in Libya. This law, which was the first to focus 
on accounting and related fields (Laga, 2013), brought the profession into the limelight (Ritchie 
and Khorwatt, 2007). It sought to raise standards by setting out the responsibilities of and a 
code of behaviour for accountants and auditors, and by requiring accountants to be registered. 
Finally, it laid the groundwork for the creation of a Libyan Association of Accountants and 
Auditors (El-Firjani et al., 2014).  
 
During the first decade of the 21st century, the Central Bank of Libya implemented a series of 
measures aimed at bringing the sector into line with the international banking system and 
fostering its development. These included the issuance of a (voluntary) CG code in 2005, the 
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restructuring of commercial banks and the transfer of ownership of some public sector banks 
to the private sector. New private banks were established and foreign investors and foreign 
banks were allowed to participate in the sector (CBL, 2010b). In 2005, the Central Bank of 
Libya issued the Libyan CG Code (LCGC). This code offered essential guidelines on corporate 
governance for commercial banks in Libya, but these guidelines were neither compulsory nor 
lawfully binding (CBL, 2005). 
 
In 2010, the Libyan CG Code was finally made mandatory. The code, which applies to all 
banks in Libya, is made up of six sections. The first discusses the central principle of corporate 
governance and its importance in ensuring that banking operations are conducted safely and 
protect the interests of shareholders, as well as an explanation of many of the terms used in this 
code. The second section identifies out the Shareholders' equity including how to make 
decisions at the General Assembly of Shareholders. The third section sets out the criteria for 
appointing board members and senior management and explains what they should do in order 
to perform their duties towards shareholders, depositors and other debtholders efficiently and 
effectively. This section addresses the board’s role in choosing and supervising management, 
and the relationship between the board of directors and the executive management. Section 
four sets out the sub-committees of the board of directors for helping the board of directors to 
perform its duties and responsibilities. These sub-committees include audit committee, 
corporate governance committee, risk management committee and appointment and 
remuneration committee, while sections five and six addresses the disclosure of corporate 
governance practices implemented by banks and some other requirements, such as a number 
of obligations of public sector shareholders (CBL, 2010a). 
 
The Libyan Stock Market was officially inaugurated in 2006 with the Government’s Decision 
No. 134. The establishment of the stock market was seen as necessary to encourage investment, 
foster the privatisation process, broaden the property base and facilitate the granting of credit. 
2007 saw the Libyan Stock Market issue the second CG Code. The code, which is directed at 
listed companies, includes articles relating to the responsibilities of the board of directors, the 
establishment of sub-committees such as the audit committee, remuneration committee, 
nomination committee and watchdog committee, and disclosure and transparency. However, 
the only mandatory article within the code is that concerning disclosure.  
 
As noted above, the Libyan CG Code was made mandatory in 2010. Also, in 2010, the 
Parliament issued Libyan Stock Market Authority (LSMA) Law No. 11, which contains a raft 
of articles governing the regulation of the stock market. This law is designed to ensure that all 
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transactions by companies listed in the market take place under conditions of transparency and 
disclosure. It also stipulates that the LSMA should be managed by a board of five members, 
who should be appointed by the Prime Minister. The law contains provisions to ensure that 
investors are protected; Article 78, for example, stipulates that if any company listed in the 
stock market finds its activities or its financial position suddenly affected by unforeseen 
circumstances, it must immediately disclose these to the directors of the stock market. 
 
Despite all these legal and regulatory efforts, however, the legal environment in Libya remains 
weak, and there is still a widespread lack of knowledge about corporate governance (Magrus, 
2012). Numerous researchers have observed that CG regulation is still inadequate in most 
Libyan firms (e.g. Larbsh, 2010; Magrus, 2012; Faraj and El-Firjani, 2014; Abdou, 2015), and 
awareness among investors remains low. This has had adverse consequences for the country, 
weakening the banking system, reducing Libya’s attractiveness to foreign investors and 
exacerbating the fragility of the national economy (Larbsh, 2010; Magrus, 2012; Alrshah and 
Fadzil, 2013). 
 
2.5.2 Board of Directors    
A board of directors is a group of individuals who have been chosen to protect the interests of 
shareholders by monitoring, guiding and advising top management (Seward and Walsh, 1996; 
Coles et al., 2008). Zhang et al., (2015) point out that the main job of the board of directors is 
to resolve conflicts of interest between stakeholders. The board of directors is the main 
governance tool connecting the firm to its institutional context (Zhu et al., 2013; Walls and 
Hoffman, 2013). The model board has a mixture of inside directors who are senior employees 
and outside directors, who may be executives in other firms (Yoo and Reed, 2015). 
 
The Libyan CG Code (2010) stipulates that boards in commercial banks must have between 
five and seven members, at least two of whom must be independent directors (CBL, 2010a). 
However, Article 530 of the Libyan Commercial Law (1953) states that if a firm’s 
memorandum of association sets upper and lower limits for the number of directors, the general 
assembly can specify the number of directors it wants within these limits. The general assembly 
is also authorised to appoint board members; if it chooses not to appoint the board chairman, 
board members may do this themselves by selecting a candidate from among their group. The 
law allows the board of directors to delegate its powers to an executive committee composed 
of some of its members (Libyan Commercial Law, 1953). 
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The 2010 code states that the final responsibility for the activities and financial integrity of the 
bank rests with the board of directors. This responsibility means that board members must not 
perform any executive function in the bank. It is the board’s job to set strategies and policies, 
to supervise the management and its commitment to these policies, and to ensure that the CG 
code is properly implemented. It is accountable to the Central Bank of Libya, the general 
assembly of shareholders and other stakeholders (CBL, 2010a).  
 
2.5.3 Board Sub-Committees 
The Libyan CG Code (2010) recommends that all banks should set up sub-committees (CBL, 
2010a), according to their circumstances and requirements. The aim of these committees 
should be to assist the board of directors to perform its duties and responsibilities. The code 
advises, as a minimum, an audit committee (see section 2.6.4), a risk management committee 
(to set risk management policy and supervise management performance in this area), an 
appointment and remuneration committee (to set standards for the appointment of executive 
managers and develop policy for the compensation of board members and executive managers) 
and a corporate governance committee (to set the general framework for the bank’s governance 
procedures, monitor the implementation of this framework, review it periodically and supervise 
CG-related disclosure) (CBL, 2010a). 
 
2.5.4 Audit Committee Formation 
A series of changes and reforms in Libya’s banking sector, including the arrival of foreign 
banks and the adoption of the Basel Committee’s recommendations (Abdulsaleh, 2014b), have 
highlighted the importance of audit committees in monitoring bank practice and protecting the 
interests of shareholders. However, as Abdulsaleh (2014a, p. 596) points out: “The challenge 
for developing countries, such as Libya, in activating the role of audit committees is to adapt 
them successfully to their own regulatory, legal, political, cultural and religious setting”. In 
Libya, audit committees were not compulsory under either the Central Bank of Libya’s 2005 
CG code or the Libyan Stock Market’s 2007 code, though their recommendation by the stock 
market did lead to them becoming more prevalent in listed companies (Larbsh, 2010). It was 
not until the CBL’s CG code became mandatory in 2010 that audit committees became 
compulsory in the banking sector.  
 
The 2010 code, which applies to all banks in the Libyan banking sector, stipulates that every 
bank must establish an audit committee (CBL, 2010a), to be appointed by the board of 
directors. It should comprise at least four members, at least two of whom should be independent 
directors. The committee members should have experience and understanding of the process 
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of risk management and CG, and one or two should have experience of financial disclosure, 
accounting and auditing. The audit committee should meet at least once every three months (or 
whenever needed) at the invitation of its chairman, and it should also hold periodic meetings 
(at least annually) with the external auditors and the director of the internal audit department. 
It may call upon any senior manager to attend its meetings if it requires clarification or 
information.  
The committee has a number of roles, including monitoring the fairness and transparency of 
financial statements, related disclosures and other information; reviewing the plan for the 
internal audit, any observations in the internal audit reports and action taken thereon; 
supervising the work of external auditors; and ensuring the adequacy and effectiveness of 
internal control systems and procedures (CBL, 2010a). It is also responsible for recommending 
the appointment or replacement of the internal audit director and the external auditor, and for 
providing the board of directors with reports to help it evaluate the performance of the bank 
(Shalba, 2016). The committee is thus a key CG mechanism, assisting the board to carry out 
its responsibilities effectively and protect the interests of shareholders. 
 
2.5.5 Disclosure Practices  
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that when legislation governing the disclosure of information 
is not enforced, firms often fail to disseminate high-quality information. In the past, Libyan 
disclosure requirements were low; Article 572 of the Libyan Commercial Code (1972) only 
required firms to produce a balance sheet, a profit and loss account, a directors’ report and an 
external auditor’s report (Libyan Commercial Code, 1972). Perhaps not surprisingly, Kribat et 
al. (2013) found that Libyan banks failed to comply fully with compulsory disclosure 
requirements during the years covered in their study (2000-2006).  
 
The weakness of disclosure in Libya is primarily attributable to the lack of accounting 
standards (Kribat et al., 2013); in the absence of such standards, even firms in the same industry 
may apply the principles, rules, methods and measures of accounting in different ways (Ahmad 
and Gao, 2004). Chong and Ahmad (2010) illustrate that the accounting regulatory and 
institutional frameworks that govern disclosure and the reporting process in Libya are in fact 
made up of a mixture of rules, regulations and institutions drawn from the USA, the UK and 
Italy. Pratten and Mashat (2009) found that in Libya, annual reports have often in the past been 
utilised exclusively for the purpose of central planning, with disclosure being limited to 
informing employees about the firm – it has not been the custom to disclose information to all 
stakeholders, even though investors rely on accounting disclosures to make investment 
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decisions (Abdo et al., 2017). However, Pratten and Mashat (2009) point out that Libyan 
companies are now becoming more aware not just of their obligations regarding disclosure but 
also of the need to spread the word about their activities. As a result, the level of disclosure in 
Libyan companies is now higher than that found in the past. The trend has been driven by a 
number of measures that have been put in place by the Libyan Government and other concerned 
bodies:  
 
• In 2007, an agreement was signed between the Libyan Stock Market and the University of 
Reading to provide training and technical assistance in Libya and the UK to securities 
traders in Libya. Training has addressed issues such as the disclosure of financial data, 
arbitration and dispute resolution, governance and the preparation of legal rules and 
regulations to protect investors. The agreement also allows for the provision of consultancy 
services to develop Libya’s financial market (Masoud, 2014). 
 
• In 2008, the General People’s Committee (Prime Ministerial) issued Decision No. 436, 
which includes a set of regulations and basic rules to adjust the process of the market with 
the aim of protecting investors and ensuring the principles of disclosure and transparency 
are observed (LSM, 2008). 
 
 
• 2010 saw the issuance of Libyan Stock Market Authority (LSMA) Law No. 11. This sets out 
a range of measures to improve the operation of the Libyan Stock Market, one of which is 
the mandatory disclosure of essential information to investors. The law requires all actors in 
the market to disclose all relevant information, data and statistics, including the status, basic 
biographical details and financial position of board members, financial statements certified 
by an outside auditor, an annual list of shareholders and any significant information that 
might impact the price of stock (LSMA, 2010). 
 
2.5.6 Factors Affecting Corporate Governance Development 
There is a variation between developed and developing countries in terms of the implementation 
of corporate governance (Huang et al., 2014; Thanathawee, 2015). This is a result of a weakness 
of corporate governance practices in developing and emerging countries (Ertugrul, 2015; Anas, 
2015). Leuz et al., (2003) conclude that in developing countries with weak economies, investors 
have few rights and regulation is not enforced, while Boubakri et al. (2005) argue that many 
developing countries lack an established institutional framework for effective corporate 
governance. This is the case in Libya, which is still in the early stages of implementing 
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corporate governance (Iswaissi and Falahati 2017), while others have argued that the 
development of CG in these firms is being hindered by unprofessional boards and 
underperforming directors (Abdou, 2015). As a result, regulation is still inadequate, there is 
little training for directors on governance systems, and the lack of accounting standards and 
legal requirements lead to low levels of disclosure. Firms lack experience in internal and 
external auditing but are concerned about the financial costs of putting such mechanisms in 
place (Abu-Azza, 2012; Magrus, 2012; Hamuda and Sawan, 2014; Zagoub, 2016). 
 
These results are similar to that of the study by Larbsh (2010), who found that corporate 
governance in Libya has impacted adversely by a number of inhibiting factors, such as 
weakness of the legal system that governs the activities of firms, poor management and poor 
company leadership, political interference, the absence of a merit system in the appointment of 
managers and boards of directors and weakness in their training, company ownership, the low 
disclosure practice, and the lack of willingness to respond to change. It has therefore proposed 
the following steps in order to have a good system of corporate governance in Libya:  
• Encouraging the awareness of the benefit of corporate governance practice in medium and 
small companies. 
   
• Developing and maintaining a healthy banking system.  
 
• Compliance with the merit system on appointing managers and board members. 
    
• Encouraging the private sector, reducing the bureaucracy and developing the economy.   
  
• Supporting Government agencies and non-governmental organisations to play a role in 
monitoring and developing the framework of corporate governance (Larbsh, 2010). 
 
2.6 Summary 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the development of Libya’s accounting and 
auditing profession, explaining that it does not currently appear to have the skill or the 
professional standing to push for improvement, with the Libyan Accountants and Auditors 
Association (LAAA) being generally seen to have failed in its mission of raising standards and 
developing accounting practice.  
 
The chapter goes on to explain that the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) has implemented a series 
of reforms over the last two decades to develop the banking sector and increase its 
competitiveness in the global marketplace. Central to this have been its efforts to encourage 
better CG among Libya’s commercial banks. The chapter discusses the progress of these efforts, 
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highlighting in particular the central role played by the CBL’s 2010 CG Code, which sets out 
guidelines for the formation of boards of directors and board committees (including ACs) and 
for disclosure practice. It also highlights the vital role played by the Libyan Stock Market in 
regulating and improving practice in listed companies.  
 
On the whole, however, the chapter shows that CG in Libya is still in the early stages of 
development. While some Libyan researchers have suggested that there has been an 
improvement in regard to disclosure practice, the general view is that the legal environment 
remains weak and awareness of CG among stakeholders is low. There is a general lack of 
knowledge about CG, directors lack training on governance systems, and firms lack experience 
in internal and external auditing, but are concerned about the financial costs of putting such 
mechanisms in place. 
 
This chapter having outlined the context of the study, the next reviews the literature concerning 
corporate governance, its mechanisms and the main theories to have influenced its development. 
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Chapter 3. Aspects of Corporate Governance 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter gives a brief overview of the development of corporate governance in 
Libya.  It describes the development of the accounting and auditing profession, Libya’s banking 
sector and the main features of CG and AC practice in Libya before identifying the key 
legislative/regulatory steps leading up to the issuance of the Libyan CG Code (2010). This 
chapter discusses the literature concerning CG, its mechanisms (including the AC) and the 
main theories to have influenced its development. It starts by discussing the concept and 
principles of CG before going on to discuss at length the theories of CG and CG mechanisms. 
 
3.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
Ever since Berle and Means proposed the separation of ownership and control in 1932, CG has 
been the subject of attention from researchers (Muniandy and Hillier, 2014), but it was the 
financial scandals and crises of the 1980s and 1990s that made it a matter of international debate 
(Huse, 2007). The Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, for example, prompted numerous 
investigations into the causes (Long and Van Hoa, 2000) and sparked fresh interest in the 
relationship between CG and investor protection (Cheng et al., 2015). The Cadbury 
Committee’s 1992 report into the financial aspects of CG was the first to raise awareness of 
CG issues, but this was followed by numerous other studies (e.g. Beasley et al., 1999; Beasley 
et al., 2000; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Chtourou et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2002). Regulatory 
bodies around the world, meanwhile, set out their own guidelines for effective CG (Fichtner, 
2010), particularly in the wake of the corporate collapses of 2001-2002. These collapses led to 
the introduction of legislation designed to enforce accountability (Gaylard et al., 2014). 
Legislation such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) and the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2003) 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation’s Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 
1999 and 2004) have encouraged companies to behave with regard to the principles of CG, but 
there is growing evidence that many companies – and not just in the west – are now waking up 
to the benefits that good CG can bring. These include higher investor confidence, lower capital 
costs and increased firm value (Garay and González, 2008). As understanding has grown of 
the impact that the local economy and legal system have on CG practice (AlHares and Ntim, 
2017), more developed, developing and emerging market countries have issued their own CG 
codes and guidelines (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Almomania et al., 2017), and company 
performance has improved all over the world (Krenn, 2014).  
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Many authors and researchers have attempted to define corporate governance, but there is no 
general consensus; definitions vary in terms of their reference to cultural, political, social and 
economic factors and the aims of governance. The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) defined 
corporate governance as the system by which organisations are directed and controlled. This 
definition highlights the responsibilities of directors and managers for setting strategic aims 
and establishing and overseeing the implementation of financial and other policies (Daryaei et 
al., 2013). Cohen et al. (2004), using the Public Oversight Board (POB, 1993) perspective, 
offer a more detailed definition which considers corporate governance in terms of its 
responsibilities, functions and mechanisms, and the role of these mechanisms in overseeing the 
financial reporting process. They define corporate governance as “…those oversight activities 
undertaken by the board of directors and AC to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting 
process” (Cohen et al., 2004, p. 2). 
 
Others have defined corporate governance in terms of its role in protecting and promoting the 
interests of shareholders: “The role of corporate governance is to protect and advance the 
interests of shareholders through setting the strategic direction of a company and appointing 
and monitoring capable management to achieve this” (Walker, 2009, p. 23).  One recent 
definition emphasises the role played by both internal and external agencies in protecting the 
interests not just of shareholders but of all stakeholders: 
 
“Corporate governance is a regulatory activity that is enforced through 
different internal and external agencies to resolve the agency conflicts and 
protect the stakeholder interests of organisations. Corporate governance 
ensures that firms are run in a responsible and accountable manner that 
enhances the overall performance” (Dalwai et al., 2015, p. 20). 
 
Another recent definition, offered by Samaduzzaman et al. (2015, p. 98), asserts that corporate 
governance is “…the set of rules and regulations that are framed to protect corporate values 
and shareholders’ interests”. 
 
The widest, most comprehensive definition of corporate governance takes into account the 
relationships between managers, shareholders and other stakeholders such as employees, 
suppliers, creditors, customers and society at large. Pande (2012) argues that this definition, 
which was put forward by the OECD in 2004, has become a benchmark for policy makers, 
organisations, investors and other stakeholders all over the world:  
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“Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance specifies the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, 
such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells 
out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By 
doing this, it also provides the structures through which the company 
objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance” (OECD, 2004, p. 11). 
 
The fact that the health of a country’s economy is closely related to the soundness of its 
banking system (Devi et al., 2017) makes it of paramount importance that banks achieve 
good corporate governance (Gagandeep and Kumar, 2016). Not surprisingly, Ahmed et al. 
(2017) found that corporate governance has a positive relationship with bank performance. 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, many central banks and related authorities have asserted the 
importance of effective corporate governance in controlling banks’ exposure to risk (Peni 
and Vahamaa, 2011). Accordingly, the Libyan CG Code (2010) describes the purpose of CG 
as being: 
“…to build the necessary foundations for sound management and effective 
supervision, including audit committees, and to safeguard the interests of all 
parties concerned with the bank (shareholders, depositors and other 
debtholders), as well as the interests of its investors, and to strengthen public 
confidence in the banking sector” (CBL, 2010a). 
Since this is the code governing ACs in the Libyan banking sector, this is the definition 
adopted in the current study. It is particularly useful here because of its explicit focus on 
monitoring and ACs, and on the importance of protecting the interests of stakeholders and 
fostering public confidence. 
 
3.3 Principles of Corporate Governance 
The OECD first developed its CG principles in 1999, following consultations with 
governments and stakeholders from around the world. The principles were subsequently 
reviewed and revised, and then re-launched in 2004. The revised principles reflect not just the 
experience of those countries that are members of the OECD but also the organisation’s 
experience and understanding of the economies of emerging and developing countries. The 
OECD principles aim to provide the basis for an effective CG framework. To this end, they set 
out the rights of shareholders, key ownership functions and measures to ensure that 
shareholders are treated equitably. They also set out the responsibilities of the board and define 
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the role played by other stakeholders in CG. The need for disclosure and transparency is 
highlighted throughout (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). 
 
A similar concern for transparency is evident in the set of core principles presented by the 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) to the US Congress in 2002. Among 
other issues, the NACD’s principles, which were designed to improve corporate governance, 
address disclosure requirements for publicly traded firms in the USA (NACD 2002). The 
principles recommend that: boards should contain a substantial majority of independent 
directors; that key committees (e.g. audit, compensation, nomination) should be composed of 
independent directors; that each of these committees should have a board-approved written 
charter detailing its functions and responsibilities; that the board should formally designate an 
independent director as chairman or lead director; that the performance of the chief executive 
officer should be regularly and formally evaluated; that the adequacy of the company's 
compliance and reporting systems should be reviewed at least annually; that the board should 
adopt a policy of holding periodic sessions of independent directors; that the audit  committee 
should meet independently with both internal and independent auditors; that the board should 
be constructively engaged with management in developing and implementing corporate 
strategy; and that new directors should be put through a "director orientation" programme to 
familiarise them with the business, industry trends and recommended governance practices (all 
directors to be assured of "continuing education"). 
 
The Business Roundtable also issued its own core set of CG principles in 2002. This 
organisation, which is made up of chief executive officers from leading American companies, 
identified six key principles: 
1. The board of directors should be responsible for selecting the chief executive officer 
(CEO) and for overseeing the CEO and other top executives; 
2. The management is responsible for operating the corporation in an effective and ethical 
manner with the goal of creating shareholder value; 
3. The management is responsible for preparing financial statements, under the oversight 
of the board of directors and its AC, that fairly present the financial conditions and 
operations of the corporation; 
4. The board of directors and its AC should engage an independent accounting firm to 
perform financial statement audits; 
5. The independent accounting firm should maintain its independence in fact and in 
appearance, conduct the audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing 
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Standards (GAAS), and inform the board through the AC of any concerns regarding the 
quality and integrity of the financial reporting process;  
6. Corporations have a responsibility to deal with their employees in a fair and equitable 
manner (Rezaee et al., 2003). 
 
Kooiman (1999) argues that, notwithstanding the range of definitions, the literature almost 
universally sees corporate governance as having three key principles: it represents a 
commitment to take collective action in order to enhance legitimacy and effectiveness; it 
recognises the importance of rules to guide interactions between stakeholders; and it 
acknowledges that companies must find new ways of doing things. 
 
3.4 Theories of Corporate Governance 
It has been repeatedly asserted that no one theory is adequate to clarify CG practices completely 
(Daily et al., 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Young and Thyil, 2008). As Tricker (2015, p. 
74) observes: "Corporate governance, as yet, does not have a single widely accepted theoretical 
base nor a commonly accepted paradigm". Mallin (2007) argues that the major theories that 
have affected the development of CG are agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory 
and institutional theory. While the focus of agency theory is the board’s monitoring function 
(Beasley et al., 2009), stakeholder theory focuses on the firm’s need to satisfy the legitimate 
expectations of its stakeholders to ensure competitive advantage and survival (Roy and Goll, 
2014). Stewardship theory sees directors and executives as stewards whose interests are aligned 
with those of the organisation and its owners (Burghausen and Balmer, 2015), while 
institutional theory addresses the symbolic role of governance structures (Beasley et al., 2009).  
 
As CG practices vary from country to country as result of social, economic, legal and political 
factors (Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017), careful consideration of the available theoretical 
perspectives was necessary to ensure that those adopted for the study were the most appropriate 
to the Libyan case. CG is still in the early stages of implementation in Libya (Iswaissi and 
Falahati, 2017) and practice is generally weak (Larbsh, 2010; Zagoub, 2016; Iswaissi and 
Falahati, 2017). Furthermore, most firms are state-owned and have a high ownership 
concentration (Abdou, 2015); concerns have been expressed at the level of Government 
intervention, particularly from the Central Bank of Libya, which extends to the appointment of 
board and AC members and even board chairmen. CG practice in Libya is thus operating within 
an environment that is very different from that in other countries. The following sections 
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discuss these four main theories in detail and explain which were selected as the most 
appropriate for the current study and why. 
 
3.4.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory has been utilised by thinkers and researchers in a range of disciplines including 
accounting, finance, economics, marketing, sociology and political science (Clark, 2004). In 
the accounting literature, it has been used extensively to explain and interpret accounting 
practices as a whole (Aldredge et al., 2017). Agency theory focuses on the relationship that 
arises between two parties when one (the principal) engages the other (the agent) to perform a 
service on their behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is often used to describe the relationship 
between an organisation’s owners and managers; the owners (the principals) give the managers 
(the agents) power to administer their interests and make decisions on their behalf. 
 
Agency theory posits that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between 
principals/shareholders and agents/managers; it assumes that company directors are usually 
more interested in exploiting the company for their own benefit than in maximising returns for 
shareholders (Lane et al., 1998; Davidson et al., 2004). The fact that managers and shareholders 
may have very different aims means that the latter must put strict oversight controls in place to 
ensure their interests are being protected; mechanisms such as the board and the AC are 
therefore designed to monitor managers and prevent opportunistic behaviour (Beasley et al., 
2009). 
 
Information disclosure is a key part of the agent’s duty towards the principals (Abdo et al., 
2017), and agency problems are most likely to arise where this information is shared 
asymmetrically (Hussainey and Hassanein, 2017). Poor monitoring of agents by principals can 
also lead to agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hoque, 2006). Moral risks may arise where 
the contract between agent and principal is weak and the agent is able to take an action that 
damages the principal’s interests (Clark, 2017). Jensen (1993) explains that moral risk is greater 
in companies whose size and complexity make oversight difficult, while Shapiro (2005) 
observes that agents’ behaviour is likely to be impacted by the availability of financial rewards, 
opportunities in the labour market and their connection with outside parties who have no 
concern for the interests of owners. Problems may also arise as a result of adverse selection, if 
shareholders hire agents who lack the skills to deliver the desired returns, either because they 
do not know enough about the candidates or because the contracting process is itself flawed 
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007). 
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The AC is one of several mechanisms designed to minimise conflicts of interest and their 
impact on organisations, and consequently principals, by allowing the latter to monitor 
management (Rezaee, 2009; Liao and Hsu, 2013). Pincus et al. (1989) found that agency costs 
are a significant factor in the establishment of ACs; Abed and Al-Najjar (2016) explain that 
they reduce agency costs by monitoring the activities of management and resolving the 
problems caused by information asymmetry (Bukit and Iskandar, 2009). McKnight and Weir 
(2009) also argue that CG mechanisms such as the AC reduce agency costs, while Henry (2010) 
concludes that internal governance and external shareholders both act as agency-mitigating 
mechanisms. Agency theory posits that the presence of outside directors on the board and the 
AC is crucial to protect the interests of stakeholders and reduce the potential for conflicts of 
interest, and that the experience and knowledge these directors bring strengthen the board’s 
monitoring function (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Klien, 2002; Yoo and Reed, 2015).  
 
The importance of ACs is acknowledged in the Libyan CG Code (2010), which requires all 
banks to establish such a committee to monitor managers and protect the interests of 
shareholders (CBL, 2010a). The provision is particularly important given that managers in 
state-owned companies with high ownership concentration (common in Libya’s banking 
sector) have little incentive to disclose information voluntarily (Rouf, 2011; Hawashe, 2016a), 
raising the risk of information asymmetry and agency problems (Hussainey and Hassanein, 
2017). ACs are intended to reduce the resulting agency costs by enhancing the quality of 
information flow between managers and shareholders and averting conflict (Samaha et al., 
2012). A lack of relevant research means that it is uncertain whether agency problems in the 
Libyan banking sector are the result of conflicts in the owner-manager relationship (Alrshah 
and Fadzil, 2013) or in the relationship between majority and minority shareholders (Abdou, 
2015) (majority shareholders are often able to use their voting rights to gain additional 
benefits). In either case, the implementation of CG mechanisms such as ACs may help 
minimise these conflicts and mitigate their impact (Alrshah and Fadzil, 2013; Elgharbawy et 
al., 2016). 
 
In general, the decision to adopt the agency view of the relationship between management and 
owners has implications for the methodological approach, from the choice of sector to the 
analytical techniques applied (Brennan et al., 2008).  
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3.4.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Like agency theory, stakeholder theory has been employed by thinkers and researchers across 
a range of disciplines, including business and accounting (Jamali, 2010). The stakeholder 
concept, for example, has been applied in a range of contexts, including studies on corporate 
social responsibility (Wang and Huang, 2006), business ethics and venture management 
(Butterfield et al., 2004). Suter et al. (2013) define stakeholders as any groups or individuals 
who can impact or be impacted by the achievement of the organisation’s goals, while Lewis 
(2011) defines stakeholders simply as individuals who have an interest in an organisation’s 
processes and/or outputs. Stakeholder theory acknowledges that companies can have an impact 
on a wide range of organisations and individuals – not just investors but also clients and 
suppliers of services and goods (Fowler et al., 2015). 
 
Unlike agency theory, which concentrates primarily on the relationship between owners 
(principals) and agents (managers), stakeholder theory is interested in a wider set of 
constituents (Mallin, 2010). Supporters of the stakeholder model highlight that organisations 
can only exist with input from a range of groups – they need the support of society as a whole, 
along with a benign business/political environment. Lenders, customers, workers, investors, 
auditors, the government and the community can all have financial, economic, social, 
technological and environmental impacts on the company (Clement, 2005). When making 
decisions, therefore, managers should aim to take into consideration all those individuals who 
have an interest in the company’s activities and who can impact or be impacted by its failure 
or success (Stovall et al., 2004). Stakeholder theorists do not just see companies as having an 
ethical obligation to do their best to satisfy the legitimate expectations of these various groups, 
they believe that by acknowledging the interests of all stakeholders, companies can improve 
profitability (Ayuso and Argandoña, 2009).  
 
Stakeholders have been categorised, by researchers and by organisations themselves, in various 
ways. For example, Hult et al. (2011) split stakeholders into two groups: primary stakeholders, 
upon whom the company relies directly for its survival and growth (e.g. employees, customers, 
shareholders, suppliers and regulators), and secondary stakeholders, who have no contractual 
relations with or legal authority over the company (e.g. competitors, special interest groups and 
trade associations) (Eesley and Lenox 2006). In contrast, Parent and Deephouse (2007) 
categorise stakeholders in terms of power, legitimacy and urgency, while Benson and Davidson 
(2010) argue that how a company classifies its stakeholders will depend on whether it is 
adopting the stakeholder model for strategic or moral reasons.  
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Various authors have attempted to explain the relationship between CG and stakeholders. 
Mattingly et al. (2009) conclude that stakeholder management is associated with good CG, 
earnings quality and low earnings management, while Mallin (2007) argues that stakeholders 
function like external managers and can have a major impact on monitoring mechanisms. The 
growing interest being shown by stakeholders in the structures of CG may be attributable to 
the collapse of companies like Enron; as Lee (1998) illustrates, this collapse did not just affect 
shareholders – all the company’s stakeholders suffered. This leads Alpaslan et al. (2009) to 
argue that such crises can be avoided as long as firms pay attention to the interests of and 
cultivate good relationships with all of their stakeholders.   
 
While supporters of agency theory dismiss the stakeholder approach on the grounds that it is 
impossible to balance all stakeholders’ interests (Sternberg, 1997; Hoque, 2006), particularly 
in state-owned firms (Heath and Norman, 2004; Mbo, 2017), supporters of stakeholder theory 
continue to press for all of these interests to be taken into account (Stovall et al., 2004). Both 
theories describe a scenario in which the management of the firm acts on behalf of others (Aras 
et al., 2017), but stakeholder theory underlines the significant responsibility managers have 
towards a wider group of constituents, not just shareholders. These constituents are all 
stakeholders, and the company has an obligation to safeguard their interests and meet their 
requirements as far as possible. The difficulty lies in how to create mechanisms that can 
properly distribute the company's residual returns to all of these stakeholders. 
 
3.4.3 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory differs from agency theory in that it starts from the premise that an 
organisation's managers are motivated to work in the best interests of the organisation. Albrecht 
et al. (2004) drew on psychology and sociology literature in their discussion of stewardship 
theory, explaining that the board and executives act as stewards, whose interests are aligned 
with those of the organisation and its owners (see also Burghausen and Balmer, 2015). They 
are therefore more likely to work in the interests of the company rather than in pursuit of selfish 
interests (Hernandez, 2012). As time passes, they are also more likely to come to view the 
company as an extension of themselves (Clarke, 2004).  
 
Stewardship theory sees a strong relationship between managers and the success of the firm, 
with stewards seeking to protect and maximise shareholder wealth by achieving and 
maintaining strong firm performance (Yusoff and Alhaji, 2012). Thus, the main difference 
between agency theory and stewardship theory is that while the former focuses on personal 
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interest, the latter focuses on protecting the interests of others (Hiebl, 2015). It has been 
suggested that extreme agents and extreme stewards represent the polarised ends of a shared 
continuum, which ranges from a complete focus on self-interest to a complete focus on the 
interests of others (Davis et al., 1997). However, Caers et al. (2006) explain the difference 
between stewardship theory and agency theory as being simply that stewardship theory does 
not rest on the assumption that the relationship between shareholders and managers will always 
be characterised by conflicts of interest. Rather than presenting the two theories as 
diametrically opposed, Caers et al. (2006) argue that stewardship theory should be seen as a 
modification of agency theory. 
 
Georgiou et al. (2012) argue that, in contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory does not 
regard the mechanisms of CG as being necessary to ensure good financial performance. For 
example, proponents of stewardship theory assert that CEO duality is a way of improving 
performance because it allows more effective and efficient decision making (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Cornelius (2005), meanwhile, sees CG as the responsibility of managers, whose 
role as stewards is to supervise and implement the aims and strategies of the firm. Unlike 
agency theory, which sees the role of the board of directors as being to monitor managers’ 
activities, stewardship theory sees it as being to lend support, give advice, and share experience 
and skills with the management (Glinkowska and Kaczmarek, 2015). Such arguments have led 
Hu and Alon (2014) to claim that although agency theory is the approach most often employed 
in governance literature, there is enough evidence to suggest that stewardship theory offers 
researchers a viable alternative. A note of caution is necessary, here, however. Critics of 
stewardship theory point to numerous corruption cases around the world as evidence that 
managers in state-owned firms in particular often act in their own, rather than the enterprise’s, 
best interests (Mbo, 2017). This is made easier by shareholders’ relative lack of involvement 
in the day-to-day business of the company (e.g. they play no part in the nomination of directors) 
and the lack of transparency (Nix and Chen, 2013). In Libya’s case, the high level of state 
ownership and ownership concentration in the Libyan banking sector (Abdou, 2015) rendered 
stewardship theory unsuitable for the study.  
 
3.4.4 Institutional Theory  
Institutional theory is one of the dominant perspectives within organisation and management 
theory (Greenwood et al., 2008); it has been widely utilised to assess the practical influence of 
CG codes (Solomon, 2013). Fiss (2008) explains that institutional theory is uniquely positioned 
to contribute to researchers’ knowledge of CG because of the insights it offers into the nature 
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of authority and control structures. For example, Beasley et al. (2009) argue that institutional 
theory confirms that governance structures are often primarily symbolic/ceremonial; their 
legitimacy is paramount, but the formal processes are only loosely coupled with true 
monitoring. The theory posits that many organisational structures, such as the AC, are 
established merely to conform to social expectations (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998; Cohen et al., 
2004). In fact, according to institutional theory, the board of directors’ two main roles are 
linkage and administration (Stedham and Beekun, 2000). In its linkage role, the board 
concentrates on establishing relations between the organisation and the external environment, 
while in its administrative role, it oversees the performance of top management, particularly 
the chief executive officer (CEO). 
 
Institutional theory suggests that the introduction of new CG codes will usually be met with 
resistance (Solomon, 2013). This resistance can result in “decoupling”, whereby the 
organisation appears to comply with the code but continues its internal practice with little or 
no genuine change in corporate behaviour. This highlights the need to address embedded social, 
historical and political factors which might impact on an organisation’s ability and willingness 
to embrace new regulations or practices (Cohen et al., 2007), and hence its approach to CG 
(Fiss, 2008). 
 
Institutional theory sees governance mechanisms as generally the products of either coercion 
by legislators looking to improve organisational effectiveness through the imposition of 
specific practices, or imitation (Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016). In the latter case, an organisation 
may adopt a system that has been applied successfully by other organisations as a way of 
enhancing its legitimacy (Cohen et al., 2007). Over time, this inter-organisational imitation 
may lead to the homogenisation of CG practice (Braiotta and Zhou, 2006; Lee, 2012). However, 
critics of institutional theory argue that this emphasis on imitation limits the theory’s ability to 
account for variation and change (Lee, 2012). 
 
There is a general consensus among researchers that institutional theory offers a useful lens for 
investigating the role and activities of ACs, particularly when used in conjunction with agency 
theory. Stedham and Beekun (2000) argue that the two theories are complementary and can 
together allow a deeper understanding of CG mechanisms, including ACs. Kalbers and Fogarty 
(1998), Beasley et al. (2009) and Yasser and Al Mamun (2016) all recommend using both 
theories as they allow for varying interpretations of the AC’s role; while agency theory sees 
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the AC as playing a practical monitoring role, institutional theory assumes that it may be more 
concerned with creating legitimacy. 
 
3.4.5 Theories Adopted in the Study 
The preceding sections show that no one particular theory can fully explain and interpret CG 
practice. All are more relevant to some environments than others, and these environments 
themselves differ from country to country (Mallin, 2007). As noted above, the high level of 
state ownership in the Libyan banking sector made stewardship theory inappropriate for the 
study (Abdou, 2015), as this theory assumes that managers in state-owned firms are more likely 
to act in their own rather than principals’ best interests (Mbo, 2017). The high level of state 
ownership and ownership concentration were also incompatible with stakeholder theory’s 
assumption that stakeholders are a diverse group with very divergent interests (Heath and 
Norman, 2004; Mbo, 2017). As agency theory is most closely related to the study’s research 
focus – the role of ACs in CG – it was adopted as the main theoretical lens. The review of the 
literature confirmed that the AC is regarded as a key mechanism for tackling the agency 
problem and preventing opportunistic management behaviour (Beasley et al., 2009). This is 
recognised in the Libyan CG Code (2010), which stipulates that all banks should set up an AC 
to assist the board of directors in monitoring managers and protecting the interests of 
shareholders. The fact that managers in state-owned companies with high ownership 
concentration (common in the Libyan banking sector) have little incentive to disclose 
information voluntarily (Rouf, 2011; Hawashe, 2016a), which significantly raises the risk of 
information asymmetry and agency problems (Hussainey and Hassanein, 2017). ACs are 
intended to reduce the resulting agency costs by improving the information flow between 
managers and shareholders and averting conflict. It is uncertain whether agency problems in 
Libya are the result of conflicts in the owner-manager relationship (Alrshah and Fadzil, 2013) 
or in the relationship between majority and minority shareholders (Abdou, 2015), but in either 
case, the implementation of CG mechanisms such as ACs is crucial to minimise these conflicts 
and mitigate their impact (Alrshah and Fadzil, 2013).   
However, an alternate view of ACs in Libya’s banking sector is that they may be primarily 
symbolic and intended only to demonstrate outward compliance with the Libyan CG Code 
(2010). In other words, they may be best understood through the lens of institutional theory. 
Accordingly, this study follows previous Libyan accounting studies (e.g. Abu-Azza, 2012; 
Alrshah and Fadzil, 2013; Shalba, 2016; Iswaissi and Falahati 2017) by using these theories 
and authors such as Kalbers and Fogarty (1998), Stedham and Beekun (2000), Beasley et al. 
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(2009) and Mulyadi (2018) by combining institutional theory and agency theory to investigate 
the role and activities of ACs in the Libyan banking sector. The theories were employed in 
tandem to describe and interpret the results, in the expectation that this would yield a deeper 
understanding of the role being played by these committees. 
 
3.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Supporters of agency theory assert that effective CG mechanisms are essential to protect the 
interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Dalwai et al. (2015) point out that it is 
necessary to understand what effect these mechanisms are having, and that they should be 
reviewed continuously to ensure that the interests of managers are aligned with those of other 
stakeholders. Wahba (2015) also argues that the mechanisms of CG should be assessed 
regularly. A wide range of CG mechanisms have been identified (Al-Baidhani, 2012) and 
broadly classified as either internal or external (Rezaee, 2007), but opinions vary on what 
should be in which category and the effectiveness of each mechanism.  
 
The implementation of CG is still at a very early stage in Libya (Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017); 
CG regulation remains inadequate and ineffective (Larbsh, 2010; Abdou, 2015; Iswaissi and 
Falahati, 2017), and the development of CG is being hindered by unprofessional boards and 
underperforming directors (Abdou, 2015). Other challenges include the weak legal system 
(Magrus, 2012), state interference in the board appointment process (Iswaissi and Falahati, 
2017), a general lack of knowledge about CG (Zagoub, 2016), lack of training among directors 
on governance systems (Larbsh, 2010), and the lack of accounting standards, which leads to 
low levels of disclosure (Kribat et al., 2013). Firms lack experience in and are concerned about 
the cost of implementing internal and external auditing systems (Abu-Azza, 2012; Magrus, 
2012). The Libyan CG Code (2010) seeks to address some of these issues by requiring banks 
to adopt a set of CG mechanisms, including the board of directors, board committees 
(particularly ACs), internal auditing, and disclosure and transparency. This section highlights 
the role played by these mechanisms and considers the factors that can impact upon their 
effectiveness. 
 
3.5.1 The Board of Directors   
The board of directors plays a significant role in the corporate governance process (Voß and 
Xia, 2009). The main task of the board is to ensure that the interests of the owners are protected 
(Yoo and Reed, 2015); Monks and Minow (2008) point out that the main premise of corporate 
governance is that it is the duty of the board of directors to ensure that all economic decisions 
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are in favour of the shareholders. Mallin (2007) suggests that the board protects shareholders’ 
interests by putting in place aims, strategies, plans and policies that will maximise the firm’s 
chances of success. As Volonté (2015) argues, prescriptive legislation serves both to stipulate 
the board’s responsibilities and to define public expectations regarding board performance. 
This legislation requires boards to protect shareholders’ interests by fulfilling two key tasks: 
monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Keay and Loughrey, 2015) and advising senior 
management (Bankewitz, 2017).  
 
The board of directors is the main governing body in a firm and one of its most significant 
decision-making groups. It plays a central role in the company’s most important strategic, 
investment and financing decisions and in the hiring, firing and assessment of top managers 
(Frijns et al., 2016; Brooks, 2016). It is the main monitoring and advisory body, plays a 
significant role in resource acquisition, and is responsible for resolving any conflicts of interest 
between directors and other stakeholders (Derbali and Ayeche, 2014). Al Daoud et al. (2015) 
describe the board of directors as a crucial mechanism of corporate governance that balances 
the interests of managers and other stakeholders of the firm.  
 
Given the central importance accorded to the board of directors in the CG literature, it is 
unsurprising that there has been extensive focus on the links between board size and 
composition, and performance. In terms of size, for example, Abidin et al. (2014) conclude that 
having a large board enhances the overall performance of the firm because it means that 
directors have a wider range of ideas, skills and experiences available to them. Albu et al. (2015) 
argue that this makes large boards better monitors and more efficient, and that their CG practice 
is likely to be more advanced and their level of disclosure higher. In terms of board composition, 
there is a particular focus in the CG literature on why firms should appoint non-executive 
directors (NEDs) and what effect this has on firm performance (Goergen, 2012). Agency theory 
proposes that the presence of outside directors on the board is crucial to protect the interests of 
stakeholders and that the experience and knowledge these directors bring strengthens the 
board’s monitoring function, ultimately leading to improved firm performance (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). This is echoed by Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012), who argue that 
boards with a higher proportion of independent directors are more effective at monitoring 
managers. Similarly, Yoo and Reed (2015) found that having a large proportion of outsiders 
on the board is a prerequisite for ensuring owners’ interests are protected – Volonté (2015) 
argues that outside directors are more likely to do this than inside directors. Derbali and Ayeche 
(2014) show that outside directors are more likely than inside directors to challenge decisions 
that have been made by management or the board, while Abidin et al. (2014) argue that 
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independent outside directors play a significant role in fostering long-term performance. Other 
authors argue that achieving the right balance of executive and non-executive directors reduces 
the likelihood that board decision making will be dominated by one individual or clique (El-
Faitouri, 2014; Yatim and Yusoff, 2014). Finally, Muravyev et al. (2014) point to the 
importance afforded to outside directors in numerous CG codes and stock exchange laws and 
regulations as evidence of their perceived value. 
 
Investigations into the causes of corporate collapse have focused particularly on the role played 
by the board (Popli and Popli, 2015), with a number concluding that boards bear a large share 
of the blame because they have failed to carry out their oversight function adequately and 
allowed corporate fraud and manipulation to go unchecked. Such findings have led Abidin et 
al. (2014) to call for CG guidelines regarding board structure and ownership configuration to 
be revised. 
 
Under Libyan law, the board is responsible for governing and directing the firm, which it does 
by formulating organisational plans, policies and objectives; overseeing the firm’s internal 
administrative and financial systems; determining the responsibilities of the management and 
their compensation; organising shareholder meetings; and presenting the annual report 
detailing the firm’s activities (Libyan Commercial Code, 1972; Libyan Banking Law, 2005; 
Libyan CG Code, 2010). In practice, however, boards in Libya have been criticised for failing 
to accept and implement internal audit recommendations (Abu-Azza, 2012) and for failing to 
train members in governance practices (Magrus, 2012). Shalba (2016) also points to the 
continuing influence of nepotism when it comes to board appointments, and to weaknesses in 
the legislation governing the way boards and their mechanisms function. Finally, he observes 
that concentrated ownership frequently affects board performance, with decisions being taken 
that prioritise the interests of major shareholders. 
 
3.5.2 Board Committees 
An important CG mechanism (Green and Homroy, 2018), board committees allow the board 
to delegate responsibility for specific tasks (Spira and Bender, 2004), thereby helping it carry 
out its duties more efficiently (Jiraporn et al., 2009). Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) argue that 
board committees help boards to achieve more effective decision making by dividing 
responsibilities and tasks among board members, thereby avoiding the coordination and 
communication difficulties/costs associated with bringing the full board together, especially if 
the board is large. Such is the perceived importance of these committees, Chen and Wu (2016) 
go so far as to argue that most board activity actually takes place in committee meetings, rather 
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than in board meetings. The Libyan CG Code (2010) also recognises their value in its 
stipulation that all banks in the Libyan banking sector should set up sub-committees to assist 
the board of directors in performing its tasks and responsibilities. These committees should 
include, at least, an AC, a risk management committee, an appointment and remuneration 
committee and a CG committee. 
 
3.5.3 Audit Committee 
Recent incidences of corruption and collapse have revealed weak control mechanisms at the 
heart of a number of major corporations. Fichtner (2010) suggests that the Enron collapse in 
particular led regulators and governments throughout the developed world to pay renewed 
attention to governance mechanisms, especially the AC. Similarly, Rustam et al. (2013) 
observe that in many countries, these scandals have resulted in the creation of CG guidelines 
(such as the USA’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the UK’s Combined Code (FRC, 2003)) 
which give a prominent role to ACs. The Smith Report (2003) placed particular emphasis on 
the importance of appointing an independent AC; as appreciation of their centrality to good 
CG has grown (Mangena and Pike, 2005; Salleh and Haat, 2014), there has been an increasing 
focus on promoting AC effectiveness (Vera-Munoz, 2005; Turley and Zaman, 2014).  
 
Song and Windram (2004), Rezaee (2009) and Liao and Hsu (2013) identify the role of the AC 
as being to ensure responsible CG, to review the firm's financial reporting and to provide a 
channel of communication between the board, external auditors and internal auditors in order 
to protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. As stated earlier, the Libyan CG 
Code (2010) made the establishment of ACs compulsory in Libyan companies. The code 
requires these committees to be made up of three NEDs with experience in accounting, auditing 
and banking. As the main focus of this research, the AC, its role and functions are discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four. 
 
3.5.4 Internal Audit 
Recent financial crises and corporate scandals have further highlighted the importance of the 
internal audit function (Eulerich et al., 2017). The main role of the internal audit is to provide 
independent assurance that risk management, governance and internal control processes are 
operating effectively (Tricker, 2015; Abbott et al., 2016). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
emphasises the importance of the internal audit, observing that the external auditor must be 
able to rely on its work. 
 
The primary purpose, nature and scope of internal auditing are set out by the Institute of Internal 
Auditing (IIA) (2017), which states that:  
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"Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an organisation’s operations. It 
helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes" (IIA, 2017).   
 
According to this view, the key responsibilities of the internal audit include the following: 
overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure process; monitoring the choice of accounting 
policies and principles; overseeing the hiring, performance and independence of the external 
auditors; overseeing regulatory compliance; monitoring the internal control process; and 
discussing risk management policies and practices with management (Jones, 2013). Ahmad et 
al. (2009) argue that the internal audit function can be enhanced by the presence of an AC, but 
in truth, the creation of an effective monitoring environment is heavily dependent on the 
relationship between these two entities (Marx and Voogt, 2010; Alzebana and Sawan, 2015). 
The UK Combined Code (FRC, 2012) acknowledges this relationship in its assertion that the 
AC should review and approve the internal audit function, while at the same time ensuring that 
it has the resources and access to information it needs to fulfil its mandate. In Libya, the 
importance of the internal audit function is highlighted in the CG Code (2010), which advises 
that in order to ensure the department’s independence, the board of directors should be guided 
by the AC and the appointment and remuneration committee whenever it appoints a new 
internal auditing director (CBL, 2010a). 
 
3.5.5 Disclosure and Transparency 
The OECD Principles (2004) hold up the disclosure process as one of the mechanisms of good 
CG (para V, p. 22): “The corporate governance should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company”. Accordingly, the subject 
of disclosure has received considerable attention from authors, a number of whom have given 
their own definitions. For example, Bushman et al. (2004, p. 207) define disclosure as "firms 
making available specific information to people outside publicly-traded firms", while Dubbink 
et al. (2008) define disclosure as the delivery of information allowing economic actors to access 
all information about a firm's condition and activities. 
 
As the financial information given in the annual report is some of the most important 
information that any company must disclose, a considerable number of studies have focused 
on this topic. Maheshwari and Maheshwari (2009) point out that one of the central accounting 
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principles is that the disclosure in annual reports should be full and fair. However, Archambault 
and Archambault (2003) found that the disclosure of financial information is a complex process 
which is impacted by a wide range of cultural, economic, political and financial factors, as well 
as by the firm’s own operating systems. 
With respect to transparency, Barth and Schipper (2008, p. 174) define financial reporting 
transparency as "the extent to which financial reports reveal an entity's underlying economics 
in a way that is readily understandable by those using the financial reports". Martin (2014) 
suggests that transparency requires governments, organisations, firms and individuals to be 
open and to disclose information about their plans, rules, processes, procedures and activities, 
so that their work is clear and comprehensible to stakeholders. This allows individuals outside 
the institution to monitor its activities, enhancing the organisation’s accountability and 
stakeholders’ participation. The literature suggests that a company’s commitment to 
transparency is indicated by the amount of accounting information it releases and the 
availability of this information (Bushman et al., 2004).  
A number of researchers see transparency as an important CG mechanism because it facilitates 
the safe transmission of information between management and investors and mitigates 
information asymmetry (Shiri et al., 2016). Solomon and Solomon (2004) show that in all 
countries of the world, an increase in corporate transparency is seen as a key indicator of CG 
reform. Summers and Nowicki (2006) argue that transparency is a series of actions that together 
create credible governance systems. Melendéz (2001) asserts that it enhances public trust and 
promotes good governance, while Ball (2009) simply states that it helps improve governance. 
 
Some authors differentiate between disclosure and transparency; Oliver (2004), for example, 
argues that there is a substantial difference between allowing others to obtain information 
(transparency) and providing it proactively (disclosure). However, this difference is often 
overlooked. Hood (2006) points out that many accounting dictionaries do not include entries 
for transparency, though they may have several entries for disclosure. Consequently, the two 
terms are often treated as synonyms. 
 
In recent years, inadequate disclosure and lack of transparency have helped to create conditions 
which have allowed unethical commercial transactions to take place unchecked. Too often, the 
result has been corporate failure (Kaur and Mishra, 2010). Both disclosure and transparency 
are evidently crucial to good CG (Louizi and Kammoun, 2016), and the AC can play a central 
role in enhancing them (Talha et al., 2009; Naveed et al., 2015). This is recognised in the UK 
Guidance on ACs (FRC, 2012), which recommends that the committee should review the 
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clarity and completeness of disclosure in the financial statements. The Libyan CG Code (2010) 
also identifies full disclosure as one of the pillars of good CG, but firms often fail to comply 
fully with disclosure requirements (Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017). This is mostly attributable to 
the lack of accounting standards (Kribat et al., 2013) and companies failing to submit financial 
statements on time (Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017). 
 
3.6 Summary  
The chapter discusses the mechanisms of corporate governance which are regarded as 
potentially the most effective. The effectiveness of these mechanisms may depend on the 
responsibilities and size of the board, the balance of executive and non-executive directors, the 
nature of the ownership structure, the level of disclosure and transparency and the influence 
and scope of the audit committee. Existing studies consider the board to be the main monitoring 
mechanism because it is responsible for elaborating the company’s aims, strategies, plans and 
policies and for ensuring that all decisions are made in favour of the shareholders and 
stakeholders. Institutional ownership is widely regarded as important in consolidating 
corporate governance and reducing agency costs, while greater disclosure and transparency are 
seen as leading to more reliable and responsible management, lower capital cost, more long-
term investment and therefore higher stock prices. Previous studies have seen audit committees 
as an effective mechanism for monitoring the integrity of financial reporting and the 
effectiveness of the internal and external audit, thus protecting the interests of shareholders and 
other stakeholders.  
 
The discussion has asserted that no one theory is adequate to clarify corporate governance 
practices completely. While agency theory posits that the mechanisms of corporate governance, 
including the AC, are necessary to protect the interests of shareholders and reduce agency costs, 
institutional theory sees the AC’s role as largely symbolic. This is the case in Libya, where the 
formation of an AC is public evidence of the bank’s compliance with the CG Code. 
Accordingly, the two theories will be combined in order to describe and interpret the results, 
in the expectation that this will yield a deeper understanding of the role being played by ACs 
in Libya's banking sector. The following chapter discusses the issues regarding the audit 
committee as a mechanism of corporate governance. 
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Chapter 4. Audit Committees 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the literature regarding the role of the audit committee 
(AC) as a mechanism of corporate governance and the factors affecting AC practice. The 
following paragraphs examine the various definitions of the AC, discuss the role of the 
committee (including reviewing and monitoring financial reporting, the internal audit function 
and the external audit process) and investigate the factors affecting its practice before finally 
setting out the conceptual framework of the study. 
 
4.2 Overview of the Development of the Audit Committee 
Financial scandals in developed countries such as the USA have highlighted the need for 
greater transparency and credibility in order to protect shareholders and stakeholders alike 
(Glaum et al., 2004; Fearnley and Beattie, 2004). It has been argued that ACs are a key 
mechanism for achieving this transparency and protecting shareholders’ interests (Mangena 
and Pike, 2005); Song and Windram (2004), Rezaee (2009) and Liao and Hsu (2013) identify 
the role of the AC as being to ensure responsible corporate governance by reviewing the firm’s 
financial reporting and providing a channel of communication between the board, external 
auditors and internal auditors. Such is their perceived importance, countries such as the UK, 
the USA and Canada issued legislation in the final decades of the twentieth century requiring 
listed companies to have an AC. The committee’s responsibilities and tasks were defined in a 
series of documents produced by a range of institutions (see section 1.1). 
 
However, this did not prevent major corporate collapses such as that of Enron in 2001 
(Fichtner, 2010), and, as Turley and Zaman (2014) note, recent years have seen a much greater 
emphasis being placed on AC effectiveness. Regulators and governments (particularly in the 
developed world) have refocused their attention on the AC and its role as the most prominent 
corporate governance mechanism (Fichtner, 2010) in publications such as the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002), the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2003) and the Smith Report (2003).  
 
4.3 The Concept of the Audit Committee 
The audit committee has been defined as: 
“A committee of directors of a corporation which represents the full board, 
serves as a channel of communication between the board, external auditors, 
internal auditors, finance directors and other directors” (Song and Windram, 
2004, p. 199). 
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Another definition also considers the AC in terms of its responsibilities and functions: 
“The Audit Committee is a committee composed of independent, non-
executive directors charged with oversight functions of ensuring responsible 
Corporate Governance, a reliable financial reporting process, an effective 
internal control structure, a credible audit function, an informed 
whistleblower complaint process and an appropriate code of business ethics 
with the purpose of creating long-term shareholder value while protecting the 
interests of other stakeholders” (Rezaee, 2009, p. 120). 
The two definitions share a number of common features. Firstly, they stipulate that the AC is 
a sub-committee of the board of directors. Secondly, they argue that the AC should consist of 
independent, non-executive directors so that it is able to protect the interests of shareholders 
and consider issues in an objective manner. Finally, the definitions suggest that the main aim 
of the AC is to monitor the integrity of the financial statements and reporting process.  
 
Audit committees are primarily intended to increase the credibility of financial statements for 
their shareholders and investors and review the internal control and risk management systems 
(FRC, 2012). Liao and Hsu. (2013) state that ACs play a major role in monitoring financial 
reporting of a company, while Vera-Munoz (2005) notes that interest in AC effectiveness has 
increased dramatically in past decades. Turley and Zaman (2014) argue that during recent years 
ACs have become a common corporate governance mechanism internationally. Woidtke and 
Yeh (2013, p. 5) argue that: 
“When controlling shareholders assign directors to the audit committees, they 
can potentially increase the credibility of the accounting earnings reports by 
choosing independent financial and legal experts, if the objectivity and 
professional backgrounds of these members are seen to contribute to high-
quality financial statements”. 
 
Salleh and Haat (2014) also argue that appointing non-executive directors to the AC helps boost 
the board’s ability to meet its legal responsibilities and ensure the credibility and integrity of 
financial statements and reports. Finally, the FRC (2012) points to the AC’s role in reviewing 
internal control and risk management systems. 
 
Putting these various definitions together, the following definition of the AC was arrived: 
 
“The AC is one of the key mechanisms of corporate governance; a board 
committee usually made up of independent and non-executive directors, it 
helps the board to carry out its responsibilities effectively by ensuring the 
integrity of financial statements and overseeing the internal audit function and 
external audit process”. 
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4.4 The Role of Audit Committees in Corporate Governance  
There is a range of views about the role of the AC, particularly in recent years: more attention 
has been paid to the role of Audit Committees across the world during the last two decades. 
The considerable number of studies have resulted in many views regarding this role (e.g. Alles 
et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2008; Tengamnuay and Stapleton, 2009; Fulop, 2014; Akinteye et al., 
2015). This study will address the main role of the Audit Committee as regards the monitoring 
of the integrity of the financial statements, the monitoring and reviewing of the effectiveness 
of the internal audit function, including the internal control systems, and the oversight of the 
work of the external auditor. 
 
4.4.1 The Role of Audit Committees in the Financial Statements 
An effective AC can promote reliability and credibility in the financial statements (Beasely et 
al., 2009; Abernathy et al., 2013) and contribute much to the financial reporting monitoring 
process (Lin et al., 2006). This is acknowledged in SOX (2002) and by the FRC (2012), which 
suggests that the AC should play a central role in financial reporting. It summarises the AC’s 
role in this regard as follows: 
 
1. The AC should review, and report to the board on, the significant financial reporting issues 
and judgements made in connection with the preparation of the company’s financial 
statements interim reports, preliminary announcements and related formal statements. 
 
 
2. The AC should consider significant accounting policies, any changes to them and any 
significant estimates and judgements. The management should inform the AC of the methods 
used to account for significant or unusual transactions where the accounting treatment is 
open to different approaches.  
 
3. When the AC is not satisfied with any aspect of the proposed financial reporting by the 
company, it shall report its views to the board. 
 
4. The AC should review related information presented with the financial statements, including 
the business review, and corporate governance statements relating to the audit and to risk 
management.  
 
5. The AC should review the content of the annual report and accounts and advise the board on 
whether, taken as a whole, it is fair, balanced and understandable and provides the 
information necessary for shareholders to assess the company’s performance, business 
model and strategy. 
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Several writers have focused on the importance of the AC in preventing fraud and errors in the 
financial statements; Beasley et al. (2000), for example, state that companies investigated for 
financial statement fraud are less likely to have an AC, while Xie et al. (2003) argue that ACs 
play a significant role in preventing (or revealing) any irregularities in the financial reporting 
process. Goodwin and Seow (2002) also conclude that ACs have an impact on the detection of 
management fraud and errors in financial statements. They add that companies that have an 
effective AC seem to have a greater ability to avoid financial statement misstatements and to 
uncover fraud. No one has yet explored the role ACs in Libya play in monitoring financial 
statements in the Libyan banking sector, or how they perform this role. This was therefore one 
of the areas investigated in this study. 
 
4.4.2 The Role of Audit Committees in the Internal Audit Function  
The AC and internal audit are both designed to improve financial transparency and protect 
shareholders’ interests (Khelil et al., 2016). The relationship between these two CG 
mechanisms largely determines the effectiveness of the firm’s monitoring and risk management 
(Marx and Voogt, 2010; Alzebana and Sawan, 2015); as Cohen et al. (2004) explain, where the 
two are closely linked, the governance capabilities of both parties are enhanced. The IIA (2002) 
also points out that a strong functioning relationship between those responsible for the internal 
audit and the AC is necessary for each to perform its responsibilities.  
 
Those involved in the internal audit see the AC as giving greater significance to their activities 
(Turley and Zaman, 2007) and as promoting their independence (Ahmad et al., 2009) by 
insisting that 1) internal audit reports are submitted directly to the AC rather than top 
management (Tricker, 2015), and 2) the committee, rather than managers, recommends the 
appointment or replacement of the chief internal auditor (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001). Finally, the 
committee can enhance the function of the internal audit by acting as an independent forum for 
internal auditors to raise issues regarding the management of the company (Goodwin and Yeo, 
2001). For its part, the AC relies on the internal audit department for access to information on 
financial and operating matters within the organisation (Oxner and Oxner, 2006). Often called 
the “eyes and ears” of the AC, the internal audit is able to assist the committee in a number of 
ways, such as recommending external auditors, negotiating their fees and then evaluating their 
work (Saint, 2013; Eller, 2014).  
 
The AC also plays a significant role in the implementation, monitoring and verification of 
internal control procedures (Klein, 2003; Rich and Zhang, 2014; Bardhan et al., 2015). This 
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may include working with internal and external auditors to remediate any material weaknesses 
in the internal control systems (Goh, 2009).  
 
This study aims to extend the literature by demonstrating the major role ACs play in monitoring 
the internal audit function in the Libyan context. 
 
4.4.3 The Role of Audit Committees in the Work of the External Audit 
Numerous regulators and researchers recommend that the AC should have a role in the 
organisation of the work of the external audit. This role should include monitoring the 
independence, effectiveness and objectivity of external auditors (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; 
Smith Report, 2003) and making recommendations to the board in relation to the appointment 
and removal of external auditors (Beasley et al., 2009; Rezaee, 2009; Bédard and Compernolle, 
2014). The Smith Report (2003) recommends that UK ACs should review the letter of 
appointment of the external auditor, the scope of the audit and the adequacy of the planning 
process. At the end of the audit, the committee should review the results of the audit, the 
management representation letter, the report submitted by the auditor to management, and then 
the response of management to the results and recommendations of the auditor.  
 
The AC is responsible for overseeing the company’s relationship with the external auditor. It 
should ensure that a proper relationship exists between the external auditor and the management 
whose financial reporting is being audited (Alrshah and Fadzil, 2013), and help resolve any 
disputes between the two sides. This all helps to ensure the quality of the external audit and 
strengthen confidence in the final report (Bédard and Compernolle, 2014). Carcello and Neal 
(2003) suggest that an independent AC functions as a monitoring tool, and that it can stop 
managers terminating the services of auditors who want to issue a going-concern report to the 
company. Abbott and Parker (2000) point out that companies that have independent ACs are 
more likely to choose external auditors who are industry specialists. This may indicate that 
these committees want to boost the quality of their financial statements. 
 
Most researchers conclude that ACs play a significant role in promoting the independence, 
effectiveness and objectivity of the external audit process, but there are some who question the 
degree of impact they have in practice. For instance, Cohen et al. (2002) found that the AC 
plays a less significant role in the process of the external audit than top management or the 
board, while Bédard and Compernolle (2014) argue that managers still tend to drive the 
relationship with external auditors, and that ACs have little power to protect these auditors’ 
independence. Cohen et al. (2002) attribute this weakness to the facts that most committees’ 
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remit is limited to monitoring the financial reporting process, and that committee members 
generally lack the financial expertise to carry out their tasks properly.  
 
There has been little empirical investigation of the role played by CG mechanisms, including 
ACs in Libya's banking sector (Zagoub, 2016). Accordingly, this study seeks to add to the 
literature by identifying how much of a role ACs are able to play in the external audit process 
in the sector, given that CG is still in the early stages of implementation. 
 
4.5 Factors Affecting Audit Committee Practice 
The AC’s ability to perform its responsibilities and duties is impacted by a number of factors, 
which may be either enabling or inhibiting in their effect. Numerous studies have investigated 
the factors affecting AC effectiveness in developed countries (e.g. DeZoort et al., 2002: Benkel 
et al., 2006; Braswell et al., 2012; Baxter, 2010; Salleh and Steward, 2012), and a few have 
done the same for developing countries (e.g. Saat et al., 2012; Modum et al., 2013; Mbobo and 
Nweze, 2015; Qasim 2018), but no one has yet attempted to investigate the factors affecting 
AC practice in Libya. This section discusses the main enabling and inhibiting factors identified 
in the literature and considers the extent to which their impact in the Libyan environment is 
understood. 
 
4.5.1 Enabling Factors 
Significant attention has been paid in the literature to AC characteristics such as independence, 
financial expertise, size, meetings, authority, resources (particularly their access to information) 
and diligence, and how these enable the committee’s effectiveness. 
 
4.5.1.1 Audit Committee Independence 
A recurring theme in the literature is the importance of AC independence, which is seen as vital 
if the committee is to be able to perform its duty (Collier and Zaman, 2005). Most researchers 
and institutions recommend that the AC should be made up of non-executive and independent 
directors. The BRC (1999) recommends the exclusion of former and current employees, 
relatives of the administration and individuals receiving compensation from the firm (excluding 
directors' fees); in other words, AC members should not be receiving any consultancy, advisory 
or other fee from the company or be affiliated to it in any way. This is echoed in the Cadbury 
Report (1992), which suggests that NEDs should have no business or other relationship with 
the company which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgement. 
Keay (2015) underlines this when he points out that NEDs appointed for reasons of nepotism, 
business connections or reputation in the community are severely hindered in their 
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independence and ability to supervise. Finally, the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 
2014) stipulates that all members of the AC must be independent. 
 
The emphasis on director independence is not surprising, given the key role this plays in 
improving the quality of management monitoring (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012) and 
preventing (or revealing) any irregularities in the financial reporting process (Xie et al., 2003). 
Empirical studies have shown that independent ACs make the best contribution to financial 
reporting (Lin et al., 2006) and that they offer more credible judgements on the firm’s financial 
decisions (Bedard et al., 2004). They are also more likely to appoint external auditors who are 
industry specialists (Abbott and Parker, 2000). Having independent directors in the AC reduces 
the potential for conflicts of interest and opportunistic earnings management (e.g. Klien, 2002). 
Benkel et al. (2006) studied a sample of 666 Australian firms and found that the incidence of 
aggressive earnings management was reduced in companies with an independent AC, while 
Davidson et al. (2005) identified similar findings with a cross-sectional sample of 434 listed 
Australian corporates. Similarly, Xie et al. (2003) and Kao and Chen (2004) reveal a negative 
relationship between independent managers and earnings management.  
 
ACs are expected to strengthen the links between governance mechanisms within the 
corporation and between the corporation and external governance mechanisms (Rezaee, 2009); 
their independence is crucial to their ability to perform these functions effectively. Wolnizer 
(1995) argues that ACs support the relationship between the external auditor and the internal 
audit function, while Rainsbury et al. (2008) see them as supporting the relationship between 
management and the external auditor, both in normal times and at times of conflict. In all cases, 
independent ACs are seen as being better able to deal with issues in an objective and unbiased 
way and to balance the interests of managers and other stakeholders (Hasan and Xie, 2013). 
 
Research conducted in developing countries has also underlined the importance of committee 
independence; Qasim (2018), for example, found the independence of AC members to be the 
single most important factor enhancing committee effectiveness in UAE companies. The 
Libyan CG Code (2010) seeks to enhance AC independence by stipulating that at least two 
committee members should be independent directors who have no commercial relationship 
with the bank or any related institution, and who have held no executive management position 
in the bank for at least three years. However, in Libya, lack of research means that it is uncertain 
whether banks are complying with these requirements in practice.  An investigation is therefore 
required to identify whether this factor is enabling AC effectiveness. 
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4.5.1.2 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
A significant number of studies focus on the link between the level of financial expertise of 
AC members (that is, their ability to read and understand financial communications) and 
committee effectiveness (Ho et al., 2014). Some argue that at least some AC members must 
possess financial expertise if the committee is to be able to properly perform its duties; Salleh 
and Steward (2012), for example, identify AC members’ accounting and business expertise as 
two of the central factors that contribute to enhancing the committee’s effectiveness. This is 
also the view of SOX (2002), which states that it is generally desirable for at least some 
members of the AC to have financial accounting knowledge, and the UK’s Combined Code, 
which stipulates that listed companies should have at least one independent NED on the board 
with financial experience (FRC, 2003). The Smith Report (2003), meanwhile, says that the AC 
should consist of at least three independent NEDs, one of whom should have significant, recent 
and relevant financial experience.  
Among those researchers demonstrating the value of relevant expertise among AC members, 
McDaniel et al. (2002) conclude that these individuals are better able to judge the quality of 
financial reporting than their unskilled counterparts, while DeZoort (1998) argues that they 
make better estimations of internal controls. Krishnan and Lee (2009) argue that corporations 
most at risk from major lawsuits are particularly likely to appoint accounting and financial 
experts to their ACs. Lee et al. (2004) found that independent ACs with a higher standard of 
financial expertise are more likely to make an effort to work with the external auditor, while 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) conclude that committee members with more financial expertise 
are more likely to support the external auditor in conflicts with the management. On the other 
hand, Chen et al. (2005) argue that the level of financial expertise in the AC has no effect on 
the selection of specialist external auditors, and Carcello and Neal (2003) found no significant 
association between the level of financial expertise on the AC and the probability of an external 
auditor being called in following a going concern report.  
In Libya, the CG code (2010) states that at least one member of the AC must have expertise in 
financial disclosure, accounting and auditing, but again, lack of research means that it is 
uncertain whether banks are complying with this requirement. Nor is it clear to what extent this 
factor, when present, impacts on AC effectiveness in the sector.  
4.5.1.3 Audit Committee Size 
Much AC literature focuses on the size of the committee, generally measured as the number of 
committee members (Pucheta-Martínez et al., 2014). Utama and Leonardo (2014) suggest that 
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the AC should consist of at least three independent members, one of whom should chair the 
committee. This is echoed by the BRC (1999) and the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2014), both 
of which recommend a minimum of three members. The Libyan CG Code (2010), meanwhile, 
requires at least four members. 
 
Size is significant because as Albring et al. (2014) point out, it is widely used as a measure of 
effectiveness. Its influence has been investigated by a number of researchers, with varying 
results. Zaman et al. (2011) point to a positive link between committee size and non-audit 
service fees, suggesting that even when the AC is large, corporations continue to buy in non-
audit services. In their survey of 500 firms, Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) found that AC size 
was positively associated with audit fee levels. However, while Kent et al. (2010) and Soliman 
and Ragab (2014) found a significant negative association between the size of the committee 
and the management of earnings, Bedard et al. (2004) found no significant relationship between 
AC size and aggressive earnings management in a sample of 300 US companies. 
 
Other studies also offer apparently contradictory results. For example, while Mangena and Pike 
(2005) found no significant relationship between AC size and the level of interim disclosure in 
their sample of 262 UK listed companies, Kent and Stewart (2008) found a negative association 
with the level of disclosure in a sample of 965 firms listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange. Abbott et al.  (2004), using a small sample of 41 firms and financial restatements, 
found that the size of the AC had no significant impact on the quality of financial reporting. 
On the other hand, Pucheta‐Martínez and De Fuentes (2007) conclude that this variable 
significantly affects a company’s chances of obtaining a qualified audit report.  
 
These mixed results may suggest that committee size affects different aspects of AC 
performance in different ways. The general expectation is that the committee's effectiveness is 
enhanced by expanding the membership, but lack of research means that it is not clear whether 
the Libyan CG Code’s (2010) four-member minimum is sufficient for ACs in the Libyan 
banking sector to carry out their duties and responsibilities effectively.  
 
4.5.1.4 Audit Committee Meetings  
Smith (2003) describes formal meetings as being at the heart of the AC’s work. Regulatory 
bodies such as the Treadway Commission (1987) and the BRC (1999) suggest that regular 
meetings improve communication between AC members and internal and external auditors and 
make the committee more effective. However, opinions vary on the optimal meeting frequency; 
Burke et al. (2008) explain that committees generally meet between two and four times per 
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year, depending on the size and activities of the company (additional meetings may be 
convened as necessary), but Yang and Krishnan (2005) argue that to be effective in its 
monitoring function, the committee needs to meet at least four times per year. Ebrahim (2007) 
and Ali (2014) found that increasing meeting frequency results in the AC playing a more active 
and effective monitoring role, and Sharma et al. (2009) also assert that meeting frequency is a 
significant indicator of AC effectiveness. However, others argue that multiple meetings may 
actually be a sign that the committee is trying to prevent financial reporting failure (Hogan et 
al., 2014), or, if these failures still occur, that it is ineffective. Neither Soliman and Ragab (2014) 
nor Baxter and Cotter (2009) found any positive association between meeting frequency and 
financial reporting quality, and while Xie et al. (2003) and Lin and Hwang (2010) found a 
significant negative association between the number of meetings and earnings management, 
Davidson et al. (2005) found the relationship between these two variables to be insignificant.  
As far as the Libyan environment is concerned, the CG Code (2010) stipulates that the AC 
must meet at least once every three months (or whenever needed), at the invitation of its 
chairman, but investigation is required to determine whether this stipulation is enhancing AC 
effectiveness in practice.   
 
4.5.1.5 Audit Committee Authority 
The AC derives its authority from the board of directors and the law, but not all ACs fully 
understand their responsibilities or remit (DeZoort et al., 2002). Consequently, numerous 
bodies have offered guidance to assist ACs in understanding these responsibilities (e.g. Cadbury 
Committee, 1992; Treadway Commission, 1987; SOX, 2002; Combined Code, 2003). The 
committee’s authority is central to its ability to monitor the financial reporting process and 
therefore a key determinant of its effectiveness (Rittenberg and Schweiger, 2007; Mbobo and 
Nweze, 2015), but its influence also depends on the strength of its relationships with external 
and internal auditors, managers and the board as a whole (DeZoort et al., 2002).  
 
In Libya, the CG Code (2010) states that all board committees, including the AC, must be given 
adequate authority and powers to carry out their tasks properly. This study aims to investigate 
whether this provision is indeed enabling the effectiveness of ACs in Libya’s banking sector.  
 
4.5.1.6 Resources of the Audit Committee (Access to Information) 
Steinberg and Bromilow (2011) argue that the AC needs significant resources to perform the 
full range of its responsibilities effectively, but there is as yet little empirical evidence in the 
literature that AC resources are an indicator of AC effectiveness (Contessotto and Moroney, 
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2014). According to DeZoort et al. (2002), the AC needs sufficient committee members to 
perform the functions and duties assigned to it, and full access to internal and external auditors, 
managers, the full board and legal counsel, upon whom it relies for information and specialist 
expertise. The Libyan CG Code (2010) recognises the importance of information resources in 
its stipulation that ACs must have full access to internal and external auditors and executive 
managers, but the practical effect of this factor on AC effectiveness in the Libyan banking sector 
requires investigation.  
 
4.5.1.7 Audit Committee Diligence 
Hornby (2010, p. 407) defines diligence as being careful and thorough in one’s work or efforts. 
The diligence of AC members is crucial in ensuring that the committee performs its 
responsibilities effectively and with integrity (Sharma et al., 2009). Previous studies have 
highlighted the positive link between AC diligence and committee effectiveness (e.g. Elijah and 
Ayemere, 2015) and between AC diligence and improved CG practice in general (Thiruvadi, 
2012), with specific associations being demonstrated between committee diligence and 
characteristics such as financial expertise (Braswell et al., 2012). However, most of these 
studies were conducted in developed countries, and it is as yet unclear whether this factor has 
a similar effect in developing countries such as Libya.  
 
4.5.2 Inhibiting Factors 
The literature pays considerable attention to the internal and external factors that inhibit AC 
practice. Internal factors include weak board governance, a lack of clear legal requirements 
governing the AC’s responsibilities and obligations, poorly qualified or inexperienced 
committee members, and inadequate compensation. External factors such as the legal and 
regulatory environment, the accounting environment and government intervention are likely to 
affect the organisation as a whole and by extension its CG and AC. These factors are discussed 
in the following sections. 
 
4.5.2.1 Weak Board Governance  
The quality of the information produced in the financial reporting process and the monitoring 
practices of the AC are influenced by the strength of board governance as a whole. Beasley and 
Salterio (2001) emphasise that the board has a significant impact on the quality of the AC, 
particularly its independence and knowledge, as it appoints the committee’s members. They 
argue that strong, independent boards, those with an independent chairman, and larger boards 
are more likely to select a higher quality AC. In contrast, Modum et al. (2013) found that, in 
Nigerian companies, which tend to have weak board governance, board control over the 
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appointment process has impacted adversely on the functioning of ACs and left them unable to 
improve CG. Other governance characteristics such as the meeting frequency of the board may 
also impact the degree to which ACs will be committed to their oversight responsibilities 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Braswell et al., 2012); Karim et al. (2016) 
argue that in an environment with weak governance, the AC’s monitoring efforts will be 
similarly weak.  
 
In terms of Libya specifically, Larbsh (2010) points to the continuing lack of independence of 
boards and their committees. Given that strong board governance is more likely to encourage 
effective AC practice, this does not bode well for ACs in the Libyan banking sector. This study 
seeks to explore how far this factor inhibits AC performance in the sector. 
 
4.5.2.2 Lack of Clear Legal Requirements Governing the AC’s Responsibilities 
Given the importance of the AC as a mechanism of CG, regulations need to be put in place to 
ensure that it performs its responsibilities fully. The need for outside controls is underlined by 
Lin et al. (2008), who argue that ACs in Chinese listed companies are unlikely to be effective 
unless stringent obligations are imposed on them by competent authorities. SOX (2002) simply 
requires AC members to fully understand their obligation to improve CG and prevent financial 
fraud; at company level, Saad et al. (2006) argue for clear, practical and flexible terms of 
reference and responsibilities, deliberated on and accepted by the board of directors and re-
evaluated periodically. In the Nigerian banking sector, the scope of the committee’s 
responsibilities and how it performs these responsibilities are set out in a formal written charter 
(Mbobo and Nweze, 2015). In Libya, meanwhile, the CG Code (2010) stipulates that 
regulations must be produced for each board committee, taking into account the bank's 
governance policies and procedures. If these regulations are absent, the responsibilities and 
duties of the AC may be ill-defined, potentially compromising its legitimacy and undermining 
its ability to perform its role. Investigation is therefore required to determine whether ACs in 
the Libyan banking sector are being given this regulatory guidance, and if not, whether this is 
inhibiting their effectiveness.  
 
4.5.2.3 Poorly Qualified and Inexperienced Members 
Previous studies have found a positive link between the competence (i.e. qualifications and 
experience) of AC members and committee effectiveness (Bedard and Gendron, 2010). A 
number of writers have observed that the majority of members of the audit committees suffer 
from a lack of experience in the process of examining financial statements and auditing, as well 
as poor qualifications (e.g. Zhang, 2002; Lin et al., 2008). In Libya, the tendency of boards to 
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prioritise personal relationships and family ties over academic qualifications and experience 
during the appointment process (Larbsh, 2010) means that too many AC members lack the 
specialist knowledge to carry out their tasks effectively. It is reasonable to assume that this 
collective lack of qualifications and experience is inhibiting the ability of these committees to 
play a full role. 
 
4.5.2.4 Inadequate Audit Committee Compensation 
A number of studies investigate the impact of inadequate compensation; Engel et al. (2010), for 
example, found that it has an adverse effect on the quality of the AC’s financial monitoring. 
Campbell et al. (2013) suggest that the level of compensation paid to AC members can affect 
both the independence and the effectiveness of the committee. Malik (2014) echoes this view, 
suggesting that future studies should investigate the interaction between different forms of 
compensation and AC attributes such as independence and expertise.  
 
The Libyan CG Code (2010) stipulates that members of the board and its sub-committees 
should be compensated, but it is unclear whether this is happening in practice. Larbsh (2010) 
found that low compensation is perceived as having a negative effect on the development of 
CG in Libya, but there has been no investigation of the impact of this factor on AC effectiveness 
in the Libyan banking sector. It seems likely, however, that AC members will be more inclined 
to carry out their duties attentively if they feel they are being fairly recompensed.  
 
4.5.2.5 Weak Legal and Regulatory Environment  
The OECD (2004) recognises the significance of the prevailing legal, regulatory and 
institutional environment in shaping and supporting the CG framework. Fundamentally, the 
legal system underpins this framework by determining the responsibilities of stakeholders and 
enabling the enforcement of their rights (Larbsh, 2010). In a number of developing countries, 
however, slow and ineffective legal systems mean that investors in these countries seldom go 
to court to resolve problems (Nganga et al., 2003). In the case of Libya, an outdated legal system 
and inconsistent enforcement do little to inspire confidence in investors (Larbsh, 2010; Faraj 
and El-Firjani, 2014). Shalba (2016) argues that the legal system is adversely affecting 
governance in Libya by failing to define the board’s responsibilities in law, while Iswaissi and 
Falahati (2017) argue that CG regulation in Libya's banking sector is inadequate. This has 
implications for AC practice, but lack of research means that the nature of this impact is not 
fully understood. The evidence so far suggests that weaknesses in the legal and regulatory 
environment inhibit CG, and particularly AC practice, in the Libyan banking sector. 
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4.5.2.6 Weak Accounting Environment 
Despite the creation of the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association and foreign firms 
bringing UK and US accounting standards into Libya (El-Firjani et al., 2014), accounting 
professionals in the country still lack expertise in accounting, auditing and financial reporting 
(Zakari and Menacere, 2012; Alfatiemy, 2013; Maatoug, 2014). El-Firjani et al. (2014) argue 
that the accounting profession has failed to achieve its objective of developing accounting 
practices. Zakari and Menacere (2012), meanwhile, refer to the general weakness of the external 
audit function, particularly as regards the collection of audit evidence. Part of the problem is 
that accounting education in Libya still follows a traditional, now outdated, curriculum, but the 
sector lacks the qualified academics and researchers it needs to update it. There are also no 
Libyan accounting and auditing standards. This leads Hamuda and Sawan (2014) to recommend 
the adoption of international auditing and accounting standards.  
 
The accounting and auditing profession does not enjoy high status in Libya, mostly due to the 
perceived weakness of the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association (Masoud, 2017). This 
state of affairs is unlikely to change without a thorough overhaul of the profession’s regulatory 
systems to bring them into line with those in developed countries. At the moment, low standards 
within the profession lead to too many serious errors, and even to ACs being given false 
information. This not only undermines the credibility of the accounting and auditing profession 
but also that of ACs, organisations and the CG concept itself. In light of these concerns, it is 
important to investigate the extent to which the weak accounting environment is seen as 
impacting AC effectiveness.  
 
4.5.2.7 Government Intervention 
Politics may impact on CG arrangements; Roe (2003, p. iii) asserts that "politics can press 
managers to stabilise employment, to forego some profit-maximising risks with the firm, and 
to use up capital in place rather than to downsize when markets are no longer aligned with the 
firm’s production capabilities". In terms of government intervention specifically, Wu and Patel 
(2015) point out that government intervention exists in CG and accounting because of the 
political structure and the controlling shareholder situation of the government in numerous 
restructured state-owned corporations. Pučko (2005) argues that government involvement in 
governance systems means that governments are becoming one of the main stakeholders of 
companies, such as when they intervene radically in the practice of profit sharing. Larbsh (2010) 
asserts that a governance system which is based on the law might not be effective in developing 
countries where political intervention and social connections have a significant effect on the 
practice of governance. 
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It has been argued that the Libyan Government has been half-hearted in its attempts to reform 
governance because, as the largest shareholder in most major firms and institutions, it has the 
most to gain from the status quo – it controls the economy at the expense of other shareholders 
(Abdou, 2015). Both Larbsh (2010) and Iswaissi and Falahati (2017) found that political 
intervention affects CG in Libya, for example through the Central Bank of Libya’s involvement 
in the appointment of board members (Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017). This has a knock-on effect 
on the selection of AC and other committee members and, in turn, the decision making and 
performance of these entities. This study seeks to investigate how far this intervention inhibits 
AC performance in the Libyan banking sector. 
 
4.6 Conceptual Framework  
Effective CG practice is rare in developing countries (Ans, 2015). Boubakri et al. (2005) argue 
that many of these countries lack an established institutional framework for effective CG, while 
Leuz et al. (2003) conclude that in countries with weak economies, investors have few rights 
and regulation is not enforced. This is the case in Libya, which is still in the early stages of 
implementing CG (Iswaissi and Falahati 2017). As a result, regulation is still inadequate in 
Libyan firms, and practice is generally weak (Larbsh, 2010; Magrus, 2012; Zagoub, 2016). 
Libyan ACs thus operate within an environment that is very different from that in developed 
countries, though it is as yet unclear how far this environment impacts on the practice and 
effectiveness of these committees in Libya’s banking sector (Zagoub, 2016).  
 
From a conceptual perspective, it is imperative to explore the current role of AC practice in 
Libyan banks, and then to investigate the impact of any obstacles on this practice, so that action 
can be taken to improve AC effectiveness. Burke et al. (2008) argue that the main objectives 
when gathering information on AC performance are firstly, to assess this performance against 
the duties, responsibilities and activities set out in the charter, and secondly, to identify where 
it should be by comparing it with leading best practice. The goal is to identify what resources 
are needed for the committee to achieve its objectives and execute its functions and to discover 
any obstacles blocking its improvement. This is therefore the aim of this study. 
 
The literature review indicates that researchers have approached the AC’s role from a number 
of angles. Many have highlighted potential enabling factors (e.g. DeZoort et al., 2002; Braswell 
et al., 2012); a number of studies, particularly in developed countries, have focused on the 
impact primary characteristics such as independence, financial expertise, size and meeting 
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frequency have on AC practice (e.g. Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Carcello and Neal, 2003). 
DeZoort et al. (2002) identify authority, access to information and diligence as additional 
factors that contribute positively to AC performance. Others have focused on the impact of 
inhibiting factors such as weak board governance, the lack of clear legal requirements 
governing AC responsibilities and obligations, the lack of requirement for AC members to be 
qualified or experienced, inadequate AC compensation, the legal and regulatory environment, 
the accounting environment and government intervention (e.g. Lin et al., 2008; Fernando, 2009; 
Modum et al., 2013; Wu and Patel, 2015; Shalba, 2016).  
 
Figure 4.1 presents the conceptual framework for the study. As a board sub-committee, the AC 
in a Libyan bank performs a number of main responsibilities and roles that are delegated to it 
by the board of directors, in line with the CG Code (2010). These roles are: reviewing the 
financial statements, reviewing and supervising the internal audit function and the internal 
control system and monitoring the work of external auditors. The model shows that the AC’s 
effectiveness in these roles and responsibilities may be affected by a number of enabling and 
inhibiting factors. The enabling factors include: authority, access to information, diligence, 
independence, financial expertise, meetings and size. The inhibiting factors include: weak 
board governance, the lack of clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities and 
obligations, the lack of a requirement for AC members to be qualified or experienced, 
inadequate compensation, the weak legal and regulatory environment, the weak accounting 
environment and government intervention. The framework demonstrates that the enabling 
factors enhance the effectiveness of the AC by reducing agency conflicts and creating external 
legitimacy (as suggested by institutional theory). This helps the AC achieve its ultimate 
objective of improving CG in the bank. By contrast, the inhibiting factors adversely affect AC 
performance and prevent it from achieving this objective. 
 
The conceptual framework provides the means to explore the current practice of ACs in Libya’s 
banking sector from different perspectives. It demonstrates the factors that impact on their 
effectiveness, and then identifies actions to enhance this effectiveness in this sector. 
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Figure 4.1 Diagram of the Conceptual Framework for the Current Study 
 
 
 
4.7 Summary and Gap in the Literature 
The review of the literature indicates that significant attention has been paid to ACs as a key 
mechanism within the CG process (Mangena and Pike, 2005), especially in recent years. Turley 
and Zaman (2014) and Fichtner (2010) among others note the role of recent corporate collapses 
and scandals in refocusing regulator and government attention in the developed world on ACs, 
with the result that many of these countries have created CG guidelines in which these 
committees are given a prominent role (Rustam et al., 2013). These guidelines have generally 
identified the roles of the AC as being to ensure responsible CG, to review the firm’s financial 
reporting and to provide a channel of communication between the board, external auditors and 
internal auditors (e.g. Rezaee, 2009; Liao and Hsu, 2013). 
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From investigations into the AC’s roles and responsibilities (e.g. Keune and Johnstone, 2012; 
Campbell et al., 2013; Fulop, 2014; Hogan et al., 2014; Turley and Zaman, 2014; Eulerich et 
al., 2017) to explorations of AC characteristics and the factors affecting their performance (e.g. 
DeZoort et al., 2002; Sharma et al., 2009; Baxter, 2010; Engel et al., 2010; Bierstaker et al., 
2012; Braswell et al., 2012; Malik, 2014; Abernathy et al., 2014; Albring et al., 2014; Alzeban 
and Sawan, 2015; Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2017; Poretti et al., 2018), the vast majority of 
studies so far have focused on ACs in developed countries, such as the UK, the USA, Canada 
and Australia. Only a few have focused on developing countries, which generally offer a 
significantly different operating environment for CG and ACs (Barghathi et al., 2017; Iswaissi 
and Falahati, 2017). These differences are likely to have an impact both on practice in these 
committees and on their effectiveness as mechanisms of CG; in other words, the research 
findings from developed countries may not be applicable here.  
 
The limited number of studies investigating CG, and particularly AC practice, in developing 
countries means they are still poorly understood (Al-Moataz, 2010; Bett and Tibbs, 2017; 
Chanda et al., 2017). Early investigations, such as those by Soliman (2003) and Al-Moataz 
(2003), focused on the effectiveness of ACs in developing countries, generally finding them to 
be largely ineffective in their oversight role, but more recent explorations have begun to give 
a more detailed picture of the role played by ACs in these countries. A growing body of 
literature now examines, for example, the effect of AC characteristics on company performance 
(Alqatamin, 2018), factors that may enhance AC effectiveness (Qasim, 2018), the role of ACs 
and boards in reducing earnings management (Khosheghbal et al., 2017), and the influence the 
AC-internal audit function relationship has on the moral courage of the head of the internal 
audit function (Khelil et al., 2016). The current study seeks to add to this literature by offering 
a new perspective and evidence from a developing country regarding the AC’s current role as 
a mechanism of CG, the factors affecting these committees and how to improve their 
effectiveness. 
 
The literature review indicates that insufficient attention has been given either to the factors 
that affect AC practice or to ways of enhancing their effectiveness. To this end, the study 
highlights fourteen factors and divides them, for the first time, into factors that enable and 
inhibit ACs. A number of prior studies have focused on investigating and evaluating the factors 
that influence the effectiveness of the AC (Baxter, 2010; Saat et al., 2012; Kituku and Ahmad, 
2016), but most have limited themselves to only a few factors. Furthermore, none have 
considered how a weak accounting and auditing profession impacts specifically on the AC; 
Fernando (2009) argues that CG in general is affected by the accounting environment, 
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including the accounting and auditing profession, while Srivastava and Lognathan (2016) point 
out that unqualified accountants generate inaccurate information which leads to poor decision 
making that can affect the whole organisation, including CG and the AC. The current research 
therefore contributes to the literature by exploring the particular impact that this factor can have 
on AC performance.  
 
Many developing countries lack the institutional framework necessary for effective CG 
(Boubakri et al., 2005). This is the case in Libya, which is still in the early stages of 
implementing CG in the banking sector (Iswaissi and Falahati 2017) and where CG regulation 
remains inadequate (Larbsh, 2010; Abdou, 2015). There has been little empirical investigation 
of CG mechanisms and systems in this sector (Zagoub, 2016), with the result that very little is 
known about the composition, authority, independence, meetings, responsibilities and 
resources of ACs in the Libyan banking sector. However, as the country’s economy opens up 
further to privatisation and foreign investment (Abdo and Aldrugi 2012; Masoud, 2014a), a 
full understanding of how these committees operate – and how effective they are – becomes 
ever more important in order to protect the interests of shareholders. Only two studies have 
been conducted in Libya so far (Abdulsaleh, 2014a; 2014b), and these examine the potential 
(rather than the current) role of the AC in just three banks, relying on data from questionnaires 
distributed to a very small sample. Furthermore, Abdulsalehh’s research was conducted before 
the Libyan CG Code (2010) made ACs compulsory in the banking sector. It is this information 
gap that the current study seeks to address by using a combination of quantitative questionnaire 
surveys and qualitative semi-structured interviews and combining elements of agency theory 
and institutional theory to gain the richest possible understanding of the results (Kalbers and 
Fogarty,1998; Beasley et al., 2009).  
 
It is hoped that the study’s findings will not only contribute to academic discussion but also 
help Libya’s policy makers and shareholders in their decision making (and encourage them to 
pay greater attention to the AC mechanism), and that they will prove instructive to board 
members, AC members and regulators as they attempt to reduce the obstacles facing ACs and 
enhance their effectiveness. The main concerns of the study are to identify just how much 
influence ACs have within the country’s banking sector and to investigate the impact of a 
number of factors on their practice, so that action can be taken to improve their effectiveness. 
The following chapter discusses the research methodology and methods that were employed to 
pursue these aims. 
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Chapter 5. Research Methodology and Methods  
5.1 Introduction 
This study aims to assess the current status and performance of ACs in the Libyan banking 
sector, to investigate the factors that affect their practice and to identify actions to enhance their 
effectiveness. The previous chapters having shed light on the literature pertaining to CG and 
ACs and their application in Libya, this chapter discusses the methodology and methods 
adopted in this research. It starts by discussing the research paradigm and restating the research 
objectives and questions before going on to discuss the research design and the use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. It focuses at length on the questionnaire survey that was 
employed, describing the selection of the study population and sample, the design of the 
questionnaire and the way in which the gathered data were analysed. 
 
5.2 Research Philosophy and Methodology 
Research methodology has been defined as the scientific study of the methods, tools or devices 
that support the collection of data (Daniel et al., 2018). Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that 
social scientists must give careful consideration to the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions that underlie their research, just like researchers in the natural and 
physical sciences. The sociological dimension involves a choice between two views of society: 
that is, whether it evolves rationally (the regulatory view) or as a result of radical change 
(Holden and Lynch, 2004). The scientific dimension involves selecting either a subjective or 
an objective approach – each of these has its own assumptions regarding ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology (Holden and Lynch, 2004). Goles and 
Hirschheim (2000) suggest that the first two of these – ontology (how we know what we know) 
and epistemology (how we gain knowledge) – are the central issues in social science. Crotty 
(2003) defines ontology as the study of the nature of reality and existence. Zhu et al. (2015) 
point out that ontology research is burgeoning and widespread in the discipline of information. 
Frestadius (2015) defines epistemology as the investigation of how things are known, or as 
Langdridge (2007, p.24) puts it: “what we can say we know about human nature”. Both are 
crucial because, as Ryan et al. (2002) argue, the researcher’s assumptions regarding a 
phenomenon’s reality (ontology) will affect how they gain knowledge of the phenomenon 
(epistemology), and in turn, the methodology they employ. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed a comprehensive philosophical framework to describe 
the nature of social science research (see Figure 5.1). The framework presents the four key 
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dimensions of ontology, human nature, epistemology and methodology, together with the 
philosophical stands associated with each. In the objective (or quantitative) approach, these are 
realism, positivism, determinism and the nomothetic approach, while in the subjective 
(qualitative) approach, they are nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism and the ideographic 
approach. 
Figure 5.1 Scheme for Assumptions Concerning the Nature of Social Science 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3) 
 
Objectivism posits that reality exists independent of the observer, and that it can be perceived 
through the senses and measured to yield objective knowledge (Rand et al., 1990). In contrast, 
Saunders et al. (2009, p.111) argue that: 
 
“The subjectivist view is that social phenomena are created from the 
perceptions and consequent actions of social actors. What is more, this is a 
continual process in that through the process of social interaction these social 
phenomena are in a constant state of revision”. 
 
In other words, the subjectivist approach supposes that reality is created by humans, while the 
objectivist approach supposes that reality is external and that the researcher can maintain a 
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detached, objective stance (Savin-Baden and Major, 2012). The epistemological dimension is 
concerned with how this reality can be known (Borim-de-Souza et al., 2015), particularly the 
extent to which it is possible to obtain objective data to “measure” or quantify social 
phenomena (Lee and Jones, 2015). 
 
Human nature, the third dimension in Burrell and Morgan’s framework, refers to those essential 
or core features that make us human (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014). While objectivists regard 
humans and their experience as products of the environment (represented by the determinist 
standpoint), subjectivists take the view that individuals are completely autonomous and their 
actions the result of free will (voluntarism) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
5.2.1 Research Paradigm 
Borim-de-Souza et al. (2015) define a research paradigm as a basic collection of beliefs which 
guide the researcher’s actions. In developing a philosophical paradigm, the researcher must 
consider a number of core assumptions about the nature of society and the nature of science 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The selection of an appropriate research paradigm maximises the 
likelihood of achieving high quality results (Healy and Perry, 2000). According to Saunders et 
al. (2003), the philosophical standpoints most often employed in business research are 
positivism, anti-positivism and realism. Accordingly, these approaches are discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. 
 
5.2.1.1 The Positivist Approach  
Ryan et al. (2002) argue that with the growing emphasis on empiricism, positivism has become 
one of the most important philosophical approaches for researchers. According to O’Sullivan 
and Irby, “The positivist research paradigm assumes that reality is ordered, predictable and 
ultimately knowable through objective measures and rigorous application of scientific method” 
(2014, p. 375). The positivist approach is linked with quantitative research methods (Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). It is assumed to be totally objective (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004) as data collection and analysis methods are value-free rather than reliant on subjective 
interpretation (Krauss, 2005). 
 
The positivist paradigm assumes that the methods, aims and concepts of the natural sciences 
can be applied to the social sciences (Lather and Lather, 1991); its proponents argue that social 
reality is observable and that social science research can produce law-like generalisations such 
as those generated by natural scientists (Saunders et al., 2009). However, Cohen et al. (2007) 
are less convinced, arguing that positivism is less successful when applied to the complexities 
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of human nature and intangible, elusive social phenomena. Henn et al. (2005, p.13) point out 
that: 
 
“The logic of a positivist research design is that: We seek to identify processes 
of cause and effect to explain phenomena, and to test theory; Knowledge 
should be based on what can be tested by observation of tangible evidence; 
Researchers should use scientific methods which emphasise control, 
standardisation, and objectivity”.  
 
The ultimate goal of most positivist researchers is to discover the generalisations that represent 
the current best understanding of a phenomenon and to communicate these concisely to an 
audience that shares their underlying assumptions (Malsch and Salterio, 2015). 
 
A number of previous authors have supported the use of the positivist paradigm in accounting 
research. Ryan et al. (2002) argue that positivism has had a profound impact on the recent 
development of accounting, economics and finance research, while Laughlin (1995) claims the 
positivist perspective is widely employed in mainstream accounting research. Not all social 
scientists support its use, however, with some being alienated by the positivists’ appeal to 
value-free knowledge and their rejection of metaphysics (Ryan et al., 2002). 
 
The accounting research that is sometimes labelled as positivist seeks to empirically validate 
general causal explanations of accounting-related phenomena. It aims at objectivity, in the 
sense that empirical results and the inferences drawn from them are meant to be independent 
of the characteristics of the individual researcher (Luft and Shields, 2014). Within the critical 
accounting literature, there are numerous examples of studies that have used quantitative 
indicators to describe the status quo and to provide a starting point for a more in-depth 
qualitative analysis. These studies have inverted the usual relationship between qualitative and 
quantitative methods found in positivistic research, in essence using quantitative methods to 
provide a first-order mapping of the field (Everett et al., 2015). 
 
5.2.1.2 The Anti-positivism Approach  
Anti-positivism is subjective and qualitative in orientation; it assumes that reality is internally 
based on the description the researchers attach to it (Wang, 2015). In this approach, the social 
world is understood by investigating the meanings it holds for individuals (Marsh and Stoker, 
2002). Since these individuals differ, the researcher must be prepared for variation and 
inconsistency (Saunders et al., 2009). Anti-positivism comes from two intellectual traditions: 
phenomenology and symbolic interactionism (ibid). Phenomenology refers to the way in which 
we as humans make sense of the world around us, while symbolic interactionism describes the 
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process whereby individuals interpret the actions of others and adjust their own understanding 
and actions accordingly. Malsch and Salterio (2015) argue that one of the main challenges of 
the interpretive researcher is to establish connections between the local and global level of 
analysis so that they can transfer local results to the global context in order to gain a better 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
 
5.2.1.3 The Realist Approach   
The realist paradigm combines elements of positivism and anti-positivism. Like positivism, it 
employs the methods and logic of the natural sciences (Hibberd, 2010), but unlike positivism, 
it does not claim that the resulting knowledge will perfectly reflect the object of study (Fisher, 
2007).  According to Saunders et al., 
 
“Realism is another philosophical position which relates to scientific enquiry. 
The essence of realism is that what the senses show us as reality is the truth: 
that objects have an existence independent of the human mind. The 
philosophy of realism is that there is a reality quite independent of the mind. 
Realism is a branch of epistemology which is similar to positivism in that it 
assumes a scientific approach to the development of knowledge” (2009, p. 
114). 
 
These authors explain that two types of realism are evident in business and management 
research: direct realism and critical realism (Saunders et al., 2009). While direct realism posits 
that our five physical senses perceive the true state of the world (or as Keefe (2015) puts it, we 
perceive things rather than ideas of things), critical realism posits that these perceptions are 
merely illusions of the real world. In both approaches, the researcher is able to employ a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (Healy and Perry, 2000), which, as Krauss 
(2005) points out, allows him or her to mitigate the effects of any methodological variance by 
triangulating the results. 
 
Saunders et al. (2003, p. 85) suggest that “business and management research is often a mixture 
between positivism and interpretivism, perhaps reflecting the stance of realism”, and a number 
of authors have supported the use of the realist paradigm in accounting research; Bisman (2010), 
for example, argues that it is necessary to consider how human behaviour and social relations 
impact upon the process and outcomes of decision making in accounting, and that accounting 
studies conducted within a realist paradigm and applying both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies are more likely to generate reliable and coherent results.  
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In light of the findings from the literature review above, it was decided that the realist paradigm 
would be the most appropriate for this research. This approach allows the researcher to employ 
positivist methods to gather empirical and quantitative data, and anti-positivist, qualitative 
methods to gain an insight into the subjective views and experiences of participants and make 
better sense of the statistical results (see Maxwell and Mittapalli, 2010; Allmark and 
Machaczek, 2017). In the current study, the questionnaire survey allowed the capture of 
quantitative information from a large sample of respondents, thus facilitating generalisation of 
the findings. The questionnaire data were supported by the qualitative data gathered from the 
semi-structured interviews, promoting data quality and minimising the risk of bias. The 
deductive approach was considered appropriate because the study seeks to test known concepts 
and theoretical patterns rather than to infer new patterns and concepts from the empirical data 
(see Saunders et al., 2009; Bhattacherjee, 2012; Trochim et al., 2015). 
 
5.3 Research Design 
The study employed a combination of quantitative questionnaire surveys and qualitative semi-
structured interviews to boost data quality and minimise the risk of bias (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997). Data were first gathered from the questionnaire responses. This instrument allowed 
information to be gathered from a large number of participants (Mohamed et al., 2015). Semi-
structured interviews were then used to gain a better understanding of the research questions, 
and to confirm and further explore the questionnaire survey findings. The respective merits and 
drawbacks of these methodologies, and the justification for the use of a mixed method approach, 
are discussed in the following sections. The issues surrounding data access and ethical 
considerations are also discussed below. 
 
5.3.1 Quantitative Research  
Quantitative research applies statistical methods, usually to a wide range of data sources, to 
gather numerical data. These data are subjected to statistical analysis in order to achieve 
outcomes which can be generalised to the general population (Laurie et al., 2015; Amaratunga 
et al., 2002). Creswell (2009) observes that quantitative research methods focus on quantifiable 
variables, while Abu Bakar and Abdullah (2008) identify experiments and surveys as the most 
common quantitative research methods. 
 
The quantitative approach has a number of advantages; in addition to its potential to yield 
generalisable results, Hyde (2000) argues that it produces quantifiable, reliable information, 
while Babbie (2015) argues that it generally makes observations clearer and that it is easier to 
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aggregate, compare and summarise data. Statistical analysis may be used to generate anything 
from simple averages to complex mathematical formulas and models; Fielding and Schreier 
(2001) argue that these can enhance our initial understanding of a phenomenon by giving an 
overall snapshot. 
 
On the other hand, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue, quantitative results may not 
accurately reflect the respondents’ understanding, and the knowledge that is produced might 
be very abstract and too general for direct application to specific local contexts. Similarly, 
Larsen (2009) suggests that if the researcher is dealing with large amounts of numerical data, 
the data processing is likely to lack precision. Langdridge and Hagger-Johnson (2009), 
meanwhile, argue that quantitative methods over-simplify the intricacies of human nature, and 
fail to recognise the individuality and autonomy of respondents and the subjective nature of 
social science research. Despite these objections, Everett et al. (2015) observe that quantitative 
methods can help researchers to better understand accounting and auditing practice.  
 
5.3.2 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is generally defined as any type of research in which the results are not 
arrived at by statistical means (Golafshani, 2003). The outcomes of qualitative research are 
presented in narrative rather than numerical form; Simbolon describes the aim of this kind of 
research as being “…to describe the phenomenon in detail” (2014, p. 24). In recent decades, 
qualitative methods have become indispensable to social scientists; indeed, some researchers 
argue that they should take priority over quantitative methods (Chesebro and Borisoff, 2007; 
Fitzsimmons, 2007; Thompson and McPherson, 2011). Supporters of the qualitative approach 
argue that these methods allow the researcher to understand the lived experience of respondents 
and to examine individuals in their natural context. The researcher can capture a range of 
perceptions and attitudes in the respondents’ own words (Bless et al., 2013), while instruments 
such as the semi-structured interview also enable the researcher to ask supplementary questions 
to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon (Larsen, 2009). Qualitative methods are also 
open to innovation, whether this involves developing a completely new method, using a tried 
and tested method with new respondents, or bringing in methodological expertise from another 
discipline (Takhar-Lail and Ghorbani, 2015). 
 
 
Critics of the qualitative approach counter that: “Qualitative data bring the disadvantages of 
purely verbal descriptions” (Babbie, 2015, p. 24). Smith (2015) points to the difficulty of 
interpreting naturalistic verbal reports, while Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) state that 
results may be influenced by the researcher’s personal bias and idiosyncrasies, rendering them 
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less credible. Furthermore, qualitative research usually uses small samples that are selected for 
particular characteristics and therefore cannot represent the general population (Laurie et al., 
2015). Finally, critics point to the length of time it takes to collect and analyse qualitative data 
(Larsen, 2009). 
 
5.3.3 Mixed Method (Triangulation) 
Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 126) define triangulation as “a validity procedure where 
researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to 
form themes or categories in a study”. Denzin (2012, p. 82) argues that “The use of multiple 
methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon in question”. Blanche et al. (2006) agree, explaining that the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods in the same study allows researchers to investigate 
different aspects of a phenomenon in order to understand it properly. Thus, quantitative 
methods might be used to collect general data around the field of study, with qualitative 
methods being employed to access local knowledge and develop theoretical explanations and 
concepts (Kelle, 2006). Creswell and Clark (2011) go further, arguing that some questions can 
only be answered using the mixed method approach. 
  
Triangulation boosts data quality and minimises the risk of bias (Hussey and Hussey, 1997); 
as Johnson and Turner (2003) point out, both quantitative and qualitative methods have 
limitations which may be mitigated to some extent by using them in combination. This leads 
Esteves and Pastor (2004) to conclude that employing multiple methods increases the 
robustness of the results. For these reasons, this study adopted a mixed method approach to 
data collection. The study’s conceptual framework provides the means to explore from 
different perspectives current practice among audit committees in Libya’s banking sector, to 
identify the issues or obstacles that affect their performance, and to identify actions to enhance 
their effectiveness. These objectives were achieved by means of a questionnaire, which elicited 
the views of five groups of actors in Libya’s banking sector, and through semi-structured 
interviews with senior employees in the sector. These sought to obtain in-depth insights into 
the role of audit committees and to gather data beyond the scope of the questionnaire. The 
mixed method approach was particularly vital in this instance, given the absence of secondary 
data in the areas addressed in the research questions. 
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Table 5.1  Summary of Methods and their Link to Research Objectives and Questions 
Research Objectives  Research Questions Data Collection 
To explore the present role 
of AC in the Libyan 
banking sector. 
 
What role do ACs currently play in 
Libya’s banking sector? 
- Main: 
Questionnaire survey with the five 
groups 
  
- Support: 
Interviews with senior employees 
How do these committees perform 
their role?  
To investigate the factors 
that affect the effectiveness 
of ACs in this sector. 
What factors impact on the 
effectiveness of ACs in this sector? 
Main: 
Questionnaire survey with the five 
groups 
  
- Support: 
Interviews with senior employees 
How do these factors affect the 
role of ACs? 
To identify ways of 
enhancing the effectiveness 
of ACs in this sector. 
 
What can be done to enhance the 
effectiveness of ACs in this sector? 
Main: 
Questionnaire survey with the five 
groups 
  
- Support: 
Interviews with senior employees 
 
 
5.3.4 Data Access 
The data collection process may be adversely affected by a number of factors, from the social, 
cultural, economic and religious context of the research (Lægaard, 2011), to the dearth of 
relevant studies in the field, particularly in developing countries (Al-Moataz, 2010). In the 
current study, data collection was made more difficult by the reluctance of target banks to 
participate in the research. Only after they had seen the ethical approval granted by Nottingham 
Trent University and support letters from both the Libyan Embassy and Misurata University 
(the researcher’s sponsor), did banks consent to the distribution of questionnaires and allow 
individuals to be interviewed. Even then, gaining access to board members and audit committee 
members was extremely difficult as these individuals tend not to be permanently quartered in 
the bank. A further hurdle was the sheer size of the country (679,362 square miles or 1,759,540 
square km) (O’Neal, 2012), especially as the banks in the sample were located in different 
cities. Fortunately, the researcher was able to call on friends working in these banks to assist 
in distributing and collecting the questionnaires and to conduct some of the interviews. 
 
All prospective interviewees were fully briefed about the nature and objectives of the study, 
interview duration, and the arrangements for ensuring the confidentiality and safe storage of 
data. They were also informed that they had the right to withdraw at any stage without giving 
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a reason and that their anonymity would be respected. Despite these assurances, however, many 
were initially reluctant to be interviewed; they were only persuaded to participate when they 
had come to trust the researcher and developed curiosity about the research. A similar 
reluctance was initially evident in the case of the questionnaire survey, with many of those 
approached claiming that they were too busy or did not understand the research topic. 
Consequently, care was taken to reassure these reluctant respondents that any unclear or 
ambiguous questions would be explained to anyone who asked at any point in the survey 
process. The survey was administered in two stages. In the first stage, the majority of 
questionnaires were distributed by hand (the others by email) to participants in sixteen of 
Libya’s seventeen commercial banks (the one bank without an audit committee was excluded 
from the sample) to be collected subsequently. After two months, the majority of email 
questionnaires had not been returned, so the second stage was to resend these email 
questionnaires. This prompted some of these recipients to return their questionnaires. 
 
5.3.5 The Translation of Interview Transcripts and Questionnaire  
The questionnaire and interview forms were originally written in English and then translated 
into Arabic to ensure that they would be easily understood by the respondents. The accuracy 
of this translation was then checked by translating them back into English. The translation of 
the questionnaire and interview schedule had to be done carefully to ensure that the questions 
had the same meaning for all respondents and would yield useful data (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Bradley (2013) argues that translation should be carried out by someone who is both fluent in 
the languages concerned and who understands the purpose of the questionnaire and the 
intention underlying the design of each item. In this case, the researcher’s own translations 
were reviewed by a professional translator, a Libyan Arabic native speaker with a PhD in 
English Literature from a UK university and more than fifteen years’ experience. As a Libyan 
national, the translator was familiar with the target country and the local dialect used by 
respondents. After the field study, the interview transcripts were translated from Arabic into 
English for analysis. Again, the researcher’s translations were reviewed by the same 
professional translator.  A few ambiguous phrases in the transcripts were also referred to the 
translator. All transcripts sent to this translator were fully anonymised in order to protect 
confidentiality. 
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5.3.6 Ethical Considerations 
In accordance with the University Research Governance Framework and the ethical guidelines 
published by the relevant associations, an application was submitted to the College Research 
Ethics Committee (CREC) for approval of the proposed research plans prior to the fieldwork. 
This contained an explanation of the steps that would be taken to maintain data security and 
participant confidentiality. The application was formally approved by the committee in 
November 2015. 
 
The field study was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines. A letter was attached 
to each questionnaire when it was first distributed giving the researcher’s contact details 
(address, email address and mobile number) in case the respondents felt they needed to contact 
him. This letter emphasised that the information and personal opinions they provided would be 
kept strictly confidential. To ensure that the participants were fully informed about the research, 
they were also given Participant Information Sheets. As explained in section 5.4.4, they were 
assured that they could withdraw from the research at any time. 
 
Data confidentiality and the participants’ anonymity were protected at every stage of the 
research process, primarily by ensuring that there was nothing in the questionnaires or the 
interviews that could indicate the identity of the participants/interviewees. Returned 
questionnaires were kept secure in a locked filing cabinet at NTU, while the interview data 
were transferred from Libya to the UK in a password-protected file which was not accessible 
to anyone else. This was also stored in a safe place. As a result of these measures being put in 
place, no ethical concerns arose either during or after data collection. 
 
5.3.7 Validity, Reliability and Generalisability of the Findings 
According to Gill and Johnson (2002, p. 118), “validity refers to the accuracy of the 
measurement process while the reliability of measurement refers to its consistency”. A number 
of researchers point to the use of a mixed methods research design as a way of enhancing both 
validity and reliability; for example, Guion et al. (2011) argue that combining questionnaires 
with interviews adds a depth to results that would not have been possible using a single method, 
Golafshani (2003) notes that methodological triangulation reduces bias and increases the 
truthfulness of the findings, and Bentahar and Cameron (2015) argue that it is vital to overcome 
the weaknesses of individual methods. In this study, the use of questionnaire surveys and 
interviews allowed the findings to be triangulated and checked for consistency. 
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The most popular way to measure the reliability of quantitative survey data is Cronbach’s 
Alpha. This allows the researcher to check the internal consistency of items within the survey 
(Sijtsma, 2009; Gadermann et al., 2012) by measuring the extent to which the participants’ 
responses correlate with each other (Vaske et al., 2107). A Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of 
0.70 is considered sufficient to indicate data reliability (e.g. Narkwilai et al., 2015; Valikhani 
and Karpardaz, 2015). The Alpha coefficient in this study was 81.3% for all quantitative tests, 
indicating that all the data are reliable.  
 
Gill and Johnson (2002) differentiate between internal and external validity, defining internal 
validity as the extent to which the conclusions regarding cause and effect are warranted, and 
external validity as the extent to which conclusions might be generalised to other people 
(population validity) and to other environments (environmental validity). The internal validity 
of this study was strengthened by distributing the survey to virtually the entire population of 
those with the greatest experience and awareness of AC practice in the Libyan banking sector 
(see section 5.1.4) and then interviewing twenty senior staff from this population. This 
interview sample was considered large and diverse enough to yield adequate information to 
support and further explore the survey findings (see Baker and Edwards, 2012; Fontaine and 
Letaifa, 2012). The quality, relevance and usefulness of the semi-structured interviews were 
enhanced by ensuring that the participants were fully informed about the scope and aims of the 
study and relaxed and confident about taking part (they were provided with consent forms and 
a copy of the ethical approval). They were reassured of the confidentiality of the findings, and 
care was taken not to influence their responses in any way, for example by maintaining a neutral 
tone throughout. Both the survey and interview questions were developed following a careful 
review of the CG literature. 
 
The fact that the entire population of the target sector (commercial banks in Libya’s banking 
sector) was studied means the findings are already generalised to this sector; in other words, 
the study has external population validity. It does not, however, have ecological validity 
because the findings are not necessarily generalisable to non-banking sectors in the Libyan 
economy, which differ from the banking sector in key ways (e.g. in the CG code followed). 
While the study's findings overall reliability and validity are good, it is not advisable to 
generalise the findings beyond the intended scope of the study. 
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5.4 Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire survey is the most frequently employed data-gathering tool among social 
scientists (De Munck, 2009). An effective way of collecting responses from a large sample, it 
allows concepts to be translated into measurable values for the purpose of quantitative analysis 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The questionnaire survey is generally utilised to measure phenomena 
at the group rather than the individual level (Ciciriello et al., 2014) and tends to be employed 
for explanatory or descriptive research (Adeoye, 2015); that is, to investigate and explain the 
links (particularly cause and effect) between variables, or to identify and describe the 
variability within a phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
Saunders et al. (2009) identify two kinds of questionnaire: self-administered (this may be 
internet-mediated, postal or delivered and collected by hand) and interviewer-administered 
(either by telephone or in a structured interview). Self-administered questionnaires are widely 
employed by researchers; not only can they cover a large sample and a wide geographical area 
relatively cheaply, but they can also be used to reach a population which might otherwise be 
difficult to access. Furthermore, when the information being sought is sensitive in nature, the 
anonymity they offer may make respondents more likely to complete them honestly (Kazi and 
Khalid, 2012). This was a particularly relevant consideration in this study. The major 
drawbacks of this method are the possibility of a low response rate (particularly if the 
questionnaire is being administered by email) and the danger that questions may be left 
unanswered, which may affect the validity of the findings (Lubbe et al., 2006; Mbatha, 2015; 
Garwe, 2016). An attempt was made to overcome these limitations first, by distributing the 
majority of questionnaires by hand and second, by sending the emailed questionnaires a second 
time if the first yielded no response. The data from the questionnaires were also supplemented 
by the data from the semi-structured interviews. 
 
5.4.1 Study Population and Sample 
Usually, the researcher identifies a population that exhibits the characteristic(s) of interest and 
then selects a sample from this population with the aim of eliciting information that can be 
extrapolated to the population as a whole. However, since the target population for this study 
is relatively small, the questionnaire was distributed to virtually the entire population. A list of 
400 potential respondents was prepared following a search of the banks’ websites and 
telephone conversations with the Central Bank of Libya officials. This list comprised four 
board members, three AC members, seven executive managers, seven internal auditors and 
four external auditors from each of sixteen of Libya’s seventeen commercial banks (the 
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excluded bank does not have an audit committee). Each of these individuals received a copy 
of the questionnaire. Of these sixteen banks, five are state-owned, five are privately owned and 
seven are under mixed ownership (Libyan and foreign) (see Table 2.1, p. 21). 
 
The questionnaires were directed towards those individuals with the greatest experience and 
awareness of audit committee practice; that is, individuals from the five groups listed below. 
These groups have both the means and the authority to monitor firms; indeed, they are widely 
regarded as the foundation stones upon which a bank’s monitoring mechanisms are built (see 
Stewart and Munro, 2007; Rezaee, 2009; Ittonen et al., 2010; Waweru et al., 2011).  
 
• Board members: as part of one of the main mechanisms of corporate governance (Voß 
and Xia, 2009), board members play a central role in the company’s most important 
strategic, investment and financing decisions (Frijns et al., 2016). Many studies have 
focused on the perceptions of board members (e.g. Millstein et al., 2000; Cornforth, 
2001). 
 
• Audit committee members: are obviously of central importance in this research. It was 
therefore crucial to discover their views on issues such as the extent to which it is important 
for audit committees to have financial expertise and independence, and whether the size of 
the committee and the frequency and conduct of its meetings impact its effectiveness 
(Marx, B., 2009; Marx and Van Der Watt, 2011). 
 
• Executive managers: work closely with the audit committee (Corgel et al., 2004). Several 
studies have pointed out that the audit committee works with managers to monitor the 
financial reporting process (Campbell et al., 2013; Abernathy et al., 2013). Since this 
necessitates regular meetings between the two groups, managers are familiar with audit 
committee practice. 
 
• Internal auditors: also work closely alongside the audit committee (Song and Windram, 
2004; Rezaee, 2009; Cohen et al., 2004) and are consequently familiar with its role and 
practice. The interaction between the AC and the internal audit department is a key factor 
in achieving effective CG (see Rich and Zhang, 2014; Bardhan et al., 2015). Oxner and 
Oxner (2006) found that the former often relies on the latter to give it greater access to 
information within the organisation. Equally important, however, is the fact that the 
relationship promotes effective monitoring (Alzebana and Sawan, 2015). 
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• External auditors: meet the audit committee regularly to discuss a range of issues, in 
particular the results of the audit process (Vasile and Mitran, 2016). The audit committee 
also serves as a channel of communication between the external auditor and the 
management, and as mediator in any dispute between the two (Song and Windram, 2004; 
Keune and Johnstone, 2012). For this reason, the external auditor may be in a position to 
provide an objective assessment of the committee’s practice. 
 
5.4.2 Designing the Questionnaire 
Jankowicz (2005) suggests that preparation of a questionnaire requires less skill than 
conducting semi-structured or in-depth interviews, though Saunders et al. (2009) caution that 
producing a good questionnaire is more difficult than one might think. They work best with 
standardised questions that will be interpreted in the same way by all participants (Robson, 
2002), as this is likely to produce data that are more internally consistent and coherent for the 
purposes of analysis (Farnik and Pierzchała., 2012). In the current study, the aim of the 
questionnaire was to gather the perceptions of five groups of actors regarding the research 
questions. These research questions, which were developed following the literature review, in 
turn guided the development of the questionnaire.  
 
The questionnaire was divided into two sections, the first of which gathered respondents’ 
demographic information (role, educational level, degree subject and work experience). The 
second section aimed to obtain respondents’ perceptions regarding current audit committee 
practice, the impact of obstacles on this practice and measures which might enhance their 
effectiveness. This section consisted of four parts: The first asked respondents to indicate 
whether their audit committee plays a role in monitoring financial statements and in internal 
and external auditing, and how it performs this role. Little is known about the current status of 
audit committees in Libya, so it was important to gain greater insight into their systems and 
structure and any perceived deficiencies in performance. The second part asked respondents to 
indicate whether they agreed that the listed enabling factors affect audit committee practice 
(the listed factors were the committee’s authority, access to information, diligence, financial 
expertise, independence, meeting frequency and size). This part was designed to gain insight 
into the extent to which ACs are perceived as benefiting from these factors. The third did the 
same for inhibiting factors (listed internal factors were weak board governance, the lack of a 
clear statement of the committee’s legal responsibilities and obligations, no entry requirements 
in terms of qualifications and experience, and inadequate compensation, while external factors 
included the legal and regulatory environment, the accounting environment and government 
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intervention). The aim here was to understand the extent to which ACs are perceived as being 
adversely affected by these factors. The identification of these factors laid the groundwork for 
the crucial fourth part, which asked respondents to indicate whether they agreed that the listed 
corrective measures (actions) would enhance the effectiveness of ACs (these measures were: 
strengthening the country’s accounting and auditing profession, appointing AC members 
according to their experience and qualifications, establishing legal requirements governing 
ACs, ensuring board support for ACs, improving the legal and regulatory environment and 
ensuring that AC members are sufficiently compensated). 
 
The questions in the survey were developed from some of the issues and questions raised in 
previous studies (e.g. DeZoort et al., 2002; Bedard et al., 2004; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Lin 
et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2009; Sharma et al., 2009; Braswell et al., 2012), though care was 
taken to ensure that they were relevant to the Libyan context and the Libyan CG Code (2010) 
whenever possible. New questions were also developed to investigate issues particularly 
relevant to the Libyan context, such as the impact of the accounting and auditing profession on 
AC practice. All of the questions in the second section were closed-ended with five-point Likert 
scales. Not only are these widely used in social science research (Jafarabadi and Pakdaman, 
2016), but they have been shown to work well in the Libyan environment (Libyan participants 
are more familiar with the five-point Likert scale than with larger scales) (e.g. Larbsh, 2010; 
Magrus, 2012).  
 
The questionnaire began with a brief summary outlining the project and the purpose of the 
questionnaire. Within the main body of the instrument, care was taken to word each question 
in clear and direct language, and to avoid any that might be confusing, too complex or 
embarrassing. The layout was designed to make the instrument quick and easy for respondents 
to complete, while still ensuring that answers would be clear and sufficiently detailed for 
analysis. Spaces were also left in the survey for respondents to offer comments and reflections. 
Finally, the English questions were translated into Arabic to ensure that they would all be 
equally well understood by all participants. The answers in the completed questionnaires were 
translated back into English for analysis, with the translations being revised by a professional 
translator. 
 
5.4.3 Pilot Study 
A pilot study is vital for producing an effective questionnaire. Its prime purpose is to estimate 
the possibility of developing a comprehensive questionnaire that will produce helpful 
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information in the main survey (El-Zamly and Amin, 2011). Accordingly, it should allow space 
for participants to make comments or suggest revisions. The pilot study also allows the 
researcher to perform a preliminary analysis to establish whether the wording and content of 
the questionnaire are likely to present any difficulties in the main analysis (Burgess, 2001; Bell, 
2014). 
 
The questionnaires in the pilot study were distributed to the same five groups of actors as the 
main study (see section 5.5.1). Fewer questionnaires were distributed to board members and 
audit committee members because these are numerically smaller groups within banks. In total, 
100 questionnaires were distributed with the help of university colleagues in Libya and by 
email. 64 completed questionnaires were returned. Five incomplete questionnaires were 
excluded, leaving 59 usable questionnaires, or a response rate of 59%. Table 5.2 indicates that 
the group with the highest response rate (counting completed questionnaires only) was the 
executive managers group with 72%, followed by the external auditors group with 65%. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Pilot Study Response Rate 
 
 
 
In response to suggestions from the pilot study participants, the instrument was amended, with 
the wording of some questions being made clearer and the formatting being improved. Scaling 
was modified in certain questions and additional spaces inserted for feedback. The participants 
also recommended that the answers on the Likert scale should be numerically coded. The pilot 
exercise was valuable in validating the main survey and enhancing its potential as an instrument 
for collecting useful data.  
 
Groups 
Questionnaires 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Received 
Questionnaires 
Excluded 
Questionnaires 
Analysed 
Analysed 
(Percent) 
 Board Members  15 6 - 6 40% 
AC Members 15 7 - 7 46.7% 
Executive Managers 25 19 2 17 72% 
Internal Auditors 25 19 3 16 64% 
External Auditors 20 13 - 13 65% 
Total 100 64 5 59 59% 
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5.4.4 Questionnaire Distribution 
The distribution of questionnaires began in early February 2016 and continued until July of 
that year. In most instances, questionnaires were distributed and collected by hand. The few 
remaining questionnaires were sent by email. When the majority of the questionnaires had not 
been returned after two months, they were resent. This prompted some recipients to return their 
questionnaires.  
 
In total, 400 questionnaires were distributed across the five groups. 246 questionnaires were 
returned, 28 of which were rejected because they were incomplete. This left 218 for analysis, 
representing a response rate of 54.5%. This was acceptable: response rates in previous Libya-
based studies have ranged between 40% and 70% (e.g. Larbsh, 2010; Magrus, 2012; Zagoub, 
2016). Table 5.3 indicates that the highest response rate came from the executive managers 
group (66.1%), followed by the internal auditors group (63.4%), then external auditors 
(54.7%), AC members (35.4%) and board members (32.8%). Fewer questionnaires were 
received from board and AC members because these groups tend not to have permanent offices 
in the banks or attend regularly. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Questionnaire Survey Response Rate 
 
 
5.4.5 Analysis of Questionnaire Survey Data 
Raw quantitative data need to be processed and turned into statistics, graphs and charts in order 
that the researcher can explore, describe, present and examine the relationships and trends 
therein (Saunders et al., 2009). There are two approaches to statistical analysis: in descriptive 
Groups 
Questionnaires 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Analysed 
Analysed 
(Percent) 
Overall  
Percent  
 Board Members 64 21 32.8% 9.6% 
AC Members 48 17 35.4% 7.8% 
Executive Managers 112 74 66.1% 33.9% 
Internal Auditors 112 71 63.4% 32.6% 
External Auditors 64 35 54.7% 16.1% 
Total 400 218 54.5% 100% 
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analysis, the aim is to statistically describe, aggregate and present the constructs of interest or 
associations between these constructs; while in inferential analysis, statistical tools are used to 
test hypotheses (theory testing) (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
 
Statistical methods are classified as either parametric or non-parametric (Kumawat et al., 
2013). Parametric statistical procedures depend on assumptions about the shape of the normal 
distribution in the underlying population and about the form or parameters (i.e. means and 
standard deviations) of the assumed distribution (Hoskin, 2014). Non-parametric procedures, 
on the other hand, do not depend on assumptions about the shape or form of the probability 
distribution of the data (Hoskin, 2014). The use of parametric procedures is appropriate when: 
the data cases selected for the sample are independent; the data cases are drawn from normally 
distributed populations; the populations from which the data cases are drawn have equal 
variances; and the data are numerical. Where this is not the case, non-parametric procedures 
should be used (Saunders et al., 2009; Habbash and Alghamdi, 2015). As the data yielded by 
the questionnaire survey in this study were ordinal and nominal, and normal distribution was 
not assumed (Newbold et al., 2013), non-parametric testing methods were applied. 
 
5.4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The application of the descriptive statistics method involves establishing frequencies and 
percentages for responses, standard deviations, mean and median scores, rank, kurtosis and 
skewness (Bickel and Lehmann, 2012). Descriptive statistical measures used in this study 
include frequency distribution, percentages distribution, mean scores and standard deviation. 
 
5.4.5.2 Analytical Statistics 
Analytical statistical tests include: 
• Kruskal-Wallis Test 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric statistical method used to test whether samples 
originate from the same distribution. It is used to compare more than two samples that are 
independent or not related (Czaplicki, 2014). In this case, it was employed to identify the 
existence of any statistically significant differences between the five groups within Libya’s 
banking sector. 
 
• Mann-Whitney Test 
The Mann-Whitney test is used to compare the mean values of two samples (Grzegorzewski 
and Śpiewak, 2017). In the current study, this test was used to compare the means of pairs 
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of the five key groups in the banking sector (For example with regard the role of AC’s in 
monitoring financial statements). 
 
 
5.4.6  Analysis of the Background of Participants 
As Table 5.4 shows, 50.9% of the survey participants held a Bachelor’s degree, 32.1% held a 
Master’s degree, 8.7% had some other form of qualification (e.g. a Diploma in accounting or 
business administration) and 8.3% held a PhD. Breaking this down by group: the board 
members were evenly divided between PhD, Master’s and BA holders (33.3% each); almost 
half (47.1%) of AC members held a Master’s degree, while 35.3% held a BA and 17.6% held 
a PhD; almost half (48.6%) of executive managers held a BA, while 37.8% held a Master’s 
degree, 6.8% held a PhD and the same percentage held some other qualification; more than half 
(57.7%) of internal auditors had a BA, while 22.5% had a Master’s degree and 19.7% had a 
diploma in accounting or business administration; and 60% of external auditors had a BA, while 
31.4% held a Master’s degree and 8.6% held a PhD.     
 
Turning to their majors, across the sample as a whole, almost two-thirds (65.1%) majored in 
accounting. Management, finance, economics and other majors were studied by 16.5%, 7.3%, 
5.5% and 5.5% of the sample respectively. An overwhelming 94.3% of the external auditors, 
67.6% of the internal auditors, 58.8% of the audit committee members, 55.4% of the executive 
managers and 47.6% of the board members had an accounting background. 
 
With regard to work experience, the figures in the table show that the largest percentage in the 
sample (58.3%) had more than 15 years’ work experience. 18.8% had 10-15 years’ experience, 
17.4% had 5-10 years’ experience and just 5.5% had less than 5 years’ experience. The high 
level of experience among the sample lends credibility to the findings of the survey. Executive 
managers and board members were the most experienced with 63.5% and 61.9% respectively 
of these groups having more than 15 years’ experience. The most likely reason for this is that 
such positions are usually only given to highly experienced individuals. 85.7% of the board 
members, 79.5% of the executive managers, 74.9% of the internal auditors and 74.3% of the 
external auditors had work experience of more than 10 years. The figure for audit committee 
members was significantly lower (64.7%), probably because these committees are a relatively 
recent phenomenon in the Libyan banking sector. 
 
In summary, 94.5% of the survey participants had at least 5 years’ work experience, 72.4% had 
an accounting or finance background, and 91.3% had at least a first degree. These demographic 
details suggest that we may have a high a degree of confidence that their responses reflect a 
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thoughtful and well-informed understanding of AC practice and performance in the Libyan 
banking sector. 
 
Table 5.4 Educational Qualification, Major and Experience of Participants 
Panel A:  Qualification 
Education Level  
Board 
Members 
AC 
Members 
Executive 
Managers 
Internal 
Auditors 
External 
Auditors 
All Five 
Groups 
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
PhD 7 33.3% 3 17.6% 5 6.8% 0 0.0% 3 8.6% 18 8.3% 
Master 7 33.3% 8 47.1% 28 37.8% 16 22.5% 11 31.4% 70 32.1% 
First degree (BA) 7 33.3% 6 35.3% 36 48.6% 41 57.7% 21 60.0% 111 50.9% 
Other 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 6.8% 14 19.7% 0 0.0% 19 8.7% 
Total 21 100% 17 100% 74 100% 71 100% 35 100% 218 100% 
Panel B: Major 
Major 
Board 
Members 
AC 
Members 
Executive 
Managers 
Internal 
Auditors 
External 
Auditors 
All Five 
Groups 
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Accounting 10 47.6% 10 58.8% 41 55.4% 48 67.6% 33 94.3% 142 65.1% 
Finance 3 14.3% 3 17.6% 4 5.4% 4 5.6% 2 5.7% 16 7.3% 
Economics 2 9.5% 1 5.9% 4 5.3% 5 7.1% 0 0.0% 12 5.5% 
Management 4 19% 2 11.8% 19 25.7% 11 15.5% 0 0.0% 36 16.5% 
Other 2 9.5% 1 5.9% 6 8.1% 3 4.2% 0 0.0% 12 5.5% 
Total 21 100% 17 100% 74 100% 71 100% 35 100% 218 100% 
Panel C: Experience 
Length of 
Experience 
Board 
Members  
AC 
Members 
Executive 
Managers 
Internal 
Auditors 
External 
Auditors 
All Five 
Groups 
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Less than 5 years 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 4.1% 7 9.9% 2 5.8% 12 5.5% 
From 5 years to 10 
years 
3 14.3% 6 35.3% 12 16.2% 11 15.5% 6 17.1% 38 17.4% 
From 10 years to 15 
years 
5 23.8% 4 23.5% 12 16.0% 14 20.0% 6 17.1% 40 18.8% 
More than 15 years 13 61.9% 7 41.2% 47 63.5% 39 54.9% 21 60.0% 127 58.3% 
Total 21 100% 17 100% 74 100% 71 100% 35 100% 218 100% 
 
 
 
5.5 Interview Method  
Interviews allow the researcher to collect data to answer the research objectives and questions 
(Saunders et al., 2009). More than this, the fact that the interviewee is able to explain their 
experience in their own words, in as much detail as they like, means that this data may be 
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complex and rich; the researcher is in effect able to enter the participant’s world (Gratton and 
Jones, 2010). Consequently, this is a popular data-gathering technique among social scientists 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). As Corbin and Strauss (2008) show, qualitative research methods such 
as the semi-structured interview yield results which cannot be reached through statistical or 
other quantitative approaches, as well as bringing a subjective dimension into the study 
(Kauppi, 2012). 
 
5.5.1 Types of Interview 
Saunders et al. (2009) classify interviews according to the level of formality involved, 
describing them as structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Structured interviews may be 
used to supplement or confirm the results of a questionnaire survey and to develop a broader 
picture (Picciano, 2015), but they lack the flexibility to allow the researcher to gain real insight 
into the subject (Bryman and Bell, 2007). At the other extreme, unstructured (in-depth) 
interviews, which have no predetermined questions (though the researcher should have a clear 
idea of what is to be covered), allow the participant to speak freely and at length on the issues 
that concern them (Saunders et al., 2009). Between these two lies the semi-structured interview, 
one of the most widely used data collection methods in qualitative research (Ritchie et al., 
2013). This was the option chosen here.  
 
Polit and Beck (2003) suggest that semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to cover a 
list of topics in a standardised way, enabling the responses to be compared by item and 
quantified (McIntosh and Morse, 2015). At the same time, they allow a degree of flexibility; 
they are particularly useful for addressing complex issues as the researcher is able to modify 
questions in response to the participant’s answers (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). As a result, the 
questions and themes explored may differ from one interview to another (Ramlan et al., 2015). 
Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to gain insight into how the respondents 
perceive events and behaviours and thus to gain a more accurate understanding of their views 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). They are often used in the area of accounting research, including for 
the investigation of ACs, because they allow the collection of more detailed information than 
could be gathered via quantitative methods (Turley and Zaman, 2007; Beasley et al., 2009). As 
a result, they were considered the most effective instrument for conducting an in-depth 
exploration of AC practice, as it is perceived by those involved. 
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5.5.2 Conduct of Interviews 
The main objective of the interviews was to enable the researcher to fine tune the quantitative 
data collected via the surveys (Kauppi, 2012); they were an opportunity both to confirm the 
findings of the questionnaire and to seek further clarification in key areas from senior 
employees in the banking sector. Twenty face-to-face semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with representatives from the sixteen banks in the sample, and these interviewees 
were encouraged to talk as freely and honestly as possible about their views and experiences.  
 
Each interview was approximately 60 minutes long and began with a few questions to obtain 
general information about the participant. The main body of the interview followed an 
interview protocol, though deviations were allowed when necessary to probe further into an 
interesting or ambiguous answer (Bhattacherjee, 2012). These questions, which were 
composed following a comprehensive review of the relevant literature (e.g. DeZoort et al., 
2002; Cohen et al., 2004; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Lin et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2009), 
sought to obtain the participants’ perceptions about the current role of audit committee in 
Libya’s banking sector, the effect of obstacles on this practice and actions that might be taken 
to enhance their effectiveness. A neutral tone was maintained throughout by the researcher so 
as not to influence the interviewee’s responses (Bhattacherjee, 2012). All interviews were 
recorded, with additional comments and critical observations being noted throughout. The 
interviews were subsequently transcribed verbatim for the purpose of analysis. 
 
5.5.3 Profile of Interview Participants 
The twenty interviewees were drawn from the same five groups (four per group) as the survey 
sample; that is, board members, audit committee members, executive managers, internal 
auditors and external auditors. All of these groups have a working relationship with the audit 
committee. The interview sample was felt to be large and diverse enough to yield adequate 
information for the study (see Guest et al., 2006; Baker and Edwards, 2012; Fontaine and 
Letaifa, 2012), and to gather any data that could not be obtained by means of the questionnaire.  
 
The interviewees were selected using the snowball method (García‐Andreu et al., 2015), with 
interviewees being asked to propose the names of other suitable candidates. As large a sample 
was selected as possible within four key constraints: first, interviewees had to have participated 
in the questionnaire survey, and to understand and approve the purpose of the study; second, 
they had to come from one of the five groups being targeted in the study; third, they had to 
have adequate experience of working in corporate governance, particularly of working in or 
with audit committees; and fourth, they had to have at least a first degree (and preferably a 
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postgraduate degree). In practice, it was extremely hard to find individuals from all sixteen 
banks who met these requirements, with board members and audit committee members being 
especially difficult to track down (these individuals are not regularly on site). Care was taken 
to choose individuals from a range of banks in order to enhance the credibility of the findings.  
 
The interviews, which took place after the questionnaire survey, were all conducted face-to-
face. Interviewees were assured that the interview transcripts would remain anonymous and 
that their identity would be disguised by means of code names (e.g. A0001). They were also 
assured that data would be stored safely in the university and would remain confidential. Table 
5.5 presents the profile of the interview participants, including their role, what kind of 
organisation they work for, their highest qualification, major and years of experience. 
 
Table 5.5 Profile of Interview Participants 
No Code Position Organisation Qualification Major 
Years of 
Experience 
1. 1-1  Board member   State bank PhD Accounting 22 
2. 1-2 Board chairman Mixed ownership PhD  Accounting 38 
3. 1-3 Board chairman State bank Bachelor Accounting 20 
4. 1-4 Board member  Mixed ownership Master Finance 30 
5. 2-1 Chair of AC  Mixed ownership PhD  Accounting 32 
6. 2-2  AC member Mixed ownership PhD  Accounting 35 
7. 2-3 Chair of AC State bank Bachelor Accounting 29 
8. 2-4 AC member State bank Bachelor Accounting 35 
9. 3-1 Executive manager Mixed ownership Master Accounting 16 
10. 3-2  Executive manager State bank Master Management 18 
11. 3-3  Executive manager Mixed ownership Master Economics 19 
12. 3-4  Executive manager Private bank Master Finance 20 
13. 4-1 Internal auditor Mixed ownership Bachelor Accounting 35 
14. 4-2 Internal auditor State bank Master Finance 08 
15. 4-3 Internal auditor         State bank Bachelor Accounting 23 
16. 4-4 Internal auditor Mixed ownership Master Accounting 07 
17. 5-1 External auditor Private bank PhD  Management 33 
18. 5-2 External auditor Private bank Master Accounting 31 
19. 5-3 External auditor State bank Master Accounting 15 
20. 5-4 External auditor State bank Master Accounting 20 
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The table indicates that 50% of the interviewees held a Master’s degree, 25% held a PhD and 
25% held a Bachelor’s degree. A massive 70% majored in accounting, with just 15% majoring 
in finance, 10% in management and 5% in economics. In terms of work experience, 85% had 
worked in the banking sector for more than 15 years, 10% had done so for between 5 and 10 
years, and 5% for between 10 and 15 years. No one in the sample had worked in the sector for 
less than 5 years. 
 
In summary, almost all of the interviewees (90%) had at least 10 years’ work experience, while 
the majority (70%) had an accounting background and all had at least a Bachelor’s degree. 
They may therefore be assumed to be in a position to provide objective perceptions regarding 
current audit committee practice, the impact of obstacles on audit committees and actions 
which could enhance their effectiveness. In other words, the demographic profile of the 
participants should enhance confidence in the results. 
 
5.5.4 Analysis of Interview Data 
Selecting the right data analysis technique(s) was vital if the study was to achieve the research 
objectives and answer the research questions (Saunders et al., 2009). The most widely used 
approaches for analysing qualitative data in interpretive and exploratory research are thematic 
and content analysis (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). Thematic analysis was adopted in this study 
because of its usefulness in identifying and describing explicit and implicit concepts and 
identifying themes and patterns (Braun and Clark, 2006). The thematic analysis was performed 
using NVivo 11 because this software can manage large volumes of qualitative textual data 
(Silver and Lewins, 2014). This makes organising and accessing the data easier, thereby 
facilitating high-quality coding and the identification of inter-variable relationships (Patton, 
2015). 
 
The first step in the process was to transcribe each interview, in Arabic, from the audio 
recording to Microsoft Word document format. A microanalysis was then conducted of each 
interview to ensure the meaning of every word, phrase, sentence and paragraph was clearly 
understood. The anonymous transcripts were then translated into English and revised by a 
professional translator (see section 5.3.6), with every effort being made to maintain the original 
meaning. Finally, all the translated interview transcripts were transferred into the NVivo 11 
software for data management and coding. 
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The software was employed to conduct line-by-line coding to identify emerging themes and 
patterns within the data. Nodes (codes) were set up to represent the concepts identified in the 
data (see Figure 5.2), and material from the transcripts was gathered into these nodes (see 
Paulus et al., 2017). Recurring themes were transferred into new nodes consisting of a number 
of codes. As the coding progressed, nodes were amended, added or reclassified. 
 
Figure 5.2 NVivo Showing a List of Defined Nodes 
 
 
 
The coding process was based on the key research themes in the literature review and any 
emerging related themes, with each code representing one of these themes. The codes were 
classified into categories in order to answer the research questions. The transcripts were 
reviewed and meaningful words and phrases highlighted. Several themes emerged for 
codification; for example, the interviewees perceived the role of the AC in monitoring financial 
statements as effective, limited etc. These perceptions were given codes based on their 
meanings. These themes were categorised into sub-dimensions and checked for any potential 
linkage or relationship with the main research themes. This was useful as it enabled the 
researcher to categorise themes as relating to many or few participants. 
 
The NVivo program enabled the creation of a robust database for analysis and was much easier 
and more time-efficient than manual coding would have been. It allowed the researcher to 
manage and query data and ideas, and to arrive at basic themes which were instrumental in 
answering the research questions. 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the three philosophical standpoints most often employed 
in business research – positivism, anti-positivism and realism – and discusses the choice of 
realism as the most appropriate paradigm for developing a general understanding of ACs in 
Libya. Bisman (2010) argues that realist accounting studies employing both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies may generate reliable and high-quality results. Accordingly, this 
study uses a combination of quantitative questionnaire surveys and qualitative semi-structured 
interviews to address the research questions, with the questionnaire being used to elicit the 
views of five key groups within Libya’s banking sector, and the semi-structured interviews 
with senior employees being used to gain in-depth insights and to collect data that are beyond 
the scope of the questionnaire. 
 
The chapter discusses at length how the questionnaire and semi-structured interviews were 
designed so as to ensure that they would gather adequate data for the study. It describes the 
target population and sample for both the questionnaire survey and the interviews; the 
questionnaire design, pilot study and reliability measure; and the procedures for the interviews. 
Finally, it discusses the non-parametric statistical methods that were selected for the 
quantitative analysis (descriptive statistics such as frequency and percentage distribution, mean 
and standard deviation, and analytical statistical tests such as the Wilcoxon Signed Rank, 
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney) and the use of NVivo software for the qualitative analysis. 
The next chapters present in greater detail the analyses and discussion of the results obtained 
from these two data-gathering instruments. 
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Chapter 6. Analysing the Present Role of the Audit Committee 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The study’s conceptual framework identifies three key tasks: exploring the current practice of 
ACs in Libya’s banking sector; investigating the impact of specified factors on this practice; 
and identifying actions to enhance the committees’ effectiveness. This chapter presents and 
discusses the results gathered from the questionnaire and semi-structured interviews that 
pertain to the first of these tasks, as expressed in the first and second research questions; that 
is, what role do ACs currently play and how do they perform this role? Chapters 7 and 8 address 
the second and third tasks respectively. The questionnaire and interviews were conducted with 
individuals from five groups, which are widely regarded as the foundation stones upon which 
a bank’s monitoring mechanisms are built. These groups include members of the board of 
directors (BD), audit committee members (AC), executive managers (EM), internal auditors 
(IA) and external auditors (EM). 
 
As discussed in the literature review (Chapters 2 and 3), most developing countries lack an 
institutional framework for CG (Boubakri et al., 2005), meaning that ACs in these countries 
operate in an environment that is different from that seen in their more developed counterparts. 
This is likely to have an impact both on practice in these committees and on their effectiveness 
as mechanisms of CG. In the case of Libya, however, a lack of research means that little is even 
known about the current status of ACs. In order to assess their effectiveness, more must be 
understood about their composition, systems and structure and whether they are being given 
sufficient resources to perform their function (Morgan, 2010). As the first step towards this 
understanding, this chapter seeks to explore the current role of ACs in the Libyan banking 
sector. The interviewees and questionnaire respondents expressed a range of views about the 
role currently being played by ACs in this sector. Over the last two decades in particular, 
researchers and practitioners around the world have paid special attention to the role of the AC 
in ensuring responsible CG and protecting the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders 
(see section 1.1). It does this primarily by reviewing and monitoring the organisation’s financial 
reporting, internal audit function and the external audit process. These are therefore the focus 
of the following sections.  
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6.2 The Role of the Audit Committee in Monitoring Financial Statements 
Since 2001, regulators and governments have paid close attention to the AC and its role as the 
most prominent CG mechanism (Fichtner, 2010). Numerous studies have identified the 
monitoring of financial statements as a key aspect of this role; for example, Anderson et al., 
(2004) and Xie et al., (2003) both argue that the AC has a major impact on the reliability of 
financial reporting. This aspect of the AC’s role was therefore the focus of the first question in 
the survey.  
 
Table 6.1 presents the mean scores and standard deviations for the participants’ responses to 
this question. Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale the extent to 
which they agreed that the given statements described tasks undertaken by the AC as part of 
its role as the monitor of financial reporting. Statement 4 (“The AC reviews corrections made 
by management to financial statements”) generated the highest aggregated mean score (3.75), 
followed in descending order by statement 3 (“The AC reviews external audit reports 
concerning financial statements” – 3.74), statement 2 (“The AC monitors the extent to which 
the financial statement process complies with accounting standards” – 3.73) and statement 1 
(“The AC reviews significant accounting policies” – 3.50). The Cronbach's Alpha test 
generated a value of 0.78 for this question, which is higher than 0.70, indicating that all the 
data are reliable. 
 
The mean scores for the four statements were also aggregated by group in order to arrive at an 
overall mean for each group. The highest of these overall group means (3.85) came from the 
board members (BD) group, indicating that it agreed most strongly that ACs play an active role 
in monitoring financial statements. The second strongest agreement came from the external 
auditors (EA) group (3.75), followed by the internal auditors (IA) group (3.70) and finally the 
audit committee members (AC) group and the executive managers (EM) group (both 3.60). 
This lower mean score suggests that many AC members and executive managers might not be 
completely satisfied with how their AC is performing this aspect of its role. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics on AC’s Role in Financial Statements 
No Statements 
Group Means Total 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Rank 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
BD AC EM IA EA 
1. 
The AC reviews significant 
accounting policies. 
3.71 3.35 3.35 3.49 3.74 3.50 4.00 1.08 4 
0.78 
2. 
The AC monitors the 
compliance of the financial 
statement process with 
accounting standards. 
3.76 3.65 3.64 3.85 3.74 3.73 4.00 1.01 3 
3. 
The AC reviews and monitors 
EA reports concerning financial 
statements. 
3.86 3.82 3.80 3.69 3.63 3.74 4.00 1.14 2 
4. 
The AC reviews corrections 
made by management regarding 
deficiencies in the financial 
statements reported by auditors. 
4.05 3.59 3.61 3.79 3.89 3.75 4.00 1.00 1 
Overall Group Means 3.85 3.60 3.60 3.70 3.75 3-68 - - - 
BD: Board members      AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 shows how the responses to this question were distributed both within individual 
groups and across the sample as a whole. In order to facilitate the process of analysis, the 
strongly disagree and disagree responses were combined, as were the strongly agree and agree 
responses. The answers from the mid-point of the Likert scale were placed in the uncertain 
category. Across the sample as a whole, statement 4 attracted the highest percentage of agree 
answers (71.6%), followed by statement 3 (71.1%), statement 2 (68.8%) and statement 1 
(61.9%). There was thus a high level of agreement with all four statements. It should be noted, 
however, that between 15.6% and 20.6% of the sample as a whole were uncertain whether 
these tasks are undertaken by ACs (or were reluctant to give an opinion). 
 
 
It should also be noted that for every statement, the percentage of respondents expressing 
agreement was higher in the BD group than in any other group (76.2%, 76.2%, 71.5% and 
85.7%). This indicates that these board members were generally satisfied with how their AC 
monitors financial statements. There was much less satisfaction among members of the AC 
group, however, with this group recording the lowest percentage of respondents expressing 
agreement for three out of the four statements (53.0%, 70.6%, 58.8% and 58.8%). The result 
P a g e  | 91 
 
is indicative of a clear gap between board members and AC members concerning the 
committee’s role in monitoring financial statements. It suggests that many AC members 
themselves are not satisfied with this aspect of their role. This was confirmed in the interviews 
(see below) when several AC members explained that their committee has only limited 
involvement in the financial reporting process.  
 
 
Table 6.2 Frequency Distribution of Responses on AC's Role in Financial Statements 
No Statements 
Board 
Members 
N = 21 
AC 
Members 
N = 17 
Executive 
Managers 
N = 74 
Internal 
Auditors 
N = 71 
External 
Auditors 
 N = 35 
Total 
N = 218 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
1. 
The AC reviews 
significant accounting 
policies. 
19.0 4.8 76.2 17.7 29.4 53.0 24.4 14.9 60.7 12.7 31.0 56.3 11.5 17.1 71.4 17.5 20.6 61.9 
2. 
The AC monitors the 
compliance of the 
financial statement 
process with accounting 
standards. 
9.5 14.3 76.2 11.8 29.4 58.8 14.8 12.2 73.0 11.2 15.5 73.3 14.3 17.1 68.6 12.8 15.6 71.6 
3. 
The AC reviews and 
monitors EA reports 
concerning financial 
statements. 
9.5 19.0 71.5 11.8 17.6 70.6 14.9 14.9 70.2 15.5 19.7 64.8 20.0 8.6 71.4 15.1 16.1 68.8 
4. 
The AC reviews corrections 
made by management 
regarding deficiencies in 
the financial statements 
reported by auditors 
14.3 0.0 85.7 17.6 23.6 58.8 14.9 14.9 70.2 8.5 23.9 67.6 14.2 8.6 77.2 12.8 16.1 71.1 
D: Strongly disagree and disagree          U: Uncertain         A: Strongly agree and agree 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the Kruskal-Wallis test found no significant differences between the 
groups for any of the four statements, producing values of 0.21, 0.94, 0.81 and 0.40 respectively. 
The Mann-Whitney test confirmed that there were no statistically significant differences 
between pairs of groups on this question apart from between the BD group and the EM group 
on statement 4. The result here (0.04) may be another indicator that many executive managers 
are dissatisfied with the role their AC plays in monitoring financial statements. 
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Table 6.3 Comparisons Between Groups on AC’s Role in Financial Statements 
NO    
Statements Kruskal-
Wallis 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
  BD-AC BD-EM BD-IA  BD-EA  AC-EM AC-IA  AC-EA  EM-IA  EM-EA IA-EA 
1. The AC reviews significant 
accounting policies. 
0.40 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.99 0.74 0.56 0.14 0.73 0.13 0.22 
2. 
The AC monitors the 
compliance of the financial 
statement process with 
accounting standards. 
0.81 0.80 0.90 0.50 0.86 0.89 0.46 0.74 0.24 0.67 0.62 
3. 
The AC reviews and monitors 
EA reports concerning 
financial statements. 
0.94 0.90 0.87 0.69 0.75 0.99 0.63 0.68 0.45 0.53 0.99 
4. 
The AC reviews corrections 
made by management 
regarding deficiencies in the 
financial statements reported 
by auditors. 
0.21 0.12 0.04* 0.18 0.54 0.77 0.42 0.24 0.40 0.11 0.43 
*P -values < 0.05 
 
 
 
The interviews provided further confirmation of the perceived importance of this role, with 70% 
of the interviewees asserting that one of the main responsibilities of the audit committee is to 
review and monitor financial statements. The AC member explained that the committee has 
the important job of reviewing these statements before they are submitted to the board: 
 
“The audit committee reviews the financial statements and makes sure all the 
key items are on these statements before submission to the board of directors” 
AC (2-1). 
 
This was echoed by another AC member, also from a mixed ownership bank: 
“The audit committee reviews the financial statements and reports before 
submission to the board of directors, and also when the external auditor 
submits his report, it prepares a report and recommendations for the board” 
AC (2-2). 
 
The director of internal auditing from another mixed ownership bank also explained that it is 
the committee’s responsibility to offer the board comments and notes on the financial statement: 
“The audit committee examines and reviews the financial statements and then 
comments on them; for example, the committee might recommend the creation 
of some allowances in the balance sheet of the bank” IA (4-1). 
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The comments suggest that these interviewees see the audit committee as being actively 
involved in most of the details surrounding the financial reporting process. This level of 
involvement is advocated both by academics, who argue that audit committees should actively 
participate in the supervising and monitoring functions alongside managers and external 
auditors (Campbell et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2004; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Beasley et al., 
2009), and by regulators, who see proactive audit committees as enhancing the reliability and 
credibility of the financial reporting process for end-users (Abernathy et al. 2013). 
 
This level of participation by the AC is not universal, however; about 30% of the interviewees 
described their AC as having only limited involvement in the financial reporting process, 
usually because it is seen as primarily the responsibility of the board. One board member from 
a mixed ownership bank explained that the AC in his bank does not have time to review the 
financial statements in this level of detail, only stepping in if there are problems: 
 
“The audit committee does not have enough time to review the financial 
statements in detail, but it may talk to the executive management if there are 
any issues regarding the financial statements, such as questions about 
accounting policy, or if any changes are needed. It may also require the 
internal auditor to talk to the management, so the internal auditor is also 
expected to provide a report for the audit committee” BD (1-4). 
 
Similarly, an audit committee member from a state bank explained that although the AC in his 
bank does play some role, the ultimate responsibility for reviewing financial statements rests 
with the board. He explained that: 
 
“The audit committee reviews and looks at the financial situation of the bank, 
and it reports to the board and makes recommendations, and then the board 
reviews the financial statements in the board meetings” AC (2-4). 
 
The aim of this section was to explore the range of tasks ACs in Libyan banks are expected to 
perform in regard to financial statements. The findings indicate that the majority of participants 
saw the AC’s role in this regard as consisting of four main responsibilities: to review 
corrections made by management concerning financial statements; to review and monitor 
external audit reports concerning financial statements; to monitor the compliance of the 
financial statement process with accounting standards; and to review significant accounting 
policies. However, the findings from the survey and the interviews also suggest that while there 
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appears to be a clear theoretical understanding of and support for this aspect of the AC’s 
monitoring role, this is not always being translated into good practice. Audit committees are in 
many cases playing a part in the financial reporting process (Lin et al., 2006), but it does not 
necessarily mean that they do so effectively; Abbott et al. (2004) and Soliman and Ragab (2014) 
observe that many audit committee meetings do little in practice to enhance the quality of 
financial reporting. While the findings are consistent with agency theory in the sense that ACs 
are perceived as playing an important role in monitoring and enhancing financial statements 
and improving information flow between managers and shareholders (Beasley et al., 2009; 
Samaha et al., 2012), they suggest that their ability to make any real practical contribution is 
limited either because they are given too narrow a scope or not enough time to do the job 
properly. This limitation of the AC’s role is more compatible with institutional theory’s 
assumption that the mechanism is designed mainly to signal the bank’s legitimacy within the 
sector and beyond. 
 
6.3 The Role of the Audit Committee in the Internal Audit Function  
The relationship between the members of the AC and the internal audit department is central 
to achieving good CG, effective monitoring and effective risk management (Marx and Voogt, 
2010; Alzebana and Sawan, 2015). This relationship has the potential to improve the 
governance capabilities of both parties (Cohen et al., 2004). Moreover, the AC can play the 
main role in verifying the effectiveness of internal control procedures (Rich and Zhang, 2014; 
Bardhan et al., 2015). This survey question therefore sought to explore respondents’ 
perceptions regarding the AC’s role within the internal audit function. To this end, the 
respondents were given eight statements describing tasks ACs might be expected to perform 
as part of this role and asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that ACs in Libya carry 
out these tasks.  
 
Table 6.4 presents the total mean scores and standard deviations for their responses to these 
eight statements. It shows that overall, the five groups expressed the strongest agreement with 
the second statement (total mean 3.95): “The AC reviews the internal audit reports and any 
actions taken as a result”. The second most strongly supported statement was number 6 (“The 
AC promotes the independence of the internal auditors” – 3.86), followed by statement 1 (“The 
AC reviews the objectives, plan, functions and terms of reference of the internal audit” – 3.81), 
statement 4 (“The AC receives reports on the results of internal auditors’ work” – 3.77), 
statement 8 (“The AC reviews the effectiveness of internal controls” – 3.73), statement 7 (“The 
AC can recommend the appointment or replacement of an internal auditing director” – 3.66), 
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statement 3 (“The AC ensures that the internal audit has the necessary resources” – 3.66) and 
finally, statement 5 (“The AC meets with the head of internal auditing at least once a year” – 
3.54). The rank order notwithstanding, these mean values show that the sample as a whole 
agreed that ACs in Libya perform all of these tasks as part of their internal audit role. 
 
Breaking the responses down by group, it was the AC group that was the most convinced of 
the AC’s role in the internal audit function. This group produced an overall group mean of 3.89 
for the eight statements. This was followed by the BD group (3.85), the IA group (3.84), the 
EA group (3.72) and finally the EM group (3.61). Once again, the lower mean score from the 
EM group may mean that the executive managers in the sample were less than satisfied with 
how ACs in the Libyan banking sector perform this role. However, this may be partly 
attributable to sensitivity on the part of executive managers – they may not like the fact that 
internal auditors are supervised by the AC rather than by the management, and that the internal 
audit department reports on the work of other departments directly to the committee. The 
Cronbach's Alpha result for this question was 0.85, which was higher than 0.70. 
 
Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics on AC’s Role in the Internal Audit Function 
No Statements 
Group Means Total 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Rank 
Cronbach's 
Alpha BD AC EM IA EA 
1. 
The AC reviews the objectives, plan 
and functions of the internal audit 
4.10 3.82 3.55 3.93 3.91 3.81 4.00 0.98 3 
0.85 
2. 
The AC reviews the internal audit 
reports  
4.05 3.94 3.88 3.93 4.09 3.95 4.00 0.93 1 
3. 
The AC ensures that the internal audit 
has the necessary resources 
3.52 3.94 3.55 3.73 3.66 3.66 4.00 1.05 7 
4. 
The AC receives reports on the results 
of internal auditors’ work 
3.91 3.53 3.68 3.90 3.71 3.77 4.00 1.05 4 
5. 
The AC meets with the head of internal 
auditing without the presence of 
management 
3.71 3.65 3.45 3.59 3.46 3.54 4.00 1.10 8 
6. 
The AC promotes the independence of 
the internal auditors 
3.86 4.41 3.68 4.00 3.69 3.86 4.00 0.98 2 
7. 
The AC recommends the appointment 
or replacement of internal auditing 
director 
4.00 3.82 3.55 3.70 3.51 3.66 4.00 1.04 6 
8. 
The AC reviews the effectiveness of 
internal controls 
3.67 4.00 3.54 3.88 3.71 3.73 4.00 0.88 5 
Overall Group Means 3.85 3.89 3.61 3.84 3.72 3.75  - - 
BD: Board members      AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
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Table 6.5 presents the distribution of responses to this question. Across the sample as a whole, 
78.5% of respondents agreed with statement 2 that: “The AC reviews the internal audit reports 
and any actions taken as a result”. This was the highest level of agreement for any statement. 
The second highest level of agreement was recorded for statement 6 (74.8%), followed by 
statement 1 (73.8%), statement 4 (72.5%), statement 8 (71.1%) and statement 3 (64.2%). 
Statements 5 and 7 recorded the lowest levels of agreement, with 55.9% and 55.5% respectively. 
As mentioned above, it seems that a fair number of the participants, particularly executive 
managers, were not completely convinced of these two statements. This result agrees with the 
results in the last table. 
 
Table 6.5 Frequency Distribution of Responses on AC's Role in Internal Audit Function 
NO Statements 
Board 
Members 
N = 21 
AC 
Members 
N = 17 
Executive 
Managers 
N = 74 
Internal 
Auditors 
N = 71 
External 
Auditors 
 N = 35 
Total 
N = 218 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
1. 
The AC reviews the objectives, 
plan and functions of the 
internal audit 
4.8 9.5 85.7 5.9 17.6 76.5 17.6 16.2 66.2 9.8 12.7 77.5 11.5 14.3 74.3 11.9 14.2 73.8 
2. 
The AC reviews the internal 
audit reports  
0.0 14.3 85.7 0.0 23.5 76.4 9.5 14.9 75.7 9.8 8.5 81.6 8.6 17.1 74.3 7.8 13.8 78.5 
3. 
The AC ensures that the 
internal audit has the necessary 
resources 
14.3 28.6 57.2 0.0 23.5 76.4 16.2 21.6 62.2 15.5 18.3 67.2 11.4 25.7 62.9 13.7 22.0 64.2 
4. 
The AC receives reports on the 
results of internal auditors’ 
work 
9.5 9.5 80.9 17.7 23.5 58.8 13.5 16.2 70.3 12.6 7.0 80.3 8.6 28.6 62.9 12.4 15.1 72.5 
5. 
The AC meets with the head of 
internal auditing without the 
presence of management 
19.1 19.0 61.9 11.8 29.4 58.8 20.3 27.0 52.7 12.6 25.4 62.0 14.3 40.0 45.7 16.1 28.0 55.9 
6. 
The AC promotes the 
independence of the internal 
auditors 
9.5 14.3 76.1 0.0 17.6 82.3 10.9 20.3 68.9 7.0 9.9 83.1 17.2 17.1 65.8 9.7 15.6 74.8 
7. 
The AC recommends the 
appointment or replacement of 
internal auditing director 
9.5 14.3 76.2 11.8 23.5 64.7 10.9 39.2 50.0 9.8 36.6 53.5 17.1 28.6 54.3 11.5 33.0 55.5 
8. 
The AC reviews the 
effectiveness of internal 
controls 
14.3 9.5 76.2 5.9 11.8 82.3 13.6 24.3 62.2 5.6 18.3 76.0 14.3 14.3 71.4 10.5 18.3 71.1 
D: Strongly disagree and disagree          U: Uncertain         A: Strongly agree and agree 
 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 6.6) highlighted that there were significant differences 
among the groups in regard to the AC’s responsibility for reviewing the objectives, plan, 
functions and terms of reference of the internal audit (statement 1) and its promotion of internal 
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auditors’ independence (statement 6). The p-values for these two statements were 0.04 and 
0.02 respectively. The test highlighted no significant differences in relation to the other 
statements, however. When the results for these two statements were explored further using 
the Mann-Whitney test, the results revealed significant differences between the BD and EM 
groups (0.02) and between the EM and IA groups (0.01) on statement 1. On statement 6, the 
differences were between the BD and AC groups (0.04), between the AC and EM groups (0.00), 
between the AC and EA groups (0.02) and between the EM and IA groups (0.03). The Mann-
Whitney test also revealed a significant difference between the EM and IA groups (0.03) on 
statement 8. The test results indicate that in most cases, it was the EM group that differed from 
the other groups. This was reflected in the overall group means for each group. The results 
echo those in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 in indicating that the executive managers were not completely 
satisfied with how ACs perform their role within the internal audit function.  
 
Table 6.6 Comparisons Between Groups on AC’s Role in Internal Audit Function 
NO    
Statements 
Krusk
al-
Wallis 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
  BD-AC  BD-EM BD-IA  BD-EA  AC-EM AC-IA  AC-EA  EM-IA  EM-EA IA-EA 
1. The AC reviews the objectives, plan 
and functions of the internal audit 
0.04* 0.22 0.02* 0.68 0.67 0.39 0.36 0.46 0.01* 0.05 0.95 
2. The AC reviews the internal audit 
reports  
0.68 0.60 0.77 0.97 0.41 0.82 0.63 0.28 0.76 0.19 0.24 
3. The AC ensures that the internal 
audit has the necessary resources 
0.71 0.22 0.75 0.36 0.59 0.28 0.68 0.45 0.35 0.74 0.68 
4. The AC receives reports on the 
results of internal auditors’ work 
0.39 0.40 0.39 0.66 0.50 0.74 0.22 0.73 0.08 0.96 0.21 
5. 
The AC meets with the head of 
internal auditing without the 
presence of management 
0.75 0.77 0.31 0.51 0.35 0.52 0.84 0.49 0.44 0.93 0.41 
6. 
The AC promotes the 
independence of the internal 
auditors 
0.02* 0.04* 0.53 0.39 0.66 0.00* 0.06 0.02* 0.03* 0.92 0.14 
7. 
The AC recommends the 
appointment or replacement of the 
internal auditing director 
0.38 0.58 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.32 0.68 0.37 0.41 0.98 0.48 
8. The AC reviews the effectiveness of 
internal controls 
0.14 0.19 0.53 0.33 0.71 0.05 0.53 0.35 0.03* 0.28 0.54 
*P -values < 0.05 
 
 
The interviewees expressed a high level of support for the AC’s role within the internal audit 
function, with 90% of respondents asserting that overseeing this function is one of the 
committee’s main responsibilities (the remaining 10% said that their AC does not currently 
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perform this role because its relationship with the internal audit department is weak or 
dysfunctional). The same high percentage (90%) said that the AC regularly meets with the 
director of internal auditing, while 75% said that the committee can make recommendations to 
the board for his appointment or replacement. Finally, 85% of the interviewees said their AC 
is responsible for reviewing internal controls. 
 
The head of internal auditing in one mixed ownership bank summed up the committee’s role 
as being not just to oversee the internal audit function but also to support the work of the 
internal audit department: 
“The audit committee oversees the internal audit function, and therefore, the 
role of the audit committee is to identify problems and difficulties faced by the 
internal audit department. The committee should then resolve these problems 
and difficulties” IA (4-1). 
. 
Another director of internal auditing described how the oversight process works; that is, by the 
internal audit department submitting reports and information to the committee about the 
activities of the bank’s management. Typically, 
  
“……...the internal audit department sends reports and observations to the 
audit committee about the work of the various departments in the bank, usually 
on a quarterly basis” IA (4-3). 
 
This was confirmed by an AC chairman from one state bank in the sample, who explained 
that: 
“The audit committee supervises all the activities of the internal audit 
department and receives its reports on its work and the problems that it faces” 
AC (2-3). 
 
The comments highlight the importance of the relationship between the audit committee and 
the internal audit department, apparently supporting Oxner and Oxner’s (2006) finding that the 
former often rely on the latter to give them greater access to information within the 
organisation. Indeed, the internal audit department frequently acts as the eyes and ears of the 
audit committee when it comes to matters such as choosing external auditors and evaluating 
their work (Saint, 2013; Eller, 2014). Equally important, however, is the fact that the 
relationship promotes objectivity and transparency within the organisation – because the 
internal audit department submits its reports to the audit committee rather than to the 
administration (Eller, 2014). 
P a g e  | 99 
 
 
When the relationship between the audit committee and the internal audit department is 
dysfunctional, this can cause problems for the bank, as was highlighted by an external auditor 
of a bank: 
  
“The audit committee's relationship with the internal audit is very weak, and 
the weaknesses of the work of the internal auditors are not addressed by this 
committee” EA (5-3). 
 
The weakness of the relationship means that the committee is unable or unwilling to address 
deficiencies in the work of the internal audit department, but as a board member from another 
mixed ownership bank explained, such deficiencies can have an adverse impact on the audit 
committee’s ability to do its own job: 
  
“Although the audit committee plays a role in the internal audit by following 
the work of internal auditors and their reports and observations, the poor 
quality of the internal audit department and its reports affects the work of the 
audit committee, which, in turn, tries to overcome this weakness by 
intensifying its efforts” BD (1-4). 
 
All of the interviewees agreed that their AC has regular meetings with the internal auditors. 
The director of the internal audit department in one mixed ownership bank asserted that: 
“The audit committee meets the director of the internal audit department 
without the presence of management. The meeting may also be attended by 
the assistant director of the internal audit department and the heads of internal 
auditing from the branches” IA (4-1). 
 
The AC’s role in recommending the appointment and replacement of internal audit directors 
was confirmed during the interviews by the board chairman from one state bank:  
 
“The audit committee makes recommendations to the board of directors 
regarding the appointment and replacement of the director of the internal audit 
department. For example, in the past year, he was replaced on the 
recommendation of the audit committee” BD (1-3). 
 
The interviewees also described the role played by the audit committee in monitoring the 
effectiveness of internal controls. For instance, the board chairman of one mixed ownership 
bank stated that: 
“The audit committee reviews the reports of the internal and external auditors 
with respect to internal controls, including any noted deficiencies and 
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observations, and follows up the corrective actions taken by management in 
response to these deficiencies and observations” BD (1-2).  
 
Similarly, the general manager of a private bank stated that: 
“The audit committee reviews the observations of the internal and external 
auditors in relation to deficiencies in internal control and submits a report 
about these deficiencies to the board of directors” EM (3-4). 
 
The above comments confirm the finding from the literature that audit committees are seen as 
playing a significant role in monitoring internal control systems within organisations. This 
stream of research has focused on the audit committee’s duty to verify the effectiveness of 
internal control procedures (Klein, 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; Rich and Zhang, 2014; Bardhan 
et al., 2015), to identify any weaknesses within these procedures and to discuss with internal 
and external auditors what actions can be taken to fix these weaknesses (Goh, 2009). 
 
In summary, the survey respondents thought ACs currently perform all the activities described 
in the given statements as part of their internal auditing role. This finding, which was confirmed 
in the interviews, is consistent with those identified by previous authors including Cohen et al. 
(2004), Marx and Voogt (2010) and Alzebana and Sawan (2015). These authors all highlight 
the relationship and interaction between the AC and the internal audit department as a key 
factor in achieving effective CG. The majority of respondents pointed to the significant role 
the AC plays in overseeing the internal audit function, in resolving any problems and 
difficulties faced by the internal audit department and in recommending new appointments to 
the director’s job. This is consistent with the findings of Turley and Zaman (2007), who state 
that internal auditors see the AC as giving greater significance to their activities within the 
organisation, and therefore as enhancing their effectiveness and promoting their independence 
(Ahmad et al., 2009). Finally, the majority of respondents highlighted the committee’s role in 
overseeing internal control systems. This echoes Rich and Zhang (2014) and Bardhan et al. 
(2015), who argue that ACs should play the main role in evaluating the effectiveness of these 
systems.  
 
The findings thus seem to support agency theory’s view that an effective AC can play a major 
monitoring role. However, they also illustrate that this effectiveness depends to some extent on 
the committee’s relationship with the internal audit department, and as a number of 
interviewees pointed out, this relationship may not always be strong. Institutional theory may 
offer one explanation for this; ACs that have been established primarily for the purpose of 
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creating legitimacy outside the organisation may be less inclined (or less able) to forge strong 
links with this department.  
 
6.4 The Role of the Audit Committee in the Work of the External Audit 
The audit committee can potentially play a major role in strengthening the external audit 
process. For example, it may be responsible for supervising the firm's relationship with the 
external auditor, acting as a liaison between this person and the board of directors and helping 
to ensure the quality of the external audit (Smith, 2003; Bédard and Compernolle, 2014). Its 
duties may include reviewing the scope of the audit, meeting with the external auditor to discuss 
all issues relating to the audit and finally, reviewing the results at the end of the audit process.  
The purpose of this survey question was to elicit the respondents’ views regarding the role ACs 
in Libya's banking sector currently play in this process. To this end, they were given five 
statements describing tasks the AC might be expected to perform as part of this role and asked 
to indicate whether these tasks are in fact performed by ACs in the sector. 
 
As may be observed in Table 6.7, respondents generally expressed weaker agreement with 
these statements than they did with the statements in the internal audit question. This is 
reflected in the total mean scores in the table, which show that statement 2 (“The AC reviews 
and investigates the findings of the annual audit provided by the external auditors”) scored 
highest with just 3.62. Statement 3 (“The AC ensures that audit fees are sufficient to perform 
the audit process effectively”) scored next highest with 3.46, followed by statement 5 
(“External auditors are appointed and replaced at the recommendation of the AC” – 3.33), 
statement 1 (“The AC reviews and monitors the activities, resources, expertise and 
independence of the external auditors – 3.18) and finally, statement 4 (“The AC meets with the 
external auditors without the presence of the management to discuss issues related to the audit 
process – 3.10). The bottom means are significantly lower than they were in the question 
relating to the AC’s role within the internal audit function. 
 
When the means were aggregated across the five statements, this yielded overall group means 
of 3.69 (BD group), 3.55 (AC group), 3.36 (EA group), 3.32 (IA group) and 3.20 (EM group). 
As in the previous questions, the lowest mean score was again produced by the executive 
managers, suggesting that they do not see ACs as playing a major role within the external audit 
function. Table 6.7 shows that the Cronbach's Alpha test yielded a result of 0.77 for this 
question. 
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Table 6.7 Descriptive Statistics on AC’s Role in the External Audit’s Work 
No Statements 
Group Means Total 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Rank 
Cronbach's 
Alpha BD AC EM IA EA 
1. 
The AC monitors the 
activities, resources, expertise 
and independence of the EA 
3.62 3.18 3.03 3.13 3.37 3.18 3.00 1.09 4 
0.77 
2. 
The AC reviews the findings 
of the annual audit 
4.05 3.65 3.57 3.58 3.54 3.62 4.00 0.98 1 
3. 
The AC reviews and 
investigates the audit fees  
3.52 3.59 3.28 3.65 3.37 3.46 4.00 0.99 2 
4. 
The AC meets the EA without 
the presence of management 
3.43 3.77 2.92 3.00 3.17 3.10 3.00 1.08 5 
5. 
The AC recommends the 
appointment and replacement 
of the EA 
3.81 3.59 3.20 3.25 3.34 3.33 3.00 1.10 3 
Overall Group Means 3.69 3.55 3.20 3.32 3.36 3.32 3.69 - - 
BD: Board members      AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
 
 
Table 6.8, which shows how responses to the statements in this question were distributed, 
reveals that across the sample as a whole, only two statements produced agreement from the 
respondents. These were statement 2, which 58.3% of participants agreed with, and statement 
3, which drew agreement from 57.8% of participants. On the other hand, only 43.2% of the 
total sample agreed with statement 5, 39.9% agreed with statement 1 and just 37.6% agreed 
with statement 4. 
 
These differences are made clearer when the responses to each statement are broken down by 
group. On the one hand, both the BD and AC groups expressed agreement with all five 
statements (the BD group generated group means of 61.9%, 80.9%, 61.9%, 57.2% and 71.4% 
for statements 1 to 5 respectively, while the AC group generated means of 53.0%, 58.9%, 
64.7%, 70.5% and 64.7% respectively). On the other hand, the EA group only agreed with 
three statements (statement 2: 77.2%, statement 3: 51.4% and statement 5: 51.4%), while the 
EM and IA groups only agreed with statement 2 (56.8% and 53.5% respectively) and statement 
3 (75.7% and 63.4% respectively). These findings suggest that audit committees in the Libyan 
banking sector are, for whatever reason, not yet performing the full range of tasks necessary to 
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carry out their role within the external audit function. This is in line with several previous 
studies that have found that external auditors generally see audit committees as having only 
limited power or effect and therefore as doing little to promote their work (Cohen et al., 2002; 
Turley and Zaman, 2004).    
 
Table 6.8 Frequency Distribution of Responses on AC's Role in External Audit Work 
No Statements 
Board 
Members 
N = 21 
AC 
Members 
N = 17 
Executive 
Managers 
N = 74 
Internal 
Auditors 
N = 71 
External 
Auditors 
 N = 35 
Total 
N = 218 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
1. 
The AC monitors the 
activities, resources, 
expertise and independence 
of the EA 
9.5 28.6 61.9 35.2 11.8 53.0 35.2 32.4 32.5 25.3 40.8 33.8 22.8 28.6 48.6 27.6 32.6 39.9 
2. 
The AC reviews the 
findings of the 
annual audit 
0.0 19.0 80.9 5.9 35.3 58.9 12.2 31.1 56.8 8.4 38.0 53.5 20.0 22.9 77.2 10.6 31.2 58.3 
3. 
The AC reviews and 
investigates the audit 
fees 
14.3 23.8 61.9 17.7 17.6 64.7 23.0 24.3 75.7 5.6 31.0 63.4 25.7 22.9 51.4 16.5 25.7 57.8 
4. 
The AC meets the EA 
without the presence of 
management 
19.0 23.8 57.2 11.8 17.6 70.5 36.5 35.1 28.4 33.8 35.2 31.0 37.2 20.0 42.9 32.1 30.3 37.6 
5. 
The AC recommends the 
appointment and 
replacement of the EA 
4.8 23.8 71.4 23.5 11.8 64.7 20.3 44.6 35.2 18.3 47.9 33.8 28.6 20.0 51.4 19.7 37.2 43.2 
D: Strongly disagree and disagree          U: Uncertain         A: Strongly agree and agree 
 
 
Table 6.9 shows no significant differences among the groups apart from on statement 4, which 
generated a p-value of 0.02 when the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. This statement 
concerned ACs meeting with external auditors without the presence of the management. 
However, when the Mann-Whitney test was conducted, significant differences emerged 
between pairs of groups on all but one of the statements. On statement 1, these differences were 
between the BD and EM groups (0.01) and between the BD and IA groups (0.04). The same 
pairings exhibited differences on statement 2 (0.04 and 0.03 respectively) and statement 5 (0.01 
and 0.01 respectively). On statement 4 there were significant differences between the BD and 
EM groups (0.03), and between the AC and EI (0.00) and AC and IA groups (0.01). The higher 
level of support expressed for these statements by the BD group and AC group may be due to 
the fact that these groups are the most familiar with this aspect of the AC’s role. 
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Table 6.9 Comparisons Between Groups on AC’s Role in External Audit Work 
NO    
Statements 
  Kruskal-
Wallis 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
  BD-AC  BD-EM BD-IA  BD-EA AC-EM AC-IA  AC-EA  EM-IA EM-EA IA-EA 
1. 
The AC monitors the 
activities, resources, 
expertise and 
independence of the EA 
0.12 0.26 0.01* 0.04* 0.57 0.53 0.75 0.57 0.48 0.11 0.24 
2. 
The AC reviews the 
findings of the annual 
audit 
0.32 0.11 0.04* 0.03* 0.24 0.86 0.82 0.90 0.96 0.74 0.73 
3. The AC reviews and 
investigates the audit fees 
0.37 0.74 0.34 0.77 0.70 0.23 0.86 0.55 0.05 0.64 0.35 
4. 
The AC meets the EA 
without the presence of 
management 
0.02* 0.24 0.03* 0.08 0.46 0.00* 0.01* 0.11 0.67 0.34 0.53 
5. 
The AC recommends the 
appointment and 
replacement of the EA 
0.09 0.56 0.01* 0.01* 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.54 0.84 0.45 0.60 
BD: Board members      AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
 
 
Interestingly, the interviewees expressed stronger agreement with the five statements than the 
survey respondents, with 50% of the interviewees (compared to 39.9% in the survey) noting 
that ACs in Libya’s banking sector oversee and monitor the work of external auditors; 65% 
(compared to 58.3% in the survey) agreeing that these committees examine the results of the 
audit process and report to the board of directors; 80% (compared to 37.6% in the survey) 
agreeing that ACs meet with the external auditors as required; and 75% (compared to 43.2% 
in the survey) asserting that they recommend appointees or replacements to the board.  
 
Asked about the AC’s roles and responsibilities in terms of the external audit function, one 
board member serving from a state bank offered the following brief summary: 
  
“The audit committee monitors and supervises the work of the external auditor 
in the bank and examines the results of the external audit, providing a report 
for the board of directors so that it can make the necessary decisions” BD (1-
1). 
 
Asked about this role, the AC chairman from one mixed ownership bank echoed DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) and Keune and Johnstone (2012) in seeing it as the committee’s role to 
intercede in any disputes between management and external auditors (though Cohen et al. 
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(2010) found that half of the auditors in their study saw such interventions as at best ineffectual 
and at worst counter-productive (Grenier et al., 2012)). This interviewee offered the following 
brief summary: 
 
“The audit committee acts as a liaison between the board of directors and the 
external auditor, resolving any disagreements between them. It also discusses 
the audit report with the external auditor and follows up on the observations 
made in the report” AC (2-1). 
 
Another AC chairman, from a state bank, explained that it is the AC’s job to review the audit 
plan with the external auditor. This is consistent with the Smith Report (2003), which 
recommends that the AC should review the scope of the external audit and the adequacy of the 
work that is planned. He also acknowledged that the AC “tries” to obtain information from the 
auditor about the deficiencies and weaknesses within the bank: 
 
  
“The audit committee reviews the audit plan with the external auditor and 
afterwards, discusses with him what he has achieved and what problems he 
faced. The committee tries to facilitate his work and resolve any problems with 
the management, and it tries to get information from the auditor about any 
weaknesses in the bank’s internal control systems. Finally, it discusses with 
him the report of the audit process” AC (2-3). 
 
Both of these AC chairmen echo the point made in the literature that at the conclusion of the 
external audit, the audit committee should discuss the results with the auditor (Stewart and 
Munro, 2007). 
 
Other interviewees offered a more sceptical assessment of the AC’s influence, however. For 
example, one of the external auditors observed that ACs rarely follow up on the observations 
made in the external audit report: 
  
“There is no follow-up and supervision by the audit committee of the work of 
the external auditor, particularly in the branches of banks. However, it often 
reviews the external auditor reports” EA (5-2). 
 
However, the interviewees did confirm that audit committees meet regularly – or at least, as 
required – with external auditors: 
  
“The audit committee meets with the external auditor when required and 
without the presence of management” AC (2-1). 
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And an audit committee member from a state bank explained that: 
 
"The audit committee meets with the external auditor on average twice a year. 
The audit committee members first discuss the audit process with the external 
auditor, and at the end, they discuss the report of the audit process" AC (2-4). 
 
This is in line with Stewart and Munro’s (2007) suggestion that the committee should meet at 
least annually with the external auditors, without management, in order to discuss all matters 
relating to the work of the external audit. 
When asked whether the AC is responsible for recommending the appointment or replacement 
of external auditors, an AC member from a state bank explained that: 
 
“The audit committee chooses an external auditor based on certain criteria. It 
recommends its choice to the board of directors, to be appointed for a period 
of two years, which can be extended for a further two years. Then the board 
recommends the general assembly of shareholders to approve the appointment” 
AC (2-4). 
 
This seems to be in line with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which stipulates that the audit 
committee is responsible for the appointment of external auditors. However, the evidence 
suggests that in practice, appointment decisions are greatly affected by management 
affiliations, making it doubtful whether audit committees can work independently of 
management in this matter (Stewart and Munro, 2007). 
 
The aim of these questions was to focus on the role played by the AC in the external audit 
process. The findings show that most of the survey participants agreed that: “The AC reviews 
and investigates the findings of the annual audit provided by the external auditors” and “The 
AC ensures that audit fees are sufficient to perform the audit process effectively”. However, 
there was less support for the other three statements: “External auditors are appointed and 
replaced at the recommendation of the AC”, “The AC reviews and monitors the activities, 
resources, expertise and independence of the external auditors” and “The AC meets with the 
external auditors without the presence of the management to discuss issues related to the audit 
process”. This finding is consistent with previous studies, such as those by Cohen et al. (2002) 
and Bédard and Compernolle (2014), which have concluded that the audit committee plays a 
less significant role in the external audit process than it does in the internal audit function.  
 
Despite this, the interviews showed that many ACs play a positive role in the external audit 
process, and that this contribution is valued. For example, several interviewees pointed to the 
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committee’s work liaising and resolving disagreements between external auditors, the board of 
directors and managers. This is not surprising, as a number of prior studies have argued that 
this is well within the power of a high-quality audit committee (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; 
Turley and Zaman, 2004; Keune and Johnstone, 2012). Others, however, have shown that 
external auditors are occasionally sceptical about the ability of these committees to address 
disagreements with management (Cohen et al., 2002). The mention by one interviewee of the 
AC’s attempts to extract information from the external auditors about the deficiencies and 
weaknesses in the bank’s control systems illustrates one of the problems faced by audit 
committees. Cohen et al. (2008) argue that external auditors should talk to the audit committee 
about any concerns and weaknesses within the organisation, but it seems that at present, this 
communication is often inadequate (Goff, 2013). As a result, the committee’s ability to enhance 
the independence, effectiveness and objectivity of the external audit process is limited. 
Institutional theory may offer a plausible explanation for this; it may be that ACs in the Libyan 
banking sector are essentially formed to create legitimacy outside the organisation rather than 
to provide effective support for the external audit process.  
 
6.5 Discussion of the Results 
The results of the study indicate that ACs in the Libyan banking sector are seen as performing 
a three-fold monitoring role. The first aspect of this role – monitoring the financial statements 
– involves reviewing managers’ corrections to the statements, external auditors’ reports on the 
statements, the financial statement process’s compliance with accounting standards, and 
significant accounting policies. This is consistent with regulators such as SOX (2002) and FRC 
(2012), who stipulate that the AC should play a major role in the monitoring and review of 
financial statements, and with researchers such as Xie et al. (2003), Anderson et al. (2004), Lin 
et al. (2006) and Abernathy et al. (2013), all of whom argue that the AC can promote the 
reliability and credibility of the financial reporting monitoring process. The findings thus 
appear consistent with agency theory’s assumption that ACs have an important role to play in 
improving the flow of information between managers and shareholders (Beasley et al., 2009; 
Samaha et al., 2012). However, they also indicate that in practice, many committees in the 
Libyan banking sector are not given the chance to perform this role properly. Denied the time 
they need to thoroughly review the financial statements, they are instead limited to submitting 
reports and recommendations to the board and have little impact on practice. This finding, 
which seems more in line with Soliman and Ragab’s (2014) conclusion that many ACs do little 
to enhance the quality of financial reporting, may be explained by reference to institutional 
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theory’s assumption that these ACs have been created for the purpose of enhancing legitimacy 
outside the bank rather than protecting the interests of shareholders within it. 
 
As far as the second aspect of the AC’s monitoring role – monitoring the internal audit function 
– is concerned, the survey participants agreed that their ACs currently perform all the 
responsibilities described in the given statements. In other words, these committees review the 
internal audit reports and any actions taken as a result, promote the independence of the internal 
auditors, review the objectives, plan, functions and terms of reference of the internal audit, 
receive reports on the results of internal auditors’ work, review the effectiveness of internal 
controls, recommend the appointment or replacement of the internal auditing director, ensure 
that the internal audit has the necessary resources, and meet with the head of internal auditing 
at least once a year. These results, which were confirmed by the interviewees, are consistent 
with those identified by Cohen et al. (2004), Marx and Voogt (2010) and Alzebana and Sawan 
(2015), all of whom highlight the AC-internal audit department relationship as a key factor in 
achieving effective CG. The interviewees agreed with Turley and Zaman (2007) that the AC 
enhances the internal audit’s effectiveness and independence by giving its activities greater 
weight within the organisation (Ahmad et al., 2009), and with the numerous researchers (e.g. 
Klein, 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; Rich and Zhang, 2014; Bardhan et al., 2015) who argue that 
it plays a significant role in identifying the weaknesses within internal control systems and 
works with internal (and external) auditors to determine the appropriate remedial action. 
However, while the results again seem to support agency theory’s view that an effective AC 
can play a major monitoring role, the facts that some ACs are unable or unwilling to forge a 
productive relationship with the internal audit department, and that they rarely challenge 
weaknesses in the work of internal auditors, suggest that these ACs have been established 
primarily for the purpose of creating legitimacy outside the organisation (as posited by 
institutional theory). 
 
In terms of the third aspect of the AC’s monitoring role – supervising the external audit – most 
of the survey respondents agreed strongly that ACs review and investigate the findings of the 
annual audit by external auditors, and ensure that audit fees are sufficient to perform the audit 
process effectively. This is consistent with the recommendations of SOX (2002) and the Smith 
Report (2003). However, they were less convinced that ACs recommend the appointment and 
replacement of external auditors, review and monitor the activities, resources, expertise and 
independence of these auditors or meet them without managers being present. This is roughly 
in line with the findings of Beasley et al. (2009), Rezaee (2009) and Bédard and Compernolle 
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(2014). The interviewees pointed out that many ACs in the Libyan banking sector play a 
positive role in the external audit process (e.g. by resolving any disagreements between the 
external auditors and managers), as has been posited by previous studies (DeZoort and Salterio, 
2001; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Keune and Johnstone, 2012), but it seems that they have only 
limited ability to promote the independence and effectiveness of these auditors. Institutional 
theory offers a plausible explanation for this; the finding again seems to suggest that many ACs 
in the banking sector are essentially formed to create legitimacy outside the organisation rather 
than to provide effective support for the external audit process. 
 
6.6 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the literature by exploring the current role of 
ACs in the Libyan banking sector and how they perform this role, as perceived by the survey 
respondents and interviewees in this study. These views were obtained by means of a 
questionnaire distributed to five groups of actors in this sector including board members, AC 
members, executive managers, internal auditors and external auditors, and through semi-
structured interviews with selected representatives from these groups. The interviews allowed 
the collection of data that were beyond the range of the questionnaire. In total, 218 survey 
responses were gathered and 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted. 
 
The results of the study show that the AC’s role has three main aspects: monitoring the financial 
statements, the internal audit function and the external audit process. The survey findings 
indicate that the first aspect consists of four main responsibilities: reviewing managers’ 
corrections concerning financial statements, reviewing external audit reports concerning 
financial statements, monitoring the compliance of the financial statement process with 
accounting standards, and reviewing significant accounting policies. However, while most of 
the interviewees saw monitoring financial statements as one of the main roles of the committee, 
some argued that in practice, ACs do not have adequate time to review these statements. Instead, 
they are limited to submitting reports and recommendations to the board. 
 
The survey findings show that the second aspect of the AC’s role was seen as covering eight 
main responsibilities: reviewing the internal audit reports and any actions taken as a result, 
promoting the independence of the internal auditors, reviewing the objectives, plan, functions 
and terms of reference of the internal audit, receiving reports on the results of internal auditors’ 
work, reviewing the effectiveness of internal controls, recommending the appointment or 
replacement of internal auditing directors, ensuring that the internal audit has the necessary 
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resources, and meeting with the head of internal auditing at least once a year. These results 
were confirmed by the interviewees, though several pointed out that the AC’s effectiveness 
depends to some extent on its relationship with the internal audit department, and this 
relationship might not always be strong. 
 
Most of the survey respondents agreed strongly that ACs review and investigate the findings 
of the annual audit provided by the external auditors, and ensure that audit fees are sufficient 
to perform the audit process effectively. On the other hand, they agreed less strongly that ACs 
recommend the appointment and replacement of external auditors, review and monitor the 
activities, resources, expertise and independence of the external auditor, or meet the external 
auditor without managers being present. The interviews showed that many ACs play an 
important role in the work of the external audit, but that their ability to enhance the 
independence and effectiveness of external auditors in Libya's banking sector is still limited. 
 
The following chapter discusses the findings of the survey and interviews regarding the main 
enabling and inhibiting factors affecting AC practice. 
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Chapter 7. Analysing the Factors Affecting Audit Committee Practice 
7.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in the study’s conceptual framework, the audit committee’s ability to carry out 
its duties effectively is impacted by a number of factors. These factors, which are discussed at 
length in the literature (e.g. Beasley and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2002; Carcello and Neal, 
2003; Braswell et al., 2012), may be either enabling or inhibiting in their effect. This chapter 
discusses the findings that emerged from the survey and interviews regarding the second 
concern of the conceptual framework; that is, identifying what the respondents perceived to be 
the main enabling and inhibiting factors affecting AC practice in Libya’s banking sector and 
investigating how these factors affect AC practice. 
 
7.2 Enabling Factors 
Despite the growing interest being shown by governments and regulators in the AC as a 
mechanism of corporate governance, its effectiveness in practice is hotly debated (Lin et al., 
2008). This scepticism has helped foster a body of literature that seeks to identify those factors 
that positively impact audit committee practice. The factors that have been identified by 
researchers include authority, access to information, diligence, financial expertise, 
independence, size and meeting frequency (e.g. Beasley and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 
2002; Carcello and Neal, 2003). These were therefore the focus of the seven statements given 
to the survey respondents in this question, the aim being to gain insight into the extent to which 
they were perceived as affecting ACs in Libya’s banking sector. 
 
The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that the factors 
described in the statements may positively affect an AC’s ability to perform its responsibilities 
and duties effectively. Table 7.1 presents the group means, total mean values and standard 
deviations for the resulting responses and shows that the majority of the participants agreed 
that most of these factors have an enabling effect. Statement 4 (“Having some expertise of AC 
members in the accounting field”) scored highest, with a total mean score of 4.09. This was 
followed in descending order by statement 7 (“The committee has enough members to perform 
its duties and responsibilities properly” – 3.64), statement 6 (“The AC meets regularly enough 
to perform its responsibilities and discuss of all the relevant issues” – 3.62), statement 1 (“The 
AC has adequate authority and influence to carry out its duties and responsibilities” – 3.57), 
statement 2 (“The AC can easily access information and get appropriate responses from all 
management levels” – 3.49), statement 5 (“AC members are independent directors in the board” 
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– 3.48) and statement 3 (“AC members devote adequate time and effort to the work of the 
committee” – 3.45). The Cronbach's Alpha test yielded a result of 0.79 for this question. 
 
Looking at the scores by group, it is apparent that the AC group generated the highest total 
mean score for the seven statements (3.91). This may be because, as audit committee members 
themselves, they are the best placed of the groups to appreciate the practical effect these factors 
can have. This was followed by the EA group, the BD group and the IA group, which scored 
3.80, 3.71 and 3.57 respectively. The lowest total mean score – 3.49 – came from the EM group, 
which recorded the lowest score for five of the seven statements (statement 1: 3.38, statement 
2: 3.32, statement 3: 3.32, statement 5: 3.31 and statement 6: 3.50). These responses suggest 
that executive managers do not see these factors as having a significant effect. 
 
The board members in the sample agreed most strongly that relevant accounting expertise is a 
crucial enabling factor, awarding this a score of 4.57. This was followed by the independence 
of the committee and regular meetings, both of which scored 3.67. The size of the committee 
(specifically, that it should be large enough to carry out all its responsibilities) and the 
willingness of members to devote the necessary time and effort to its work were scored joint 
third (3.62), while the authority given to the committee and its access to information were 
considered the least important factors (3.48 and 3.33 respectively). 
 
Like the board members, the audit committee members agreed most strongly with the relevant 
accounting expertise statement (4.47), followed by the regular meetings statement (4.00). 
Adequate authority, access to information and director independence all recorded scores of 
3.88, while the lowest scores were recorded for the statements referring to committee size (3.77) 
and member diligence (3.47). This suggests that the respondents in this group saw these as the 
least important enabling factors. 
 
The executive managers also saw relevant accounting expertise as the most significant enabling 
factor (3.97), but this group scored committee size as second most important (3.65), followed 
by regular meetings (3.50). Interestingly, it ranked the independence of AC members as the 
least influential factor (3.31). 
 
The internal auditors followed the BD, AC and EM groups in scoring accounting expertise as 
the most influential factor (3.93), and the BD and AC groups in scoring regular meetings as the 
second most influential (3.58). Authority and committee size were scored joint third (3.56), 
while access to information was regarded as the least important factor (3.42). 
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Finally, the external auditors group followed all the other groups in scoring accounting 
expertise as the most influential factor (4.20). It differed from the others, however, in scoring 
authority and information access as the joint second most influential factors (3.89). The 
diligence of committee members recorded the lowest mean score (3.59); the external auditors 
followed the sample as a whole in seeing this as the least important enabling factor. 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics on Enabling Factors 
 
No Statements 
Group Means Total 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Rank 
Cronbach's 
Alpha BD AC EM IA EA 
1. 
The AC has adequate authority and 
influence to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities. 
3.48 3.88 3.38 3.56 3.89 3.57 4.00 1.03 4 
0.78 
2. 
The AC can easily access information 
and get appropriate responses from all 
management levels. 
3.33 3.88 3.32 3.42 3.89 3.49 4.00 1.07 5 
3. 
AC members devote adequate time and 
effort to the work of the committee. 
3.62 3.47 3.32 3.45 3.59 3.45 3.00 0.97 7 
4. 
Some AC members have expertise in 
the accounting field. 
4.57 4.47 3.97 3.93 4.20 4.09 4.00 0.94 1 
5. 
AC members are independent and non-
executive directors. 
3.67 3.88 3.31 3.45 3.60 3.48 4.00 0.96 6 
6. 
The AC meets regularly enough to 
perform its responsibilities and discuss 
all the relevant issues. 
3.67 4.00 3.50 3.58 3.71 3.62 4.00 0.97 3 
7. 
The committee has enough members to 
perform its duties and responsibilities 
properly. 
3.62 3.77 3.65 3.56 3.73 3.64 4.00 0.95 2 
Overall Group Means 3.71 3.91 3.49 3.57 3.80 3.62 - - - 
BD: Board members      AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
 
 
Table 7.2 shows how the responses to this question were distributed. Across the sample as a 
whole, the statement which drew the strongest agreement was statement 4, regarding expertise 
of accounting. 81.7% of the total sample agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. 
Statement 7 scored second highest, with 65.8%, followed by statement 6 (60.6%), statement 2 
(56.7%), statement 1 (51.8%), statement 5 (51.4%) and statement 3 (45.6%). This statement 
referred to AC members devoting adequate time and effort to the work of the committee. One 
possible reason why this statement received such a low score may simply be that many of the 
respondents were unsure how much this factor affects audit committee practice; a huge 41.5% 
answered uncertain to this statement. 
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Breaking down the scores by group, it can be seen from Table 7.2 that support for statement 4 
was strong across the board. Indeed, in the BD group, it was unanimous, with 100% of the 
group saying that they agreed or strongly agreed that expertise of accounting is an enabling 
factor in the work of the AC. In the AC group, this figure was 94.1%, in the EM group it was 
81.1%, in the EA group it was 80.0% and in the IA group it was 74.4%. When the same is done 
for the lowest scoring statement (3: “AC members devote adequate time and effort to the work 
of the committee”), it can be seen that 57.1% of the BD group, 55.9% of the EA group, 43.7% 
of the IA group, 41.1% of the AC group and 40.5% of the EM group agreed or strongly agreed 
with this statement. It is noteworthy that just 41.1% of the audit committee members in the 
sample agreed that their diligence is an important enabling factor. 
 
 
Table 7.2 Frequency Distribution of Responses on Enabling Factors 
No Statements 
Members of 
the Board 
N = 21 
Members 
of AC 
N = 17 
Executive 
Managers 
N = 74 
Internal 
Auditors 
N = 71 
External 
Auditors 
 N = 35 
Total 
N = 218 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
1. 
The AC has adequate 
authority and influence to 
carry out its duties and 
responsibilities. 
14.3 38.1 47.6 11.8 17.6 70.6 14.9 41.9 43.3 11.3 38.0 50.7 8.6 25.7 65.7 12.4 35.8 51.8 
2. 
The AC can easily access the 
information and get 
appropriate responses from 
all management levels. 
23.8 19.0 57.2 5.9 23.5 70.6 28.7 16.4 54.8 22.5 26.8 50.7 5.7 28.6 65.7 20.8 22.6 56.7 
3. 
AC members devote 
adequate time and effort to 
the work of the committee. 
14.3 28.6 57.1 17.6 41.2 41.1 12.2 47.3 40.5 11.2 45.1 43.7 14.7 29.4 55.9 12.9 41.5 45.6 
4. 
Some AC members have 
expertise in the accounting 
field. 
0.0 0.0 100.0 5.9 0.0 94.1 5.5 13.5 81.1 7.0 18.3 74.4 8.6 11.4 80.0 6.0 12.4 81.7 
5. 
AC members are 
independent and non-
executive directors. 
19.0 14.3 66.6 5.9 35.3 61.5 23.0 23.0 54.1 8.4 46.5 45.1 8.6 45.7 48.8 14.3 34.4 51.4 
6. 
The AC meets regularly 
enough to perform its 
responsibilities and discuss 
all the relevant issues. 
14.3 19.0 66.6 0.0 23.5 76.4 14.9 29.7 55.4 9.8 33.8 56.3 8.6 22.9 68.6 11.0 28.4 60.6 
7. 
The committee has enough 
members to perform its 
duties and responsibilities 
properly. 
14.3 14.3 71.4 5.9 35.3 58.8 13.5 16.2 70.3 14.1 23.9 62.0 15.1 21.2 63.7 13.4 20.8 65.8 
D: Strongly disagree and disagree          U: Uncertain         A: Strongly agree and agree 
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Although all of the groups considered accounting expertise (statement 4) to be the most 
influential enabling factor, the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 7.3) indicated that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the groups on this statement (p-value 0.00). This 
test found no significant differences for the other statements, though the Mann-Whitney test 
revealed significant differences among groups in relation not only to statement 4 but also 
statements 1 and 2. The Mann-Whitney test highlighted that the level of agreement from the 
EM group was significantly different from that expressed by the other groups in four instances. 
This was reflected in its lower overall group mean (3.49). The result suggests that the EM group 
may not consider these enabling factors to be very influential. 
 
Table 7.3 Comparisons Between Groups on Enabling Factors 
NO    
Statements 
Kruska
l-Wallis 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
  BD-AC  BD-EM BD-IA  BD-EA AC-EM AC-IA  AC-EA  EM-IA  EM-EA IA-EA 
1. The AC has adequate authority and 
influence to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities. 
0.09 0.23 0.70 0.77 0.15 0.06 0.21 0.94 0.30 0.02* 0.10 
2. The AC can easily access information 
and get appropriate responses from 
all management levels. 
0.08 0.11 0.96 0.84 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.99 0.76 0.03* 0.04* 
3. AC members devote adequate time 
and effort to the work of the 
committee. 
0.62 0.60 0.21 0.49 0.97 0.77 0.91 0.60 0.47 0.16 0.45 
4. Some AC members have expertise in 
the accounting field. 
0.00* 0.96 0.00* 0.00* 0.32 0.01* 0.02* 0.43 0.86 0.07 0.08 
5. AC members are independent and 
non-executive directors. 
0.31 .0.57 0.17 0.23 0.65 0.07 0.10 0.33 0.80 0.38 0.56 
6. The AC meets regularly enough to 
perform its responsibilities and 
discuss all the relevant issues. 
0.39 0.42 0.44 0.56 1.00 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.73 0.29 0.42 
7. The committee has enough members 
to perform its duties and 
responsibilities properly. 
0.88 0.86 0.97 0.67 0..66 0.85 0.56 0.92 0.48 0.59 0.35 
*P -values < 0.05 
 
 
In order to gain insight into the extent to which they were perceived as affecting ACs in Libya’s 
banking sector, those factors that positively affect AC practice are discussed separately in the 
following sections. 
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7.2.1 Authority of the Audit Committee 
The authority of the audit committee is derived from the board of directors and the law 
(DeZoort et al., 2002). A number of professional bodies have issued guidelines to help audit 
committee members better understand the authority granted to them in the hope of making 
them more effective (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Combined Code FRC, 2003). The survey 
and interviews therefore sought to elicit the respondents’ perceptions regarding the authority 
given to the AC and its impact on the committee’s effectiveness.   
 
As seen in Table 7.1, the sample as a whole agreed that having sufficient authority positively 
affects the audit committee’s ability to carry out its duties and responsibilities. The overall 
group mean for this statement was 3.57, with the strongest support being shown by the external 
auditors (3.89), followed by the audit committee members (3.88), internal auditors (3.56), 
board members (3.48) and executive managers (3.38). The low mean scores from the last two 
groups suggest that these groups may be ambivalent (or uncertain) on the question of whether 
having this authority makes a major difference to the committee’s performance. This is 
underlined in Table 7.2, which shows that 51.8% of the sample as a whole agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement, but that the level of agreement varied strikingly between the groups, 
from 70.6% in the AC group and 65.7% in the EA group, to 50.7% in the IA group, 47.6% in 
the BD group and just 43.3% in the EM group.  
 
Stronger support for this factor came from the interviewees, the majority of whom (85%) 
agreed that the authority of the AC is an enabling factor (compared to 51.8% in the survey). 
The difference could be due to the fact that as senior staff, the interviewees are more likely to 
have witnessed this effect at first hand. In contrast, a huge 35.8% of the survey respondents 
were uncertain how much this factor affects audit committee practice.  
 
Saad et al. (2006) argue that ACs must be given adequate authority, established in the 
regulations, if they are to carry out their responsibilities effectively. Most of the interviewees 
were confident that their AC has this authority; according to one external auditor: 
“This is an influential factor, but as members of the board, the members of the 
audit committee certainly have the authority and influence to carry out their 
responsibilities in the bank” EA (5-1) 
 
However, a board member from a mixed ownership bank pointed out that how this authority is 
exercised depends to some extent on who sits on the committee – for example, on whether 
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there are sufficient independent members and whether these are appropriately qualified and 
experienced: 
“The audit committee has authority and influence enough to carry out their 
responsibilities, but the execution of this authority will depend on the 
composition of the audit committee” BD (1-4). 
 
This echoes concerns expressed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), Smith Report (2003) and 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2012), all of which focus on composition as a major 
determinant of the AC’s effectiveness.  
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the audit committee chairman from one state bank 
expressed his concern that his AC does not have the authority it needs to carry out its 
responsibilities effectively: 
“The audit committee has authority, but not the level of authority it needs to 
carry out its responsibilities effectively in the current conditions, especially 
given the weakness of the internal audit department, which it relies upon for 
the reports and information it needs” AC (2-3) 
 
As this interviewee suggests, any weaknesses in the internal audit function can undermine the 
committee’s authority and reduce its effectiveness (Tušek and Pokrovac, 2012). Numerous 
regulators and corporate governance agencies have argued that there needs to be a symbiotic 
relationship between the audit committee and the internal auditors to ensure the integrity and 
quality of financial statements and enhance internal controls (e.g. Treadway Commission, 1987; 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002), but this relationship is also crucial if the AC is to liaise effectively 
between the board of directors and the internal auditors (Song and Windram, 2004) as it allows 
the committee to reduce the information asymmetry that exists between these two groups 
(Boubaker and Taher, 2013). The internal audit department is thus a significant resource for 
the AC in that it provides the information the committee needs (Bishop et al., 2000) to properly 
exercise its authority over the financial reporting and external audit processes (Turley and 
Zaman, 2007; Beasley et al., 2009). This was also the view of the interviewees, particularly the 
audit committee members. They saw the committee as an important corporate governance 
mechanism; the fact that most of the interviewees felt their AC currently has sufficient 
authority and influence to perform its responsibilities effectively is a positive indicator of 
current practice in Libya’s banking sector. Overall, the survey participants and interviewees 
saw authority as an enabling factor affecting AC practice. 
 
P a g e  | 118 
 
7.2.2 Resources of the Audit Committee (Access to Information) 
If it is to perform the responsibilities and duties assigned to it, the audit committee needs 
resources (Zhang et al., 2007); specifically, it needs to be able to access the information it 
requires from all levels of the management (DeZoort et al., 2002). This access to information 
is as important as the committee’s qualifications/experience and authority in helping it to 
protect stakeholders’ interests (DeZoort et al., 2002). One of the statements was therefore 
designed to obtain the survey respondents’ perceptions regarding the effect this factor has on 
the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
Table 7.1 indicates that the statement “The AC can easily access information and get 
appropriate responses from all management levels” recorded a total mean score of 3.49. 
Breaking the results down by group, it is apparent that the highest group mean for this statement 
was recorded by the external auditors group (3.89). This was followed by the audit committee 
members group (3.88), the internal auditors group (3.42), the board members group (3.33) and 
the executive managers group (3.32). The last score suggests that the executive managers in 
the sample felt that access to information at all management levels is not crucial for the audit 
committee to be effective. Table 7.2 shows that 56.7% of the survey participants agreed with 
this statement. The AC group showed the highest level of support for the statement, with 70.6% 
agreeing or strongly agreeing. This was followed by the EA group (65.7%), the BD group 
(57.2%), the EM group (54.8%) and the IA group (50.7%). 
 
Interestingly, the interviewees were more likely to see access to information as a significant 
enabling factor than the survey respondents (75% of interviewees compared to 56.7% of survey 
respondents). This may be due to the fact that the interviewees, as senior employees, are more 
likely to observe the impact of this factor at first hand. Many interviewees said their audit 
committee can easily access the information it needs. One audit committee member from a 
mixed ownership bank stated that: 
 
“In general, the audit committee can easily access information, particularly 
through its oversight of the internal audit function” AC (2-2) 
 
However, other interviewees expressed some concerns about the level of access given to their 
AC. For example, one board chairman from a state bank acknowledged: 
 
“I think that access to information for the audit committee is not at the required 
level, but at every stage, we are trying to improve the procedures for accessing 
information; however, we have not yet reached the desired level” BD (1-3). 
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One board member from a mixed ownership bank described a slightly better – but far from 
perfect – situation at his bank: 
 
“The audit committee can easily access financial information, but there is 
difficulty in accessing other information in areas such as investment, financing 
and management” BD (1-4). 
 
A more troubling picture was painted by one audit committee member from a state bank, who 
suggested that the AC in his bank can find it difficult to access even financial information: 
 
“I think the audit committee faces obstacles when trying to access financial 
information; for example, information is often not complete or accurate, nor 
is it given to the committee in a timely manner” AC (2-4). 
 
Both interviewees and survey respondents saw access to information as an enabling factor. The 
result is consistent with a number of other studies in highlighting the importance of this factor 
in facilitating audit committee effectiveness (e.g. DeZoort et al., 2002; Beasley et al., 2009). 
Despite this, several of the interviewees indicated that audit committees in the Libyan banking 
sector can face obstacles when it comes to acquiring the resources they need to perform their 
responsibilities and duties properly. 
 
7.2.3 Diligence of the Audit Committee 
It has been argued that the diligence of AC members is one of the main factors affecting the 
committee’s ability to perform its responsibilities and duties effectively (Sharma et al., 2009); 
put simply, the more conscientious it is, the more likely it is to enhance corporate governance 
practice and ensure the quality of financial reporting (Thiruvadi, 2012). Accordingly, this 
section seeks to present the perceptions of the survey and interview participants regarding the 
impact that committee diligence has on effectiveness. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the views expressed in the literature, the survey participants ranked 
statement 3 (“AC members devote adequate time and effort to the work of the committee”) 
bottom out of the seven statements, giving it a total mean score of 3.45.  Table 7.1 shows that 
the mean score recorded by each group was: 3.62 (board members), 3.588 (external auditors), 
3.47 (AC members), 3.45 (internal auditors) and 3.32 (executive managers). The last score 
suggests that executive managers are the least concerned about audit committee members’ 
diligence. Table 7.2 shows that overall, only 45.6% of the survey participants agreed that 
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diligent committee members are an enabling factor. Breaking this down by group, 57.1% of 
the BD group, 55.9% of the EA group, 43.7% of the IA group, 41.1% of the AC group and just 
40.5% of the EM group expressed agreement with this statement. The relative lack of support 
for this factor might be due to the fact that ACs were only recently introduced into the Libyan 
banking sector. 
The interviewees showed a much higher level of support for the statement, however, with 75% 
acknowledging the diligence of audit committee members as a factor enabling AC 
effectiveness. Some of the interviewees were happy with the level of time and effort their audit 
committee dedicates to its duties; for example, the director of the internal audit department in 
one mixed ownership bank commented that: 
“Audit committee members actually devote sufficient time and effort to the 
responsibilities of the committee; they are always in contact with the internal 
audit department” IA (4-1). 
 
The board chairman of one state bank was similarly content with the effort expended by his 
AC:  
“I think that the time and effort spent by audit committee members are clear 
and obvious as they have ten meetings a year, which exceeds what is required 
under the code of corporate governance” BD (1-3). 
 
Others, however, were less impressed with the level of engagement shown by their committee; 
for example, the AC chairman from the same state bank observed that his colleagues give 
enough time and effort to the work of the committee to keep it running, but not enough to make 
any real difference to its level of performance: 
“I think that the time and effort spent by the members of the audit committee 
are satisfactory, but they are not enough to make it any more effective in 
performing its responsibilities and tasks AC (2-3). 
 
And at the opposite end of the spectrum, an external auditor noted that the audit committee 
members do not devote adequate time and effort to their duties: 
 
“I do not think the members of the audit committee devote enough time and 
effort; for example, they would not be able to address any deficiencies in the 
bank properly” EA (5-3). 
 
The findings indicate that while most of the audit committees represented in the sample devote 
a reasonable amount of time and effort to carrying out their duties, this is not always enough 
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to raise the level of performance. The general view among interviewees was that the diligence 
of audit committee members has a substantial influence on the effectiveness of the committee 
though, interestingly, this view was less widespread among the survey respondents (45.6% of 
survey respondents compared to 75% of interviewees). The difference may be due to the fact 
that as senior staff, the interviewees are more likely to have seen this influence at first hand. 
The current findings seem to be supported by prior studies, which have identified a significant 
relationship between audit committee diligence and effectiveness (e.g. DeZoort et al., 2002; 
Sharma et al., 2009; Thiruvadi, 2012; Braswell et al., 2012). 
 
7.2.4 Financial Expertise of the Audit Committee 
The committee must possess some degree of financial expertise if it is to be able to understand 
financial communications (Ho et al., 2014), monitor the integrity of financial statements 
properly (McDaniel et al., 2002), avert mistakes in these statements and uncover fraud 
(Goodwin and Seow, 2002). This has led a number of professional bodies and researchers to 
recommend that audit committees should include at least one member who has financial 
expertise (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; FRC, 2014). With these facts in mind, the survey and 
interview questions sought to elicit participants’ views regarding how the financial expertise 
of AC members impacts on the committee's effectiveness. 
 
Table 7.1 shows that overall, the survey participants agreed with the statement: "Some AC 
members have expertise in the accounting field", giving it a total mean score of 4.09. Board 
members gave this statement the highest mean value (4.57), followed by AC members (4.47), 
external auditors (4.20), executive managers (3.97) and internal auditors (3.93). It can be 
observed in Table 7.2 that 81.7% of all the survey participants agreed that having financial 
expertise on the audit committee enhances its effectiveness. The strongest agreement was 
registered by the BD group (100%), followed by the AC group (94.1%), the EM group (81.1%), 
the EA group (80%) and the IA group (74.7%). 
There was similarly strong support for this statement from the interviewees, as evidenced by 
the fact that 90% asserted that it is an influential factor, and they said that most of the members 
of their audit committee have at least some expertise in accounting practice. One audit 
committee member from a state bank explained that: 
“The members of the audit committee have sufficient accounting expertise; all 
four members come from an accounting background, and two of them have a 
PhD” AC (2-4). 
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The director of the internal audit department from another state bank described a similar level 
of accomplishment in his bank’s AC: 
“Most audit committee members actually have accounting expertise; three of 
them have an accounting background, and the fourth has an economics 
background. Two members have a PhD” IA (4-3).  
 
This expertise makes it easier for AC members to assimilate details about the day-to-day 
operations of the bank, and indeed, 65% of the interviewees felt that audit committee members 
in their bank have a sound knowledge of the firm’s broader business operations. As the board 
chairman of one mixed ownership bank explained: 
“Audit committee members indeed have the experience and qualifications to 
find out all the bank's business” BD (1-2). 
 
However, as an executive manager from another mixed ownership bank observed, their position 
within the board also allows them insight into the heart of the bank’s operations: 
“The members of the audit committee actually have sufficient knowledge 
about the business of the bank because they are members of the board of 
directors, and therefore, they have the opportunity to learn all about the 
business” EM (3-4). 
 
Not all of the interviewees agreed that their AC has a truly comprehensive knowledge, however, 
although these interviewees did not necessarily see this as limiting the committee’s ability to 
perform its duties. One external auditor argued that:  
“I do not think that the members of the audit committee have sufficient 
knowledge of all the business of the bank, but they can monitor the actions of 
the management EA (5-1). 
 
One AC member was less sanguine, observing what he perceived to be a lack of knowledge 
among some of his colleagues and associating this with a general lack of effectiveness on their 
part:  
 “There are some deficiencies in the knowledge of audit committee members 
in relation to the bank’s business, especially the less effective members” AC 
(2-2). 
 
The majority of both survey and interview participants agreed that the AC’s effectiveness is 
materially impacted by the level of financial expertise of its members. Most of the interviewees 
felt that they should have at least enough financial expertise to be able to understand the day-
to-day business operations of the bank and monitor the integrity of financial statements 
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effectively. The finding is consistent with those of numerous other studies (e.g. McDaniel et 
al., 2002; Bedard et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005; Krishnan and Lee, 2009; Ho et al., 2014). 
 
7.2.5 Audit Committee Independence 
Numerous studies have identified a positive correlation between audit committee independence 
and the quality of an organisation’s financial reporting (Lin et al., 2006; Beasley et al., 2009). 
AC independence enhances the connections between the various mechanisms of corporate 
governance within the organisation such as the relationship between external and internal 
auditors and that between the external auditors and management (Rainsbury et al., 2008; 
Rezaee, 2009). An independent committee is better able to deal with stakeholders in an efficient 
and unbiased manner, but most importantly, there is less potential for conflicts of interest and 
opportunistic earnings management (Klien, 2002). For these reasons, it is widely believed that 
audit committee members should be independent and free from any external influences 
(Ghabayen, 2012; Reddy et al., 2015; Sanjaya, 2016). Accordingly, the survey and interviews 
sought to uncover whether the participants saw the AC’s effectiveness as being affected by its 
independence. 
Overall, the survey participants broadly agreed with the statement: "The AC members are 
independent directors in the board" (see Table 7.1). The total mean score derived from their 
responses was 3.48, with individual groups scoring group means of 3.88 (AC members), 3.67 
(board members), 3.60 (external auditors), 3.45 (internal auditors) and 3.31 (executive 
managers). However, Table 7.2 shows that only just over half (51.4%) of all the participants in 
the survey agreed that AC effectiveness is enhanced by having AC members who are 
independent directors. The BD group agreed most strongly with the statement (66.6% of the 
group indicated agreement), followed by the AC group (61.5%), the EM group (54.1%), the 
EA group (48.8%) and the IA group (45.1%). The results suggest that the participants value 
AC independence to a certain extent. 
When the interviewees were asked about the independence of their audit committee, 60% said 
that it is a significant enabling factor (55% stated that the AC in their bank is made up of 
independent directors). Sixty per cent explained that the General Assembly chooses their board, 
and that the board then selects the members of the audit committee. The process was described 
by the board chairman from one mixed ownership bank: 
“Audit committee members are chosen by the General Assembly as members 
of the board, and then sanctioned by the Central Bank of Libya. Then the board 
selects the committee members based on their specialities. The committee 
members are independent and non-executive directors in the board” BD (1-2). 
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An AC chairman from a state bank described a similar selection process taking place in his 
bank:  
“The General Assembly appoints the members of the board and the Central 
Bank sanctions the appointment, then the board chooses the audit committee 
members based on their qualifications and experience. The job of chairman of 
the committee is rotated among the members. The audit committee is 
independent and the members are completely independent and non-executive” 
AC (2-3). 
 
However, not everyone approved of this approach to selection. One of the external auditors 
was concerned that: 
“The selection process for the members of the audit committee is often 
inadequate, and I think that they are not completely independent” EA (5-1). 
 
The results indicate general support for AC independence as an important enabling factor. 
Furthermore, the interviewees signalled that over half of the AC members in Libya’s banking 
sector are independent. If this is true, it is a positive indicator for the sector; Hashim and 
Rahman (2011) argue that an independent AC is better able to help owners monitor managers’ 
activities and resolve problems arising from information asymmetry, and numerous other 
authors point out that independence is vital if the committee is to be able to perform its 
responsibilities effectively (e.g. Collier and Zaman, 2005; Lin et al., 2006; Rainsbury et al., 
2008; Rezaee, 2009; Beasley et al., 2009).  
 
7.2.6 Audit Committee Meetings 
Regulatory bodies and researchers alike have argued that if audit committees are to perform 
their responsibilities and duties adequately, they must meet regularly (BRC, 1999; Smith, 2003; 
Krishnan, 2005; Burke et al., 2008). They must also be able to hold extraordinary meetings as 
needed (Burke et al., 2008); for example, if the committee is dealing with an emergency such 
as the risk of financial reporting failure (Hogan et al., 2014). Whether they are routine or 
extraordinary, meetings allow the committee to carry out its monitoring role more effectively 
(Ebrahim, 2007; Ali, 2014).   
 
As indicated in Table 7.1, the overall group mean for this statement (“The AC meets regularly 
enough to perform its responsibilities and discuss all the relevant issues”) was 3.62, with the 
strongest support being shown by the audit committee members (4.00), followed by the 
external auditors (3.71), board members (3.67), internal auditors (3.5) and finally, executive 
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managers (3.50). Table 7.2 shows that overall, 60.6% of the survey participants agreed or 
strongly agreed that having sufficient meetings positively impacts on the audit committee’s 
ability to perform its duties and responsibilities. However, the level of agreement varied 
strikingly between the groups, from 76.4% in the AC group and 68.8% in the EA group, to 
66.6% in the BD group, 56.3% in the IA group and just 55.4% in the EM group.  
 
Despite the general level of agreement expressed in the survey, however, only 55% of the 
interviewees felt that regular meetings are an enabling factor, and 70% explained that the 
committee in their bank has sufficient meetings to perform its duties and responsibilities 
properly, while 20% argued that their AC needs to increase the number of meetings it has. The 
board chairman from one state bank was in the former group, explaining that: 
“The number of meetings the audit committee has is really enough to perform 
its duties and responsibilities. It exceeds the number of meetings required by 
the Corporate Governance Code, which is just four, as it has ten meetings per 
year” BD (1-3). 
 
In contrast, the audit committee chairman from another state bank voiced his concern that his 
audit committee does not hold all the meetings it needs to carry out its responsibilities and 
duties effectively. He stated that: 
“Although there are many meetings, I think there are still fewer than there 
should be to perform the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee. 
And the committee usually meets the day before the board meeting…...” AC 
(2-1). 
 
Both the survey participants and the interviewees agreed that holding regular meetings impacts 
positively on the audit committee’s ability to carry out its duties and responsibilities. This is 
consistent with the findings of a number of studies, including, Smith (2003), Krishnan (2005), 
Ebrahim (2007), Hogan et al. (2014) and Ali (2014). However, the findings also suggest that 
in practice, this ideal is not always achieved by banks in Libya’s banking sector. 
 
7.2.7 Audit Committee Size 
The size of an audit committee is commonly regarded as a measure of its effectiveness (Albring 
et al., 2014). Size is measured in terms of the number of committee members (Pucheta-
Martínez et al., 2014), with the general expectation being that the committee should comprise 
at least three directors, one of whom should serve as chairman (FRC, 2014; Utama and 
Leonardo, 2014). This statement was designed to elicit the survey participants’ perceptions 
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concerning the effect the number of audit committee members has on the effectiveness of the 
committee. 
 
Table 7.1 indicates that the statement: “The committee has enough members to perform its 
duties and responsibilities properly” recorded a total mean score of 3.64. Breaking the results 
down by group, it is apparent that the highest group mean for this statement was recorded by 
the audit committee members (3.77). This was followed by the external auditors group (3.73), 
the executive managers group (3.65), the board members group (3.62) and the internal audit 
group (3.56). These results indicate that the sample felt that the size of the audit committee may 
impact on its effectiveness. Table 7.2 shows that overall, 65.8% of the survey respondents 
agreed with this statement. The highest level of support for the statement came from the BD 
group, with 71.4% agreeing or strongly agreeing, followed by the EM group (70.3%), the EA 
group (63.7%), the IA group (62.0%) and the AC group (58.8%) (a huge 35.3% of the AC 
group answered uncertain to this statement). 
 
Asked about the impact of the AC’s size on its effectiveness in their organisation, most of the 
interviewees asserted that this is an important enabling factor. Only half of the interviewees 
(50%) felt that: 
 
“…the audit committee has adequate members to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities properly” AC (2-1). 
 
Just over a third (35%) argued that one or more additional members should be added to the AC 
in their bank. Among them was this board member from a state bank: 
“I think the audit committee needs to add one or two members to the 
committee, especially given the huge size of the bank, which has 160 
branches…..” BD (1-1).  
 
The finding that there is a perceived link between AC size and effectiveness is consistent with 
previous studies, such as Pucheta-Martínez et al. (2014), Albring et al. (2014) and Utama and 
Leonardo (2014), and with frameworks such as the UK’s Combined Code (FRC, 2014), all of 
whom recommend that ACs should have at least three members. Awareness of the importance 
of this link led several of the interviewees to question the current size of their own AC. 
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7.3 Inhibiting Factors  
The literature review highlighted the increasing attention being paid to those factors that may 
negatively impact on the practices of audit committees. The study therefore sought to explore 
the effects of a range of these inhibiting factors on AC practice and effectiveness in Libya’s 
banking sector. The highlighted inhibiting factors were weak board governance, the lack of 
clear requirements governing the audit committee’s responsibilities and obligations, AC 
members’ lack of qualifications or experience, inadequate compensation of AC members the 
weak legal and regulatory environment, the weak accounting environment and political 
intervention (e.g. Lin et al., 2008; Sharma et al., 2009; Larbsh, 2010; Engel et al., 2010; Abdou, 
2015; Wu and Patel, 2015).  
 
The survey participants were asked to point out the extent to which they agreed that the 
potential inhibiting factors described in seven statements may adversely affect the ability of 
the audit committee to carry out its duties and responsibilities effectively. Table 7.4 indicates, 
based on the group means, total mean values and standard deviations for the participants’ 
responses, that the majority agreed that most of these factors have an inhibiting impact. 
Statement 5 (“The weak legal and regulatory environment in Libya”) scored highest, with a 
total mean score of 3.92. This was followed in descending order by statement 1 (“Weaknesses 
in board governance” – 3.77), statement 7 (“Political intervention in Libya” – 3.70), statement 
3 (“The poor qualifications and experience of AC members” – 3.46), statement 2 (“The lack of 
clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities or duties” – 3.44), statement 6 
(“The weakness of the accounting and auditing profession in Libya” – 3.41) and statement 4 
(“The inadequate compensation paid to AC members” – 3.17). The table shows that the 
Cronbach’s Alpha value for this question was 0.79, which means that all the data are reliable.  
 
Looking at the scores by group, it is apparent that the EA group generated the highest total 
mean score for the seven statements (3.83). Following the EA group were the AC group, the 
EM group and the IA group, with overall group means of 3.68, 3.50 and 3.46 respectively. The 
lowest total mean score (3.45) came from the BD group, which recorded the lowest score for 
three of the seven statements (statement 1: 3.38, statement 3: 3.00 and statement 7: 3.57). These 
responses indicate that the members of boards do not see these factors as having a significant 
impact. 
 
Board members did, however, agree strongly that the weak legal and regulatory environment 
in Libya is an important inhibiting factor (mean score 4.00). The next highest mean score 
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recorded by this group was for the weakness of the accounting and auditing profession (3.67), 
followed by government intervention in the banking sector (3.57). Weak board governance and 
the lack of clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities or duties both scored 
3.38, while the lowest scores were recorded for the statements referring to inadequate AC 
compensation and the poor qualifications and experience of AC members (3.14 and 3.00 
respectively).  
 
Like the board members, audit committee members agreed strongly that the weak legal and 
regulatory environment (4.12) and weak board governance (4.00) are inhibiting factors. 
Auditing profession scored 3.65 respectively, while the lack of clear legal requirements and 
government intervention in the banking sector both scored 3.59. Inadequate AC compensation 
and poor qualifications and experience were seen as the least significant factors (3.53 and 3.41 
respectively). 
 
The executive managers also considered the weak legal and regulatory environment to be the 
most crucial inhibiting factor (3.95) and weak board governance to be the second most 
important (3.85). These were followed by government intervention in the banking sector and 
the poor qualifications and experience of AC members, which scored 3.77 and 3.50 
respectively. Finally, the lack of clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities 
or duties, the weakness of the accounting and auditing profession and the inadequate 
compensation paid to AC members scored as the least important inhibiting factors (3.26, 3.19 
and 3.01 respectively). 
 
In contrast, the internal auditors registered their strongest level of agreement with the statement 
that government intervention in the banking sector is a crucial inhibiting factor (3.70). They 
found the weak legal and regulatory environment to be the second most influential (3.66), while 
weak board governance scored third highest (3.62). Inadequate compensation was regarded as 
the least influential inhibiting factor (3.13). 
 
Finally, the external auditors group followed the BD, AC and EM groups in scoring the weak 
legal and regulatory environment as the most influential factor (4.26). This was followed by 
weak board governance and the lack of clear requirements regarding the AC’s responsibilities, 
both of which scored 4.03. Unlike the other groups, however, this group scored the poor 
qualifications and experience of AC members as the third most important inhibiting factor 
(3.91). Once again, the inadequate compensation paid to AC members was regarded as the least 
significant factor (3.46) in terms of its impact on AC effectiveness.  
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Table 7.4 Descriptive Statistics on Inhibiting Factors 
No Statements 
Group Means Total 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Rank 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
BD AC EM IA EA 
1. Weaknesses in board governance 3.38 4.00 3.85 3.62 4.03 3.77 4.00 1.04 2 
0.79 
- 
2. 
The lack of clear legal requirements 
governing the AC’s responsibilities 
or duties 
3.38 3.58 3.26 3.31 4.03 3.44 4.00 1.08 6 
3. 
The poor qualifications and 
experience of AC members 
3.00 3.41 3.50 3. 35 3.91 3.46 4.00 1.36 5 
4. 
The inadequate compensation paid to 
AC members  
3.14 3.53 3.01 3.13 3.46 3.17 3.00 0.94 8 
5. 
The weak legal and regulatory 
environment in Libya 
4.00 4.12 3.95 3.66 4.26 3.92 4.00 1.07 1 
6. 
The weakness of the accounting and 
auditing profession in Libya  
3.67 3.65 3.19 3.45 3.51 3.41 4.00 1.29 7 
7. 
Government intervention in the 
banking sector, especially from the 
Central Bank 
3.57 3.59 3.77 3.70 3.66 3.70 4.00 1.02 3 
Overall Group Means 3.45 3.68 3.50 3.46 3.83 3.56 - - - 
BD: Board members      AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
 
 
 
Table 7.5 shows how the responses from the sample were distributed. Statement 5, which 
referred to the weakness of the legal and regulatory environment, attracted the strongest support, 
with 72.9% of the total sample saying they agreed or strongly agreed. The second highest 
percentage went to statement 1 (weaknesses in board governance: 71.1%), followed by 
statement 7 (government intervention in the banking sector: 64.2%), statement 3 (the poor 
qualifications and experience of AC members: 60.1%), statement 6 (the weakness of the 
accounting and auditing profession in Libya: 55.1%), statement 2 (lack of clear legal 
requirements: 51.9%) and statement 4 (inadequate compensation for AC members: 34.4%). 
This last statement may have received a low score because a large number of the respondents 
were unsure about the impact of this factor on audit committee practice (45% answered 
uncertain to this statement).  
 
Looking at the scores from the individual groups, it is evident that the strongest support for the 
highest scoring statement (5) came from the external auditors, with 82.8% of this group 
agreeing or strongly agreeing that the weakness of the legal and regulatory environment is a 
crucial inhibiting factor. They were closely followed by the AC group, 82.4% of whom agreed 
or strongly agreed with the statement. In the BD group, the corresponding number was 76.2%, 
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in the EM group it was 74.3% and in the IA group it was 63.4%. At the other end of the scale, 
support for the lowest scoring statement (4: “The inadequate compensation paid to AC 
members”) was strongest in the AC group (58.8%), followed by the EA group (45.7%), the BD 
group (42.8%), the EM group (29.7%) and the IA group (25.3%). One possible reason why the 
AC group supported this statement the most strongly may simply be that audit committee 
members themselves are the best placed of the groups to appreciate the practical impact this 
factor can have. 
 
Table 7.5 Frequency Distribution of Responses on Inhibiting Factors 
No Statements 
Board 
Members 
N = 21 
AC 
Members 
N = 17 
Executive 
Managers 
N = 74 
Internal 
Auditors 
N = 71 
External 
Auditors 
 N = 35 
Total 
N = 218 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
1. 
Weaknesses in board 
governance 
28.6 14.3 57.1 11.8 0.0 88.2 9.5 16.2 74.3 15.5 19.7 64.8 2.8 20.0 77.2 12.4 16.5 71.1 
2. 
The lack of clear legal 
requirements governing the 
AC’s responsibilities or duties 
 
23.8 28.6 47.6 17.7 23.5 58.8 24.4 27.0 48.6 19.7 35.2 45.1 2.9 25.7 71.4 18.7 29.4 51.9 
3. 
The poor qualifications and 
experience of AC members 
42.9 4.8 52.3 29.4 0.0 70.6 28.4 10.8 60.8 28.2 21.1 50.7 11.4 11.4 77.2 27.1 12.8 60.1 
4. 
The inadequate compensation 
paid to AC members 
33.4 23.8 42.8 23.6 17.6 58.8 25.7 44.6 29.7 14.1 60.6 25.3 14.3 40.0 45.7 20.6 45.0 34.4 
5. 
The weak legal and 
regulatory environment in 
Libya 
4.8 19.0 76.2 5.8 11.8 82.4 13.5 12.2 74.3 12.7 23.9 63.4 11.5 5.7 82.8 11.5 15.6 72.9 
6. 
The weakness of the 
accounting and auditing 
profession in Libya 
9.5 19.0 71.5 11.8 35.3 52.9 32.4 17.6 50.0 26.7 15.5 57.8 20.0 28.5 51.5 24.7 20.2 55.1 
7. 
Government intervention in 
the banking sector, especially 
from the Central Bank 
14.3 38.1 47.6 17.7 17.6 64.7 16.2 10.8 73.0 11.3 29.6 59.1 14.3 20.0 65.7 14.2 21.6 64.2 
D: Strongly disagree and disagree          U: Uncertain         A: Strongly agree and agree 
 
 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 7.6) show that there were significant 
differences among the groups in relation to statement 2: the lack of clear legal requirements 
governing the AC’s responsibilities (p-value 0.01) and statement 5: the weak legal and 
regulatory environment in Libya (p-value 0.01). However, the test identified no significant 
differences in regard to the other statements. When the Mann-Whitney test was conducted to 
explore these differences further, it highlighted significant differences between the EM and EA 
groups (0.00) and between the IA and EA groups (0.00) on statement 2, and between the EM 
and IA groups (0.03) and IA and EA groups (0.00) on statement 5. It also highlighted 
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significant differences in relation to statement 3 (between the EA group and the BD and IA 
groups: both p-values 0.04) and statement 4 (between the EM and EA groups: p-value 0.04). 
The results indicate that the responses of the EA group varied significantly from those of the 
other groups in six instances, and give some insight into how this group produced the highest 
total mean score for the seven inhibiting factors. 
 
Table 7.6 Comparisons Between Groups on Inhibiting Factors 
NO    
Statements Kruskal-
Wallis 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
  BD-AC  BD-EM BD-IA  BD-EA  AC-EM AC-IA  AC-EA  EM-IA  EM-EA IA-EA 
1. Weaknesses in board 
governance 
0.10 0.09 0.14 0.53 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.51 0.14 0.54 0.07 
2. 
The lack of clear legal 
requirements governing the 
AC’s responsibilities 
0.01* 0.62 0.67 0.70 0.06 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.99 0.00* 0.00* 
3. The poor qualifications and 
experience of AC members 
0.21 0.48 0.17 0.39 0.04* 0.57 0.86 0.18 0.37 0.35 0.04* 
4. The inadequate compensation 
paid to AC members  
0.13 0.28 0.63 0.91 0.32 0.06 0.09 0.64 0.53 0.04* 0.08 
5. The weak legal and regulatory 
environment in Libya 
0.01* 0.46 0.74 0.18 0.10 0.65 0.05 0.41 0.03* 0.10 0.00* 
6. 
The weakness of the accounting 
and auditing profession in 
Libya  
0.63 0.98 0.26 0.83 0.80 0.28 0.69 0.76 0.27 0.299 0.89 
7. 
Government intervention in the 
banking sector, especially from 
the Central Bank 
0.83 0.78 0.31 0.54 0.62 0.50 0.83 0.91 0.49 0.46 0.92 
BD: Board members      AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
 
 
In order to gain insight into the extent to which they were perceived as affecting ACs in Libya’s 
banking sector, those inhibiting factors that negatively affect AC practice are discussed 
separately in the following sections. 
 
7.3.1 Weaknesses in Board Governance  
A number of studies have highlighted the potential impact of certain characteristics of board 
governance (e.g. board independence, board meetings and board size) on the quality of 
financial reporting and audit committee commitment to its monitoring responsibilities 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Braswell et al., 2012). Beasley and 
Salterio (2001) point out that the board has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the AC 
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because the board itself chooses the committee’s members. The survey and interviews thus 
sought to elicit the respondents’ views on how weaknesses in board governance affect the audit 
committee’s effectiveness.  
 
Table 7.4 shows that the sample as a whole agreed that weaknesses in board governance 
adversely affect the audit committee’s ability to perform its duties and responsibilities 
effectively. The overall group mean for this statement was 3.77, with the strongest support 
being offered by the external auditors (4.03), followed by the audit committee members (4.00), 
executive managers (3.85), internal auditors (3.62) and board members (3.38). The low score 
from the latter group suggests that these board members were not fully convinced that 
weaknesses in their board’s governance, if any, are having a crucial influence on the 
effectiveness of the AC. Table 7.5 shows that 71.1% of the sample as a whole agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement, but the level of agreement differed among the groups, from 88.2% 
in the AC group and 77.2% in the EA group, to 74.3% in the EM group, 64.8% in the IA group 
and only 57.1% in the BD group. 
 
Approximately 60% of the interviewees felt that weaknesses in board governance may impact 
on the effectiveness of the audit committee, though half of the interviewees (50%) were 
confident that there are no such weaknesses in the corporate governance of their board. The 
general manager of one of the private banks asserted that: 
“There is no weakness in the governance of the board of directors in the bank, 
and all board committees are independent. I think that the board committees 
assist the executive management in the decision-making process and facilitate 
the work of the administration” EM (3-4). 
 
This interviewee’s confidence in the independence of his bank’s committees is interesting in 
light of Larbsh’s (2010) concern that many boards and committees in Libya lack such 
independence. Similar confidence was expressed by a board member from a state bank, who 
explained that: 
"The board applies the code of governance in the bank to the fullest. It has four 
committees, as stipulated by this code, so there are no weaknesses in the 
corporate governance practices of the board” BD (1-1).  
 
Others were more willing to acknowledge weaknesses, however. The board chairman from a 
mixed ownership bank explained that: 
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"There is just a shortage in the number of board members. When we have the 
right number, it will strengthen the corporate governance of the board" BD (1-
2). 
 
And the director of internal auditing from one of the state banks commented that: 
"......the code of corporate governance needs to be developed and updated as 
well from time to time" IA (4-3). 
 
Strong board governance is more likely to promote effective practice within the audit 
committee, while weak board governance is more likely to have the opposite effect. The audit 
committee chairman from a mixed ownership bank attempted to explain how weaknesses in 
board governance can affect the committee: 
“Indeed, this factor impacts on the effectiveness of the audit committee. For 
example, reports provided by the audit committee to the board of directors will 
not be considered if there are weaknesses within the board” AC (2-1). 
 
The findings echo many other studies in highlighting the significant impact weaknesses in 
board governance can have on audit committee effectiveness (e.g. Beasley and Salterio, 2001; 
Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Braswell et al., 2012). Even though half 
of the interviewees denied that there are any weaknesses in the corporate governance of their 
own board, most agreed that this is a crucial inhibiting factor. 
 
7.3.2 Lack of Clear Legal Requirements Governing the AC’s Responsibilities 
The audit committee’s effectiveness may be limited if there are no stringent legal requirements 
governing its responsibilities or duties (Lin et al., 2008). Saad et al. (2006) call for the AC to 
be given clear and practical terms of reference and responsibilities by the board. One of the 
statements was therefore designed to elicit the survey respondents’ perceptions on this issue.  
 
Table 7.4 indicates that the statement: “The lack of clear legal requirements governing the AC’s 
responsibilities or duties” recorded a total mean score of 3.44. Breaking the results down by 
group, it is apparent that the highest group mean for this statement was recorded by the external 
auditors group (4.03). This was followed by the audit committee members group (3.59), the 
board members group (3.38), the internal auditors group (3.31) and the executive managers 
group (3.26). This last score suggests that the executive managers in the sample felt that legal 
requirements are not crucial for the committee to be effective. Table 7.5 indicates that overall, 
51.9% of the survey participants agreed with this statement, but there was a significant 
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variation between the groups. The EA group showed the highest level of support for the 
statement (71.4% agreed or strongly agreed), but the remaining groups were much less 
supportive, with just 58.8% of the AC group, 48.6% of the EM group, 47.6% of the BD group 
and 45.1% of the IA group expressing agreement. 
 
This overall level of agreement was echoed in the interviews; when asked about the effect the 
lack of clear legal requirements, 65% of the interviewees agreed that this factor does impact on 
the effectiveness of the audit committee. Around 35% of the interviewees pointed out that the 
Libyan CG Code already defines the responsibilities and duties of the audit committee in 
general terms, but opinions were divided on whether these guidelines are sufficient. More than 
55% of the interviewees wanted individual banks to supplement the code with their own written 
document clearly specifying the responsibilities and duties of the committee. 
  
“I think that the code of corporate governance issued by the Central Bank of 
Libya is enough to carry out the responsibilities and duties of the audit 
committee, though it would be better for the bank to prepare its own written 
document concerning governance and defining the responsibilities and duties 
of the audit committee” BD (1-4). 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, it was an audit committee member who emphasised the urgency of 
such a clarification, explaining that: 
“This factor actually has an impact on the practice of the audit committee, so 
there must be regulation in the bank defining the responsibilities and duties of 
the audit committee because the Governance Code has only determined these 
responsibilities and duties in general” AC (2-4). 
 
One of the external auditors gave the outsider’s perspective, arguing that the main purpose of 
issuing a written document defining the responsibilities and duties of the audit committee is to 
ensure accountability: 
“There must be an official document clearly specifying these responsibilities 
and duties so that the members of the committee can be held accountable for 
any shortcomings in their work” EA (5-2). 
 
Evidence that more banks are preparing to take this step was provided by the board chairman 
from one state bank, who commented that:  
 
"..... the bank will prepare a guide for corporate governance in the bank which 
determines the responsibilities and duties of the audit committee" BD (1-3). 
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The results of the survey are broadly consistent with the findings of Saad et al. (2006) and Lin 
et al. (2008), who found that if audit committees are to be effective, their responsibilities and 
duties must be clearly stipulated and regulated. The interviewees agreed with this up to a point, 
though some argued that Libya’s Corporate Governance Code already sets out ACs’ 
responsibilities in general terms, and that it is preferable for individual banks to determine for 
themselves what they want the committee’s duties to be. Overall, the survey participants and 
interviewees highlighted the fact that the lack of legal requirements significantly inhibits ACs’ 
effectiveness. 
 
7.3.3 The Poor Qualifications and Experience of AC Members 
One potential obstacle to audit committee effectiveness is the lack of relevant experience and 
poor qualifications of AC members. A number of researchers have found this to be an issue for 
the majority of audit committees (Zhang, 2002; Lin et al., 2008), prompting professional bodies 
to issue guidelines to assist members better to understand the importance of experience and 
professional qualifications (e.g. FRC, 2012). This factor was therefore the focus of another of 
the survey statements. 
 
As observed in Table 7.4, the survey respondents as a whole agreed that a lack of qualifications 
and experience among AC members affects the audit committee’s ability to perform its 
responsibilities and duties (mean score 3.46). The strongest support for this statement came 
from the external auditors (3.91), followed by the executive managers (3.50), the audit 
committee members (3.41), the internal auditors (3.35) and the board members (3.00). The last 
score suggests that a fair number of this group were unconvinced that this factor has an 
inhibiting effect. Table 7.5 indicates that 60.1% of the sample as a whole agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement, but that once again, the level of agreement varied widely across the 
groups, from 77.2% in the EA group and 70.6% in the AC group to 60.8% in the EM group, 
52.3% in the BD group and just 50.7% in the IA group. 
 
In contrast, almost all of the interviewees agreed that this factor affects audit committee 
effectiveness, though more than half of the interviewees asserted that the members of their 
audit committee have adequate qualifications and experience. The AC chairman from a mixed 
ownership bank emphasised the importance of this experience in enabling the committee to 
perform efficiently: 
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"The audit committee cannot carry out its tasks effectively unless its members 
are qualified and have sufficient experience in the banking industry" AC (2-
1). 
 
Others, however, revealed that members of their audit committee have qualifications in 
unrelated fields. The director of the internal audit department in one state bank explained that: 
“This factor actually affects the practice of the audit committee, so members 
must offer qualifications and experience, but some members of the board 
majored away from the banking sector; for instance, one member of the board 
of directors majored in social science” IA (4-3). 
 
In addition to banking or accounting experience, one of the external auditors highlighted the 
value of having at least one committee member with a legal background: 
“……there should be a legal person in the committee in order to be familiar 
with the laws in the banking sector” EA (5-2). 
 
The finding that a lack of relevant qualifications and experience among AC members is an 
inhibiting factor is consistent with previous studies and the recommendations of professional 
bodies (e.g. Zhang, 2002; Lin et al., 2008; FRC, 2012). However, the fact that more than half 
of the interviewees were confident that the members of their AC have adequate qualifications 
and experience is a positive indicator of the current situation in the Libyan banking sector. 
 
7.3.4 Inadequate Audit Committee Compensation 
Several studies have highlighted the fact that the inadequate compensation paid to AC members 
has an effect on the monitoring processes of these committees (Engel et al., 2010; Bierstaker 
et al., 2012; Kim and Suk, 2012). Engel et al. (2010) argue that there is a positive link between 
audit committee compensation and the quality of the audit committee. Accordingly, the 
participants were given one statement suggesting that inadequate compensation might be an 
inhibiting factor. 
 
Table 7.4 indicates that this statement recorded a total mean value of 3.17. Breaking the results 
down by group, it is clear that the highest group mean value for this statement was from the 
AC group (3.53). This was followed by the EA group (3.46), the BD group (3.14), the IA group 
(3.13) and the EM group (3.01). Table 7.5 shows that only 34.4% of the survey respondents 
agreed with this statement. The highest level of support for the statement came from the AC 
group, with 58.8% agreeing or strongly agreeing, followed by the EA group (45.7%), the BD 
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group (42.8%), the EM group (29.7%) and the IA group (25.3%). The low scores suggest that 
a fair number of the participants may not see the inadequate compensation of AC members as 
a crucial inhibiting factor affecting the practice of the committee. 
 
In contrast, the interviewees seemed much more convinced of the importance of this factor, 
with 65% agreeing (compared to 34.4% in the survey) that inadequate compensation has 
impacted on the work of their AC committee. Once again, the difference may come from the 
fact that the interviewees were senior employees with more experience and knowledge about 
this issue (45% of the survey participants were uncertain how much impact this factor has). 
Approximately 40% of these interviewees argued that the compensation paid to AC members 
is insufficient, about 30% felt that it is adequate, and the rest either did not know or did not 
respond to this part of the question. The AC chairman from a mixed ownership bank explained 
that committee members who are paid too little – or not paid at all, as is the case in his bank – 
may be less inclined to give their duties their full attention: 
 
“In our bank, there is no compensation for the members of the audit committee. 
It can affect the committee because the members do not pay enough attention 
to their responsibilities and duties, and this has an impact on the work of the 
committee” AC (2-1). 
 
An external auditor made a similar argument for paying AC members properly: 
“Audit committee members should get adequate compensation for their work 
on the committee as well as their compensation as members of the board, 
because if they are denied appropriate compensation, they may only do the 
minimum and only cover obligations required by the board” EA (5-1). 
 
Conversely, the board chairman from a mixed ownership bank disagreed with the view that a 
lack of compensation impacts on AC practice. He argued that: 
“Although there is currently no compensation for the members of the audit 
committee in the bank, the board will soon seek approval for compensating 
the members of the AC as support them, but I do not think this affects its work 
BD (1-2). 
 
And the director of internal auditing from one of the state banks explained that compensation in 
his bank is performance-related: 
“…...there is a compensation for the audit committee and it is rewarding, but 
it depends on the effort of the committee members” IA (4-3). 
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The interviewees’ view (though it was not shared by the majority of survey respondents) that 
poor compensation is an inhibiting factor is roughly consistent with the findings of many 
studies (Engel et al., 2010; Magrane and Malthus, 2010; Bierstaker et al., 2012; Kim and Suk, 
2012). Campbell et al. (2013) suggest that the compensation paid to AC members can affect 
both the independence and the effectiveness of the committee. This view was supported by a 
number of the interviewees, who explained that audit committee members in Libyan banks can 
face obstacles when it comes to gaining the compensation they need to carry out their 
responsibilities and duties effectively and that, as a result, many perform only the minimum 
duties required by the board. This is not surprising; the FRC UK (2012) recommends that the 
members of audit committees should be awarded suitable payment for bearing a significant 
responsibility and for being expected to devote a significant amount of time to their work. 
 
7.3.5 Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Fernando (2009) argues that the legal environment may have an effect on corporate governance. 
In developing countries, for example, there may be a corporate governance framework in place, 
but a slow and ineffective legal system may make enforcing this framework problematic 
(Nganga et al., 2003). In Libya, it has been argued that the CG framework itself is inappropriate 
(Abdou, 2015) and flawed (Faraj and El-Firjani, 2014). The potential impact of the legal and 
regulatory environment on audit committees, as a key mechanism of corporate governance, 
was therefore the subject of another of the survey statements. 
 
Table 7.4 shows that the overall mean score for the statement: “The weak legal and regulatory 
environment in Libya” was 3.92. The highest group mean (4.26) came from the EA group. The 
second strongest agreement came from the AC group (4.11), followed by the BD group (4.00), 
the EM group (3.95) and finally the IA group (3.66). Table 7.5 shows the distribution of 
responses to this statement. Across the sample as a whole, 72.9% of respondents agreed with 
this statement. This was the highest level of agreement for any of the inhibiting factors. 
Breaking this down by group, the EA group recorded the highest level of support for this 
statement (82.8%). The second highest level was recorded by the AC group (82.4%), followed 
by the BD group (76.2%), the EM group (74.3%) and the IA group (63.4%). Based on the 
results of the last two tables, it seems that the majority of the participants were completely 
convinced that this is the most influential inhibiting factor on corporate governance, 
particularly audit committee practice. 
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Similar support was expressed by the interviewees, with 70% of the participants agreeing that 
the legal and regulatory environment impacts on corporate governance, particularly audit 
committee practice. Opinions were divided on the robustness of Libya’s legal and regulatory 
environment, with 65% of the interviewees describing it as weak, and just 35% arguing that it 
is adequate. There was general agreement, however, that the application of laws in the Libyan 
environment is not as effective as it should be. The board chairman of one state bank pointed 
out that: 
 
“This factor is actually an influential factor. The current legislative 
environment in Libya is weak; for example, laws are issued without 
examination of the impact of the legislation, and at the same time, certain 
aspects of the legislation of Libya’s banks are either lacking or need 
improvement” BD (1-3). 
 
The finding seems to support the view put forward by institutional theory that the AC’s role is 
largely symbolic (Beasley et al., 2009). This is the case in Libya, where the formation of an 
AC is public evidence of the bank’s compliance with the CG Code. The general manager from 
a mixed ownership bank pointed out that: 
“I think that the legal and regulatory environment affects the committee's 
practice. The formation of the audit committee may be based on the Code of 
CG, so the committee’s role may only be symbolic, and I also think that the 
laws relating to the banking sector need to be continuously developed” EM (3-
1). 
 
One of the external auditors took a different view, arguing that current legislation is adequate, 
but that much more guidance needs to be given on how the rules should be applied in practice. 
He stated that: 
“There are enough rules governing the work of the audit committee and the 
board of directors in the Corporate Governance Code, but the problem is in 
the application of the rules – it is not clear how they should be applied, and 
there are no guidelines for the work of the audit committee” EA (5-1). 
 
Finally, the AC chairman from a mixed ownership bank was critical of the legal environment 
to the point that:  
“I think that the legal environment…has become an obstacle to the banking 
business and the work of the audit committee” AC (2-1). 
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The results confirm the findings of previous studies in showing that the legal environment may 
have an effect on corporate governance (e.g. Fernando, 2009). The view expressed by a 
significant proportion of interviewees that weaknesses in the legal and regulatory environment 
affect corporate governance and consequently audit committee practice in Libya's banking 
sector is consistent with the findings of Abdou (2015) and Faraj and El-Firjani (2014). Their 
perception that the enforcement of the laws in the Libyan environment may not be effective is 
also consistent with the conclusions of Nganga et al. (2003). A number of the interviewees 
highlighted that the legal environment in Libya requires banks to establish an AC. If these 
committees are being set up merely to create legitimacy outside the organisation, their role may 
well end up being symbolic only, as posited by institutional theory. 
 
7.3.6 Weak Accounting Environment 
Wu and Patel (2015) identify the accounting environment as having an impact on corporate 
governance, but in Libya, this environment is still relatively under-developed. Maatoug (2014) 
and Ahmad and Gao (2004) argue that accounting education in the country is still based on a 
traditional curriculum, and that it lacks systematic development and does little to support 
research. El-Firjani et al. (2014), meanwhile, point out that the accounting profession in Libya 
has failed to reach its objectives regarding the development of accounting practices in the 
country. In light of these concerns, it was important to identify whether the participants saw 
this environment as impacting AC effectiveness.   
 
Table 7.4 indicates a total mean value of 3.41 for the statement that: “The weakness of the 
accounting and auditing profession in Libya” is a factor inhibiting AC effectiveness. Breaking 
the results down by group, it is clear that the highest group mean for this statement was recorded 
by the board members (3.67). The second highest group mean was recorded by the audit 
committee members (3.65), followed by the external auditors (3.51), the internal auditors (3.45) 
and lastly the executive managers (3.19). Table 7.5 shows that 55.1% of the survey participants 
as a whole agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. The BD group showed the highest 
level of support for the statement, with 71.5% agreeing or strongly agreeing. This was followed 
by the IA group (57.8%), the AC group (52.9%), the EA group (51.5%) and the EM group 
(50.0%). 
 
The interviewees showed a similar level of support for the statement, with approximately 60% 
agreeing that the weakness of Libya’s accounting and auditing profession affects corporate 
governance and audit committees in particular in Libya’s banking sector. Asked how this 
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weakness manifests itself, an audit committee chairman from a mixed ownership bank 
explained that: 
 
“The weakness of the accounting and auditing profession in Libya certainly 
affects the work of the audit committee. For example, sometimes the internal 
auditors produce very weak reports in terms of content because those auditors 
may lack the necessary qualifications” AC (2-1). 
 
The general manager from a mixed bank gave another example of how poor quality accounting 
adversely affects audit committee practice. He argued that: 
"This factor actually affects governance and audit committee practice, because 
weaknesses in the accounting profession may lead to serious errors being made 
in the bank’s accounting practice, and possibly to the provision of false 
information to the audit committee. This may lead to bad decisions being made 
based on this misinformation" EM (3-1). 
 
Conversely, the audit committee chairman from a state bank explained that having skilled 
accountants working for the bank facilitates the committee’s oversight role: 
 
".......when the accountants and auditors in the bank are more highly qualified, 
the audit committee’s monitoring and oversight process is easier" AC (2-3). 
 
Accounting education in Libya has been criticised by Alfatiemy (2013), who argues that there 
are too few qualified accounting academics in the country’s universities, poor vocational 
training for students, and a lack of research to support effective teaching and learning. His 
criticisms were echoed by one board member from a mixed ownership bank, who complained 
about the standard of accounting education in universities:  
"......the weaknesses in the accounting and auditing profession are the result of 
the weakness of accounting education in universities and the lack of adequate 
training programmes in the bank, and also the non-application of the 
International Accounting Standards and the International Standards on 
Auditing" BD (1-4). 
 
Masli (2010) also criticises the accounting education system in Libya, explaining that it relies 
on indoctrination rather than critical reflection, and that faculty members don’t have access to 
the technology that would help them improve their teaching practice. One of the external 
auditors pointed out that: 
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"Most of the accounting curriculum in Libyan universities has not kept pace 
with the evolution of accounting in the international context, which requires 
continuous development. For example, students in their final year should be 
trained in real-life institutions, such as banks, to gain the experience they need 
to be able to work" EA (5-2). 
 
Not everyone was critical of the training offered by Libya’s banks, however; one board 
member from a state bank spoke of the special care that has been taken in his bank to train 
employees in Islamic banking practices. 
"The majority of employees have been developed by the bank, with many 
employees being sent abroad for training, especially in the field of Islamic 
banking. The Nomination Committee oversees this aspect effectively. I think 
that the training has been effective and therefore, this factor has not had an 
effect at this bank" BD (1-1). 
 
These findings are consistent with the view that corporate governance is impacted by the 
accounting environment, including the weakness of the accounting and auditing profession 
(Fernando, 2009). This is the first study to investigate the impact of this weakness on ACs in 
particular. Some interviewees highlighted how it reduces the AC's effectiveness by leaving it 
reliant on weak reports and inaccurate information. Their criticisms of the old fashioned 
university curriculum echo those expressed by Alfatiemy (2013), Masli (2010) and Ahmad and 
Gao (2004), while their observation that practitioners generally fail to apply international 
accounting and auditing standards is consistent with the finding of El-Firjani et al. (2014) that 
the profession has not achieved its stated objective of developing accounting practice. 
 
7.3.7 Government Intervention 
The political structure in Libya and the fact that the government is the controlling shareholder 
in many of the country’s corporations mean that there is a high degree of government 
intervention in the banking sector (Wu and Patel, 2015). For example, managers may be under 
pressure to use up capital, to avoid taking certain profit-maximising risks, and to stabilise 
employment (Roe, 2003). The state remains the largest shareholder in most firms, thus 
controlling the economy, often at the expense of other shareholders (Larbsh, 2010; Abdou, 
2015). The survey respondents were therefore given a statement which was designed to 
investigate the effect government intervention has on audit committees in the banking sector. 
 
As may be observed in Table 7.4, the respondents generally expressed agreement with the 
statement that: "Government intervention in the banking sector, especially from the Central 
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Bank" is an inhibiting factor, giving it a total mean score of 3.70. The highest group mean for 
this statement was recorded by the executive managers group (3.77). This was followed by the 
internal auditors group (3.70), the external auditors group (3.66), the audit committee members 
group (3.59) and the board members group (3.57). It is interesting that the lowest scores came 
from the board members and the audit committee members, as these groups might be expected 
to be most aware of the effect of this factor on AC practice. Table 7.5 shows that 64.2% of all 
the participants agreed with this statement, with the EM group indicating the highest level of 
support (73.0%), followed by the EA group (65.7%), the AC group (64.7%), the IA group 
(59.1%) and the BD group (47.6%).   
 
When asked generally whether there is government intervention in the sector, especially from 
the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), 75% of the interviewees agreed. Fifty per cent of the 
interviewees felt that this intervention may impact on corporate governance and audit 
committee practice, while only 20% asserted that this intervention does not impact on them. 
The board chairman from one of the state banks described his objections to the CBL 
intervention, which he saw as interference. He argued that the job of the CBL is to act as a 
general regulator of the sector rather than to involve itself in the day-to-day affairs of individual 
banks. 
 
"There has been a lot of intervention in the work of the bank by the CBL in 
recent times. The CBL owns 80% of the bank, but this does not justify its 
interference in the affairs of the bank. Its role should be to regulate and 
supervise the activities of banks, and this intervention has an impact on the 
bank and its corporate governance" BD (1-3). 
 
The view that such intervention impacts on AC practice was echoed by the AC chairman from 
the same state bank:  
 
"The intervention of government and the Central Bank in the work of the bank 
certainly affects the practices of the audit committee; as an integral part of the 
bank, any impact on the bank will also affect the audit committee" AC (2-3). 
 
The director of the internal audit department from a mixed ownership bank complained that 
many of the CBL’s interventions take the form of measures and regulations that are not 
practicable. 
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"In my opinion, there is too much intervention from the Central Bank in the 
work of banks; it issues decisions and rules which are not feasible, particularly 
in relation to corporate governance" IA (4-4). 
 
Another typical example of government intervention is its interference in the appointment of 
senior positions such as board chairman. This can impact on the board of directors and its 
decision making (including the selection of AC members). An executive manager in a mixed 
ownership bank gave this example of government intervention in his organisation: 
 
"In my opinion, government intervention has an impact on the banking 
business and corporate governance and it needs to be limited. For example, 
the government has forced us to allow a foreign investor to become a partner 
of the bank. This partner has a 19% share of the bank's stock, with the 
chairman of the board of directors and the general manager" EM (3-3). 
 
However, while the majority of interviewees believed that there is at least some degree of 
government intervention in the banking sector, one external auditor took a different view. He 
argued that: 
 
"From my experience, I do not think that there is intervention from the 
government, especially from the Central Bank, except as provided for by law. 
This intervention is justified, given that the role of the Central Bank is to 
monitor all the banks and supervise their activities, but it has no effect on the 
work of the audit committee" EA (5-1). 
 
The findings echo other studies in suggesting that government intervention can have an adverse 
impact on firms’ CG, including the performance of their AC (e.g. Roe, 2003; Hwang and Seo, 
2004; Wu and Patel, 2015; Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017). Despite this, a number of the 
interviewees saw the intervention of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) as justified, given that 
its role is to monitor and supervise the activities of all banks.  
 
7.4 Discussion of the Results 
There was a general consensus among the survey respondents that most of the identified 
enabling factors do indeed have a positive impact, though support was less strong (though not 
to a statistically significant degree) from the executive managers group in several instances. 
The lower overall group mean (3.49) recorded by this group suggests it did not see some of 
these factors as very influential. The findings from the survey were supported by those from 
the interviews, with both generally supporting agency theory’s assumption that the AC’s job is 
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to play a practical monitoring role. The view expressed by survey respondents that at least 
some AC members should have expertise in the accounting field is consistent with the findings 
of DeFond et al. (2005) and Ho et al. (2014), who argue that some level of financial expertise 
is necessary if the committee is to be able to read and understand the financial statements 
(Maraghni and Nekhili, 2014). Researchers and regulators have also drawn the link between 
committee size and effectiveness (Albring et al., 2014), with the view among many being that 
the AC must have at least three members if it is to perform effectively (FRC, 2014; Utama and 
Leonardo, 2014). The importance attributed to the third-ranked statement (“The AC meets 
regularly enough to perform its responsibilities”) echoes the emphasis placed by many 
regulatory bodies and researchers on the committee meeting between two and four times per 
year (Smith, 2003; Burke et al., 2008; Hogan et al., 2014; Ebrahim, 2007; Ali, 2014), while the 
principle underlying the fourth-ranked statement (“The AC has adequate authority and 
influence to carry out its duties and responsibilities”) is addressed in regulations such as SOX 
(2002) and the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2003).  
 
Access to information at all levels of management was regarded as the fifth most influential 
factor, with the independent status of AC members being ranked sixth. The relatively low level 
of support given to this factor contrasts starkly with the insistence of many researchers that the 
AC must be made up of non-executive and independent directors if it is to carry out its 
responsibilities and duties properly (Collier and Zaman, 2005; Lin et al., 2006; Rezaee, 2009). 
The lowest ranked factor was the diligence of committee members; although the survey 
respondents agreed that this is an enabling factor in the work of the AC, they felt less strongly 
about this than they did about any of the other factors. Many of the respondents were not 
entirely convinced that ACs are effective. If they attribute this lack of effectiveness to the 
prevailing environment and the larger structural forces that surround ACs, it may explain why 
they saw the commitment of individual committee members as being less significant. The fact 
that the interviewees were more likely than the survey respondents to see the committee’s 
authority and access to information as significant enabling factors may be due to their being 
senior employees and therefore more likely to observe the impact of these factors at first hand. 
 
The survey respondents were slightly less agreed on the factors that adversely impact banks’ 
CG and AC effectiveness, with the external auditors group differing significantly from the 
other groups. This group had the highest total mean score for the seven inhibiting factors, 
suggesting it considered these factors to be more significant than the other groups did. Most of 
the interviewees agreed that the identified factors adversely impact AC effectiveness, with the 
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majority echoing the survey respondents in seeing the weakness of the legal and regulatory 
environment as the strongest inhibiting factor. This is consistent with Abdou’s (2015) finding 
that the legal, regulatory and institutional environment underpinning Libya’s CG framework is 
inadequate. Fernando (2009) also points to the effect the legal environment can have on CG. 
In the current environment, ACs are legally required but allowed to remain mostly symbolic – 
they are established to demonstrate compliance with the Libyan CG Code (2010) and maintain 
legitimacy (as per institutional theory) rather than to perform a substantive function.  
 
Numerous writers and regulators have pointed to weaknesses in board governance (e.g. in terms 
of the board’s independence, meetings and size) as another crucial factor that can affect AC 
effectiveness (e.g. Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Braswell et al., 2012), 
and the responses of the survey participants suggest that this is also a concern in Libyan firms 
(Larbsh, 2010). The third-ranked factor – the suggestion that political intervention adversely 
affects CG in Libya – has previously been noted by Larbsh (2010) and Abdou (2015).  
Researchers have observed that such intervention poses a particular threat to CG in state-owned 
corporations where the government is one of the main stakeholders (Pučko, 2005; Wu and Patel, 
2015), as is the case in many banks in the Libyan banking sector. Some of the interviewees 
expressed concern that government intervention in this sector extends to the appointment even 
of senior positions such as board chairman, with profound consequences for boards, ACs, and 
their decision making. Institutional theory may give some insight into these concerns; it may 
be that these interviewees were worried that they are being required to adopt practices and 
follow externally imposed regulations before they are properly prepared.  
 
The concern underlying the fourth-ranked statement (the poor qualifications and experience of 
AC members) has been discussed by a range of regulatory bodies and researchers, such as the 
UK’s FRC (2012) and Bedard and Gendron (2010). The lack of clear legal requirements 
governing the AC’s responsibilities or duties was considered the fifth most influential 
inhibiting factor (consistent with the findings of Saad et al. (2006) and Lin et al. (2008)), with 
the weakness of the accounting and auditing profession being ranked sixth. This is consistent 
with Alfatiemy (2013) and Ahmad and Gao (2004), who argue that a national lack of expertise 
in accounting, financial reporting and auditing is affecting accounting and auditing practices in 
Libya (Wu and Patel, 2015). The inadequate compensation given to AC members was ranked 
lowest by the survey respondents overall, with many indicating a lack of certainty or concern 
about the potential impact of this factor. Researchers have shown more interest in this factor, 
with several investigating the effect of compensation on the monitoring work of ACs (e.g. 
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Engel et al., 2010; Magrane and Malthus, 2010; Malik, 2014). Survey comments in the study 
suggested that inadequate compensation can pose a problem for some AC members, depending 
on their motivation for doing the job, but no one admitted to being in this category themselves. 
The interviewees were more likely than the survey respondents to see inadequate compensation 
as a significant inhibiting factor, perhaps because, as senior employees, they were more likely 
to have experience and knowledge about this issue.  
 
7.5 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the literature by investigating the main factors 
that enable and inhibit the effectiveness of ACs in the Libyan banking sector, as identified in 
the conceptual framework. There was a general consensus among the survey participants and 
interviewees that the identified enabling factors have a positive effect on AC practice in the 
banking sector. They agreed that the committee is more likely to perform this task effectively 
if: it has at least three members; these members are non-executive/independent directors, at 
least some of whom have expertise in the accounting field; it meets regularly; it has the 
authority it needs to carry out its duties; it has access to information at all levels of management; 
and AC members devote adequate time and effort to the work of the committee. The consensus 
was almost as strong that AC practice in the Libyan banking sector is inhibited by the weak 
legal and regulatory environment in Libya, weaknesses in board governance, the poor 
qualifications and experience of AC members, the lack of clear legal requirements governing 
the AC’s responsibilities, the weakness of the accounting and auditing profession, and the 
inadequate compensation paid to AC members. The following chapter discusses the findings 
regarding actions that might be taken to improve the effectiveness of ACs. 
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Chapter 8. Analysing the Actions to Enhance AC Effectiveness  
 
8.1 Introduction 
As set out in the study’s conceptual framework, the identification of actions that could be taken 
to improve AC practice follows on from the exploration of the factors impacting on this practice. 
Taking the inhibiting factors identified in Chapter 7 as a starting point, seven statements were 
devised describing actions that might be taken to address these seven challenges and improve 
the effectiveness of AC in Libya's banking sector so that they are better able to protect the 
interests of shareholders.  
 
8.2 Enhancing the Effectiveness of the AC 
The participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that the actions 
described in the statements might boost AC effectiveness. Table 8.1 indicates that the majority 
of the participants agreed that most of these actions would enhance the effectiveness of ACs. 
Statement 6 (“The accounting and auditing profession in Libya should be strengthened to help 
governance systems operate more effectively.”) scored highest, with a total mean score of 4.35. 
This was followed in descending order by statement 3 (“AC members should be appointed 
based on their experience and qualifications” – 4.19), statement 2 (“Strict legal requirements 
should be put in place to compel ACs to perform their responsibilities and duties effectively” 
– 4.16), statement 1 (“Boards should do more to support ACs in performing their 
responsibilities and duties” – 4.12), statement 5 (“The legal and regulatory environment in 
Libya should pay more attention to corporate governance and ACs” – 3.98), statement 4 (“AC 
members should be sufficiently compensated for performing their responsibilities” – 3.95) and 
statement 7 (“Government intervention should not be allowed to impact negatively on 
corporate governance and AC practice” – 3.78). The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale was found 
to be 0.88. 
 
The BD group produced the highest total mean score for the seven statements (4.22). This was 
followed by the EA group (4.20), the AC group (4.12), the EM group (4.05) and lastly the IA 
group (4.00). The fact that all of the total group means are high indicates a strong belief across 
the board that these actions would enhance the effectiveness of ACs in the Libyan banking 
sector.  
 
The board members in the sample considered the appointment of AC members according to 
their experience and qualifications to be the action most likely to enhance the effectiveness of 
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AC practice, awarding this a score of 4.57. This was followed by increased board support, 
which scored 4.29. Strengthening the accounting and auditing profession was scored third 
(4.24). Improving the legal and regulatory environment was scored fourth (4.19), while 
preventing damaging government intervention was scored fifth (4.14). Sufficient compensation 
for AC members was scored joint sixth (4.05), while strict legal requirements were considered 
the action least likely to enhance the effectiveness of ACs (3.95). It is interesting to note that 
all these scores are high. 
 
Like the BD group, the AC group thought that appointing AC members according to their 
experience and qualifications is the most important action to enhance AC effectiveness; 
however, unlike the BD group, AC members also felt that it is vital to institute strict legal 
requirements governing ACs. Both statements were given a score of 4.29. They were followed 
by strengthening the accounting and auditing profession, which scored 4.18. Board support was 
scored joint third (4.12), while sufficient compensation and preventing damaging government 
intervention were scored joint fourth (4.06). Improving the legal and regulatory environment 
was considered the least most important in enhancing the effectiveness of ACs (3.82). Like the 
board members, the respondents in the AC group gave all of these actions high values. 
 
The executive managers saw strengthening the accounting and auditing profession as the most 
crucial action to enhance AC effectiveness (4.51). This group scored strict legal requirements 
as the second most important (4.22), followed by the appointment of AC members according 
to their experience and qualifications (4.11) and board support (4.08). Sufficient compensation 
for AC members, improving the legal and regulatory environment and preventing damaging 
government intervention were considered the least important actions (3.88, 3.86 and 3.66 
respectively). 
 
The internal auditors group followed the executive managers group in scoring strengthening 
the accounting and auditing profession highest (4.24). It scored strict legal requirements as the 
second most influential action (4.10) followed by board support (4.04) and appointing AC 
members according to their experience and qualifications (4.00). It also followed the EM group 
in scoring sufficient compensation for AC members, improving the legal and regulatory 
environment and preventing damaging government intervention as the least influential actions 
(3.96, 3.94 and 3.69 respectively). 
 
Lastly, the external auditors group followed the BD and AC groups in scoring the appointment 
of AC members according to their experience and qualifications as the most influential factor 
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(4.49), and the AC group in scoring strengthening the accounting and auditing profession as 
the second most influential (4.37). This was followed by board support (4.29), improving the 
legal and regulatory environment (4.26) and strict legal requirements (4.23). Sufficient 
compensation for AC members and preventing damaging government intervention (3.94 and 
3.83 respectively) were regarded as the least important factors for enhancing AC effectiveness. 
 
Table 8.1 Descriptive Statistics on Actions to Enhance the Effectiveness of ACs 
No Statements 
Group Means Total 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Rank 
Cronbach's  
Alpha BD AC EM IA EA 
1. 
Boards should do more to 
support ACs in performing their 
responsibilities and duties. 
4.29 4.12 4.08 4.04 4.29 4.12 4.00 0.93 5 
0.88 
2. 
Strict legal requirements should 
be put in place to compel ACs to 
perform their responsibilities and 
duties effectively. 
3.95 4.29 4.22 4.10 4.23 4.16 4.00 0.88 4 
3. 
AC members should be 
appointed based on their 
experience and qualifications. 
4.57 4.29 4.11 4.00 4.49 4.19 5.00 1.08 2 
4. 
AC members should be 
sufficiently compensated for 
performing their responsibilities. 
4.05 4.06 3.88 3.96 3.94 3.95 4.00 0.89 7 
5. 
The legal and regulatory 
environment in Libya should pay 
more attention to corporate 
governance and ACs. 
4.19 3.82 3.86 3.94 4.26 3.98 4.00 1.05 6 
6. 
The accounting and auditing 
profession in Libya should be 
strengthened to help governance 
systems operate more 
effectively. 
4.24 4.18 4.51 4.24 4.37 4.35 4.00 0.73 1 
7. 
Government intervention should 
not be allowed to impact 
negatively on corporate 
governance and AC practice. 
4.14 4.06 3.66 3.69 3.83 3.78 4.00 1.05 8 
Overall Group Means 4.22 4.12 4.05 4.00 4.20 4.08 - - - 
BD: Board members     AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
 
 
 
Table 8.2 indicates how the participants' responses to this question were distributed. Across the 
sample as a whole, statement 6 (strengthening the accounting and auditing profession) scored 
highest, with 92.6% of the sample saying they agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. 
Statement 2 scored second highest, with 85.8%, followed by statement 3 (84.0%), statement 1 
(79.4%), statement 5 (77.8%), statement 4 (74.8%) and statement 7 (68.3%). The latter 
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statement suggests that government intervention, particularly from the Central Bank of Libya, 
should not be allowed to impact negatively on corporate governance and AC practice. One 
possible reason why this statement obtained such a low score compared with the other 
statements may be that a number of the respondents felt that this intervention is justified 
because the government and the Central Bank are ultimately responsible for organising and 
supervising the banking sector. 
 
Table 8.2 Frequency Distribution of Responses on Enhancing AC Effectiveness  
No Statements 
Board 
Members 
N = 21 
AC 
Members  
N = 17 
Executive 
Managers 
N = 74 
Internal 
Auditors 
N = 71 
External 
Auditors 
 N = 35 
Total 
N = 218 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
D 
% 
U 
% 
A 
% 
1. 
Boards should do more to 
support ACs in performing 
their responsibilities and 
duties. 
0.0 9.5 90.5 5.9 11.8 82.4 6.8 17.6 75.7 4.2 19.7 76.0 2.9 11.4 85.7 4.6 16.1 79.4 
2. 
Strict legal requirements 
should be put in place to 
compel ACs to perform their 
responsibilities and duties 
effectively. 
9.5 9.5 80.9 0.0 17.6 82.4 6.8 4.1 89.1 4.2 11.3 84.5 5.7 8.6 85.8 5.5 8.7 85.8 
3. 
AC members should be 
appointed based on their 
experience and 
qualifications. 
0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 17.6 82.4 17.6 0.0 82.4 14.1 7.0 78.8 5.7 5.7 88.5 11.5 4.6 84.0 
4. 
AC members should be 
sufficiently compensated for 
performing their 
responsibilities. 
4.8 14.3 81.0 0.0 17.6 82.3 4.1 25.7 70.3 7.0 18.3 74.7 5.7 17.1 77.2 5.1 20.2 74.8 
5. 
The legal and regulatory 
environment in Libya 
should pay more attention to 
corporate governance and 
ACs. 
0.0 14.3 85.7 5.9 23.5 70.6 20.5 4.1 75.3 12.7 11.3 76.1 8.6 5.7 85.7 12.9 9.2 77.8 
6. 
The accounting and auditing 
profession in Libya should 
be strengthened to help 
governance systems operate 
more effectively. 
0.0 9.5 90.4 0.0 5.9 94.1 1.4 4.1 94.6 2.8 5.6 91.5 2.9 5.7 91.4 1.9 5.5 92.6 
7. 
Government intervention 
should not be allowed to 
impact negatively on 
corporate governance and 
AC practice. 
4.8 4.8 90.5 0.0 23.5 76.5 23.0 12.2 64.8 12.7 22.5 64.8 11.4 22.9 65.7 14.3 17.4 68.3 
D: Strongly disagree and disagree          U: Uncertain         A: Strongly agree and agree 
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Although the majority of the survey participants as a whole considered strengthening the 
accounting and auditing profession to be the action most likely to boost the effectiveness of 
ACs in Libyan banks, the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated a statistically significant difference 
between the groups on this statement (p-value 0.02) (see Table 8.3). The Mann-Whitney test 
showed that the differences were between the EM group and the BD (0.04), AC (0.01) and IA 
groups (0.01). The Kruskal-Wallis test found no significant differences across the sample as a 
whole for the other statements, though the Mann-Whitney test showed that there were in fact 
significant differences among groups with respect to statement 3 (between the EA group and 
the EM (0.04) and IA groups (0.01)) and statement 5 (between the EA group and the AC (0.05) 
and IA groups (0.05)). The significantly higher level of support shown for these statements by 
the EA group may be because this group is arguably the best placed to see the positive impact 
the actions might have. 
 
Table 8.3 Comparisons Between Groups on Enhancing AC Effectiveness 
NO    
Statements 
Kruska
l-Wallis 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
  BD-AC  BD-EM BD-IA  BD-EA  AC-EM AC-IA  AC-EA  EM-IA  EM-EA IA-EA 
1. 
Boards should do more to support 
ACs in performing their 
responsibilities and duties. 
0.72 0.64 0.64 0.43 0.67 0.94 0.86 0.40 0.71 0.32 0.176 
2. 
Strict legal requirements should be 
put in place to compel ACs to 
perform their responsibilities and 
duties effectively. 
0.41 0.22 0.10 0.44 0.19 0.96 0.42 0.87 0.18 0.87 0.38 
3. 
AC members should be appointed 
based on their experience and 
qualifications. 
0.05 0.30 0.22 0.06 0.48 0.90 0.52 0.13 0.39 0.04* 0.01* 
4. 
AC members should be sufficiently 
compensated for performing their 
responsibilities. 
0.85 0.90 0.38 0.83 0.84 0.47 0.95 0.96 0.38 0.45 0.99 
5. 
The legal and regulatory 
environment in Libya should pay 
more attention to corporate 
governance and ACs. 
0.20 0.27 0.50 0.50 0.26 0.60 0.55 0.05* 0.92 0.05 0.05* 
6. 
The accounting and auditing 
profession in Libya should be 
strengthened to help governance 
systems operate more effectively. 
0.02* 0.69 0.04* 0.79 0.25 0.01* 0.46 0.12 0.01* 0.39 0.21 
7. 
Government intervention should 
not be allowed to impact negatively 
on corporate governance and AC 
practice. 
0.34 0.64 0.13 0.05 0.42 0.30 0.21 0.69 0.87 0.47 0.38 
BD: Board members     AC: Audit committee members      EM: Executive managers      IA: Internal auditors      EA: External auditors 
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In order to gain insight into the extent to which they were perceived as enhancing the 
effectiveness of ACs in Libya’s banking sector, these actions that might be taken to improve 
their effectiveness are discussed separately in the following sections. 
 
8.2.1 Developing and Strengthening the Accounting and Auditing Profession 
As observed in Table 8.1, the sample as a whole saw strengthening the accounting and auditing 
profession as the best way of improving the effectiveness of ACs. The overall group mean for 
this action was 4.35, with the strongest support being shown by the executive managers (4.51), 
followed by the external auditors (4.37), the internal auditors (4.24), the board members (4.24) 
and the audit committee members (4.18). Table 8.2 indicates that 92.6% of the sample as a 
whole agreed or strongly agreed with this step. The level of agreement varied little among the 
groups, from 94.6% in the EM group and 94.1% in the AC group, to 91.5% in the IA group, 
91.4% in the EA group and 90.4% in the BD group.  
 
The overwhelming majority of interviewees (85%) felt that developing the accounting and 
auditing profession in Libya is crucial. In this respect, they echo Hamuda and Sawan (2014) 
and Faraj and El-Firjani (2014), who argue that Libya’s ability to implement the International 
Accounting Standards (IASs) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is being 
hampered by a lack of relevant training programmes, lack of awareness and skills among 
accounting professionals and weak governance mechanisms. The interviewees offered several 
suggestions for raising standards in the profession, including creating a professional association 
or union, implementing international standards, training bank staff (particularly internal 
auditors) and developing accounting curricula in Libyan universities. The board chairman from 
a mixed ownership bank saw several ways in which a professional association might raise the 
level of expertise in the banking sector:  
“There is a need to form an association or union that is able to develop and 
improve the accounting and auditing profession itself, to train bank staff and 
to develop the banking business” BD (1-2). 
 
A board member from the same mixed ownership bank had two suggestions for how the 
profession might be developed: 
"The Central Bank should compel all banks to apply international standards 
for accountants properly, and to develop and train internal auditors in order to 
increase the effectiveness of the bank's corporate governance" BD (1-4). 
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The training of internal auditors would do much to strengthen the profession; Abu-Azza (2012) 
found that internal auditors in Libyan companies generally have low levels of experience in 
auditing, and that little emphasis is given to those aspects of the internal audit role that are 
associated with promoting efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation. The director of 
internal auditing from a state bank highlighted the particular importance of employing staff 
with internationally recognised qualifications: 
"Human resources in the banks must be developed properly, particularly in the 
internal audit department, for example by employing people who have an 
internationally recognised professional certificate in internal auditing" IA (4-
3). 
 
Maatoug (2014), Faraj and El-Firjani (2014) and Ahmad and Gao (2004) all argue that 
accounting education in Libya is still based on traditional curricula and that it lacks systematic 
development and does little to support research. An external auditor also acknowledged the 
importance of high-quality training, explaining that as this begins with the universities, it is 
incumbent on these institutions to ensure they stay up to date with developments in the field. 
"Science curricula in the Libyan universities should keep pace with the 
evolution of accounting, and then employees in the banks can be trained to 
apply corporate governance mechanisms effectively" EA (5-2). 
 
Although a number of studies have observed that the accounting profession in Libya has not 
succeeded in achieving its objective of developing corporate accounting practice (e.g. El-
Firjani et al., 2014; Ahmad and Gao, 2004; Larbsh, 2010), this is the first study to draw a link 
between the weakness of the profession and AC effectiveness. It suggests that raising standards 
among accounting and auditing professionals would enhance the quality and reliability of the 
information supplied to the AC and allow it to perform more efficiently.  
 
8.2.2 Appointment of AC Members According to their Experience and Qualifications 
As seen in Table 8.1, the survey sample as a whole agreed with the statement: “AC members 
should be appointed based on their experience and qualifications,” recording a total mean score 
of 4.19. Breaking the results down by group, it is apparent that the highest group mean for this 
step was recorded by the board members group (4.57). This was followed by the external 
auditors group (4.49), the audit committee members group (4.29), the executive managers 
group (4.11) and the internal auditors group (4.00). Table 8.2 shows that 84.0% of the survey 
participants agreed with this step. The BD group showed the highest level of support, with 100% 
agreeing or strongly agreeing. This was followed by the EA group (88.5%), the AC group and 
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the EM group (both 82.4%) and the IA group (78.8%). It is worth noting that the two tables 
show no significant differences between the groups in terms of rank order. 
When the interviewees were asked what criteria should be adopted when appointing audit 
committee members, Three-quarters (75%) said that the choice should be based on whether the 
appointee has the qualifications and experience necessary to serve the committee effectively 
and enhance its performance. An executive manager from a state bank argued that these should 
in fact be the criteria for appointing all board members, not just members of the AC: 
 
"The selection of board members as well as members of the audit committee 
should be in accordance with specific criteria to serve and enhance the work 
of the audit committee" EM (3-2). 
 
However, one Libya-based study has found that in practice, board members in the country are 
generally chosen not for their abilities or expertise but because of personal contacts and 
favouritism (Shalba, 2016). This is an issue that needs to be addressed if ACs are to perform 
their responsibilities and duties effectively. This view was echoed by an audit committee 
member from a mixed ownership bank: 
"The selection of board members, including the members of the audit 
committee, should be based on their skills and qualifications to ensure the 
success of the work of the audit committee" AC (2-2). 
 
Shalba (2016) recommends that favouritism and the intrusion of personal relationships into the 
selection process must be eliminated by the Central Bank of Libya issuing the appropriate 
legislation. In the same vein, an external auditor suggested that banks develop a formal set of 
criteria for AC appointees: 
"The appropriate way to choose the members of the audit committee is by 
defining specifications for them, including for example qualifications, 
experience, age and other factors" EA (5-1). 
 
The finding that AC members should be appointed based on their experience and qualifications 
is consistent with the recommendation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the UK Guidance 
on ACs (FRC, 2012). The interviewees asserted that the appointment of AC members should 
be based on specific criteria, such as qualifications, experience and skills, to ensure the success 
of audit committee practice. 
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8.2.3 Legal Requirements Governing the Responsibilities of ACs 
As observed in Table 8.1, the sample as a whole agreed with the statement: “Strict legal 
requirements should be put in place to compel ACs to perform their responsibilities and duties 
effectively.” The statement recorded a total mean score of 4.16. Breaking the results down by 
group, the highest group mean for this step was recorded by the audit committee members 
group (4.29). This was followed by the external auditors group (4.23), the executive managers 
group (4.22), the internal auditors group (4.10) and the board members group (3.95). Table 8.2 
indicates that 85.8% of the survey participants agreed with this step. The EM group showed 
the highest level of support, with 89.1% agreeing or strongly agreeing, but this was followed 
closely by the EA group (85.8%), the IA group (84.5%), the AC group (82.4%) and the BD 
group (80.9%). Thus, the results from the questionnaire suggest a high level of agreement right 
across the sample that implementing this measure would improve the effectiveness of ACs. 
 
The interviewees also expressed strong agreement with this measure, with 75% calling for legal 
requirements to be put in place. The board chairman from one mixed ownership bank was 
unequivocal, commenting: 
"In my opinion, the state or the Central Bank must establish strict controls, 
regulations and legislation to support corporate governance and audit 
committees in Libyan banks" BD (1-2). 
 
The importance of establishing clear terms of reference for the AC is emphasised by Saad et 
al. (2006). These authors add that the charter setting out the committee’s responsibilities should 
preferably be disclosed in the financial statements in order to assist shareholders in evaluating 
its performance. A general manager from another mixed ownership bank argued that: 
“In my view, there should be a written document produced by the bank itself 
determining the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee, and this 
needs to be updated and developed from time to time” EM (3-1). 
 
The results confirm the findings of previous studies in indicating that the institution of legal 
requirements governing the responsibilities of audit committees would enhance the 
effectiveness of these committees (e.g. Saad et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2008). The interviewees 
showed a high level of support for the idea that there should be a written document determining 
the responsibilities and duties of the audit committee. 
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8.2.4 Board Support 
As shown in Table 8.1, the sample as a whole agreed with the statement: “Boards should do 
more to support ACs in performing their responsibilities and duties,” giving it a total mean 
score of 4.12. Breaking the results down by group, the highest group mean for this step was 
recorded by the board members group and the external auditors group (both 4.29). This was 
followed by the audit committee members group (4.12), the executive managers group (4.08) 
and the internal auditors group (4.04). Table 8.2 shows that 79.4% of the survey participants 
agreed with this step. The BD group showed the highest level of support, with 90.5% agreeing 
or strongly agreeing. This was followed by the EA group (85.7%), the AC group (82.4%), the 
IA group (76.0%) and the EM group (75.7%). Notwithstanding this variation, there was strong 
support for the measure across the five groups in the sample.  
 
Similar support for this step was expressed by the interviewees, a number of whom suggested 
that audit committee practice would be enhanced by the board supporting the independence of 
the committee. An internal auditor from a mixed ownership bank explained that: 
"…the board of directors should help the audit committee overcome the 
problems and difficulties it faces so that it can carry out its tasks and 
responsibilities independently" EM (4-1). 
 
An executive manager from another mixed ownership bank went further, arguing that the 
obligation to support the work of the AC rests not just with the board but with the general 
assembly: 
"In my opinion, the general assemblies and boards of directors in Libyan banks 
should consider how to strengthen the practice of audit committees and 
consider the obstacles facing these committees" EM (3-3). 
 
The finding that boards should do more to support ACs in performing their responsibilities and 
duties is consistent with the recommendations of several professional bodies (e.g. FRC, 2012). 
Most of the interviewees felt that the board should help the audit committee overcome any 
problems and that it should remove any obstacles to its independence. 
 
8.2.5 Improving the Legal and Regulatory Environment  
As noted in Table 8.1, the sample as a whole agreed with the statement: “The legal and 
regulatory environment in Libya should pay more attention to corporate governance and ACs,” 
recording a total mean score of 3.98. Breaking the results down by group, the highest group 
mean for this step was recorded by the external auditors group (4.26), followed by the board 
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members group (4.19), the internal auditors group (3.94), the executive managers group (3.86) 
and the audit committee members group (3.82). Table 8.2 indicates that 77.8% of the survey 
respondents agreed with this step. The BD and EA groups showed the highest level of support, 
with 85.7% of each group agreeing or strongly agreeing. This was followed by the IA group 
(76.1%), the EM group (75.3%) and lastly the AC group (70.6%). It should be noted that the 
lowest level of support for this step came from the AC group, suggesting that audit committee 
members themselves, while acknowledging its importance, do not see this as one of the most 
crucial measures for supporting effective AC practice. 
 
When the interviewees were asked what actions can be taken to enhance the effectiveness of 
ACs, most suggested that the legal and regulatory environment in Libya should pay more 
attention to corporate governance and audit committees, and that current rules and guidelines 
regarding these committees should be reviewed. However, while acknowledging the need for 
change, some interviewees were concerned about the Central Bank of Libya implementing new 
legislation without considering its potential impact on the sector. A board member from one 
mixed ownership bank therefore suggested that the Central Bank should seek advice from 
others to ensure that any legislative or regulatory changes support rather than hinder the work 
of banks: 
"The Central Bank should create the right environment for the banking 
business and not issue any legislation or regulations that adversely affect the 
work of banks. It should use advisers and experts to assist it in making 
decisions and issuing appropriate regulations and legislation" BD (1-4). 
 
The director of the internal audit department from another mixed ownership bank explained 
that the legal environment in general needs to improve:  
“The legal environment for banks is very weak especially with regard to 
governance, which affects the bank’s overall performance, with consequent 
effects on governance and the audit committee, and therefore the laws and 
governance code, in particular, need to be updated” IA (4-4). 
 
The findings echo many other studies in highlighting that the legal and regulatory environment 
in Libya needs to pay greater attention to corporate governance and ACs (e.g. Larbsh, 2010; 
Faraj and El-Firjani, 2014). Although some interviewees were concerned about the Central 
Bank of Libya implementing legislation without considering its potential impact on the sector, 
most saw it as essential to enhance the effectiveness of audit committees and corporate 
governance in general. 
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8.2.6 Sufficient Compensation for AC Members 
Table 8.1 shows that the sample as a whole agreed with the statement: “ACs should be 
sufficiently compensated for performing their responsibilities,” giving it a total mean score of 
3.95. Breaking the results down by group, the highest group mean for this step was recorded 
by the audit committee members (4.06). This was followed by the board members (4.05), the 
internal auditors (3.96), the external auditors (3.94) and the executive managers (3.88). Table 
8.2 shows that 74.8% of the survey participants agreed with this step. The AC group showed 
the highest level of support, with 82.3% agreeing or strongly agreeing. This was followed by 
the BD group (81.0%), the EA group (77.2%), the IA group (74.7%) and the EM group (70.3%). 
It is worth noting that the executive managers group recorded the lowest level of support, 
suggesting that this group does not see compensation as the key to improving AC 
effectiveness.     
 
Most of the interviewees (70%) agreed that ACs are more likely to perform their 
responsibilities effectively if their members are compensated adequately. The AC chairman 
from a state bank expressed his concern that his committee members are not paid enough for 
the amount of time and energy they expend on their duties:  
“In my opinion, the compensation of audit committee members in the bank is 
inadequate, and this may be affecting the committee's work. The work of the 
audit committee is different from the rest of the other committees of the board; 
the work of these committees is probably seasonal, while the work of the audit 
committee brings its members into sometimes daily contact with the internal 
auditors and executive managers. Therefore, the committee’s members should 
be compensated for the effort and time they put in” AC (2-3). 
 
A board member from another state bank echoed this interviewee in suggesting that paying AC 
members too little may have damaging consequences for the performance of the committee as 
it may lead them to spend less time on their duties. He commented that: 
"From my experience, I think that the compensation is inadequate for what 
audit committee members do. This compensation is lower than it should be, 
which could lead to an impact on their work. Thus, the compensation should 
be reconsidered, so that it is fair and reasonable" BD (1-1). 
 
This seems to support agency theory’s assumption that AC members are more likely to be 
motivated to focus on their monitoring role if they are compensated fairly (Hayek, 2015). It 
also echoes the findings of a number of previous studies (e.g. Engel et al., 2010; Campbell et 
al., 2013). Most of the interviewees were worried that committee members in their bank are 
not paid enough for the amount of time and energy they give to their AC role. 
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8.2.7 Preventing Damaging Government Intervention  
As can be observed in Table 8.1, the sample as a whole agreed with the statement: “Government 
intervention should not be allowed to impact negatively on corporate governance and AC 
practice.” The statement recorded a total mean score of 3.78. Breaking the results down by 
group, the highest group mean for this step was recorded by board members (4.14), followed 
by audit committee members (4.06), external auditors (3.83), internal auditors (3.69) and 
executive managers (3.66). Table 8.2 shows that 68.3% of the survey participants agreed with 
this step. The BD group gave the highest level of support for the step, with 90.5% agreeing or 
strongly agreeing. This was followed by the AC group (76.5%), the EA group (65.7%) and the 
IA and EM groups (both 64.8%). As with the compensation step, the executive managers group 
was the least supportive. 
 
The interviews provided further assurance of the importance of this measure for increasing AC 
effectiveness; approximately 60% of the interviewees felt that government intervention should 
be kept to a minimum, but that where it is necessary, it should be to the benefit of the banking 
sector. For example, the board chairman from a mixed ownership bank, while acknowledging 
that a certain amount of intervention is necessary to improve the sector as a whole, was critical 
of the inappropriate government’s intervention: 
 
“In my experience, government intervention and Central Bank intervention 
are required to improve the work of banks, but sometimes there are 
inappropriate interventions, and thus intervention by the government and the 
Central Bank should be organised and limited so that there is no impact on the 
work of banks” BD (1-2). 
 
The director of internal auditing from one of the state banks suggested that the best way to 
avoid damaging government interference would be to limit the Central Bank of Libya’s remit 
to monitoring the banks: 
“In my view, government intervention, particularly from the Central Bank of 
Libya, is impacting on the banking business and corporate governance. This 
intervention has impacted on the public banks more than private banks. 
Consequently, Central Bank intervention should be limited to supervising and 
controlling the work of banks” IA (4-2). 
 
The survey results reveal a general view that government intervention should not be allowed 
to impact negatively on CG, including AC practice. This is consistent with previous studies, 
such as Roe (2003), Wu and Patel (2015) and Iswaissi and Falahati (2017). Most of the 
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interviewees argued that government intervention should be judicious and limited to measures 
that will promote CG and AC effectiveness, with some arguing that Central Bank of Libya 
intervention should be confined to supervision and monitoring. 
 
8.3 Discussion of the Results 
The majority of survey participants and interviewees agreed that the suggested actions would 
enhance the effectiveness of ACs in Libya’s banking sector. The view that strengthening the 
accounting and auditing profession is the best way of enhancing AC effectiveness is consistent 
with Larbsh’s (2010) conclusion that developing a robust Libyan CG framework also involves 
supporting the accounting and auditing profession and updating accounting education in the 
country. The result offers additional confirmation that the accounting environment has an 
influence on CG (see section 7.3.6). The second-ranked measure – that AC members should be 
appointed according to their experience and qualifications – is consistent with the FRC UK’s 
(2012) recommendation that committee members should have financial experience and 
professional qualifications, while the third-ranked measure – the institution of legal 
requirements governing AC responsibilities – echoes Saad et al. (2006) and Lin et al. (2008), 
who argue that this enhances the committees’ effectiveness. The fourth was that boards should 
do more to support ACs. The fifth-ranked action – improving the legal and regulatory 
environment – has also been recommended by Larbsh (2010), who suggests that Libya’s legal 
system should be reviewed to bring it into line with CG best practice. The view that AC 
members must be sufficiently compensated was only ranked sixth by the participants, but 
numerous researchers and regulators have argued that this is important if the committee is to 
perform effectively (e.g. Magrane and Malthus, 2010; FRC, 2012; Campbell et al., 2013). The 
lowest-ranked action was preventing damaging government intervention; although the survey 
group agreed that this could improve AC effectiveness, they felt less strongly about this than 
they did about the other suggestions. Many saw Central Bank of Libya intervention as justified, 
given its overall supervisory responsibility for the sector, while others saw government 
intervention as having only a limited impact on banks, their CG and ACs. 
 
By taking these actions, banks and the Libyan banking sector as a whole can raise the 
effectiveness of ACs and enhance their ability to address agency problems. This is the first 
study to find that strengthening the accounting and auditing profession is perceived as the best 
way of enhancing AC effectiveness in Libya. The study participants argued that this will lead 
to an improvement in the quality of the information being given to the AC by internal auditors. 
They felt that this will be best achieved through the formation of a professional association or 
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union, the application of international accounting standards, the development of accounting 
curricula at universities and the development of human resources, especially internal auditors.   
 
8.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the literature by identifying actions that might 
be taken to address the inhibiting factors identified in the conceptual framework and 
investigated in Chapter 7. 
 
There was a general consensus among the survey respondents that the suggested actions would 
enhance the effectiveness of ACs in Libya's banking sector, though the level of support was 
strongest (to a statistically significant degree) among the external auditors. This may be 
because this group is the best placed to see the positive effects the actions might have. Most of 
the interviewees also expressed agreement that the proposed actions would raise AC 
effectiveness. These findings are consistent with agency theory’s view that an effective AC can 
play a major role in addressing agency problems within the organisation. 
 
This study is the first to find that strengthening the accounting and auditing profession is 
perceived as the best way of enhancing AC effectiveness in Libya. The study participants 
argued that this will lead to an improvement in the quality of the information being given to 
the AC by internal auditors. They felt that this will be best achieved through the formation of 
a professional association or union, the application of international accounting standards, the 
development of accounting curricula at universities and the development of human resources, 
especially internal auditors.   
 
The following chapter summarises the findings obtained from the questionnaire survey and 
semi-structured interviews and discusses their implications. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion   
9.1 Introduction 
As specified in the conceptual framework, this study has three main aims: to explore the present 
role of ACs in the Libyan banking sector, to investigate the factors that impact the effectiveness 
of these committees, and to identify ways of enhancing this effectiveness. This chapter 
summarises the findings that were obtained from the questionnaire survey and semi-structured 
interviews. It starts by reviewing the results before going on to discuss the contributions made 
by the study and the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. It ends by considering 
the limitations of the study and identifying areas for future research.  
 
9.2 Review of Results 
This section summarises the overall findings obtained from the questionnaire surveys and semi-
structured interviews. 
 
9.2.1 The Present Role of the Audit Committee 
The first objective of the research was to explore the present role of audit committee in the 
Libyan banking sector. This objective was expressed in the first and second research questions: 
 
Q1. What role do ACs currently play in Libya’s banking sector? 
Q2. How do these committees perform their role?  
 
The results of the study show that the current role of audit committees in Libya’s banking sector 
includes reviewing and monitoring the organisation’s financial reporting, internal audit 
function and the external audit process. These are therefore the focus of the following sections. 
 
9.2.1.1 The AC’s Role in Monitoring Financial Statements  
The majority of survey participants saw this role as comprising four main responsibilities: 
reviewing managers’ corrections to financial statements, reviewing external audit reports on 
financial statements, monitoring the compliance of the financial statement process with 
accounting standards, and reviewing major accounting policy. The interviewees generally 
agreed, though some argued that in practice, these responsibilities ultimately rest with the board 
as a whole rather than the AC. The findings thus suggest that ACs are generally seen as having 
an important role to play in monitoring the financial reporting process and improving 
information flow, as posited by agency theorists. However, the finding that many ACs are not 
performing this role effectively in practice – that they are doing little more than superficially 
reviewing the financial statements presented to them – suggests that institutional theory’s view 
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of ACs as primarily an attempt to create legitimacy within the sector also holds true. By 
creating an AC, a bank signals its willingness to comply with the Libyan CG Code (2010). The 
committee may spend too little time reviewing the financial statements to have any real impact 
on the bank’s CG, but the mere fact of its existence is likely to improve the firm’s public 
reputation. 
 
9.2.1.2 The AC’s Role in the Internal Audit Function 
The survey and questionnaire findings suggest that ACs are widely seen as performing a range 
of tasks in regard to the internal audit function. These include reviewing the internal audit 
reports, promoting the independence of internal auditors, reviewing the objectives, plan and 
functions of the internal audit, receiving reports on internal auditors’ work, recommending new 
appointments, ensuring that the internal audit has the necessary resources, and meeting with 
the head of internal auditing. The respondents also highlighted the committee’s role in 
overseeing internal control systems, identifying any weaknesses and discussing corrective 
measures with internal auditors. The findings confirm the importance of the interaction 
between the AC and the internal audit department as a key factor in achieving effective CG, 
and the AC’s role in enhancing the effectiveness and independence of the internal audit 
function. The findings thus support agency theory’s view that the AC has a major role to play 
in monitoring the internal audit. However, they also show that its effectiveness in this regard 
depends to some extent on its relationship with the internal audit department, upon whom it 
relies for information. As a number of respondents pointed out, if this relationship is weak or 
dysfunctional, this can impact on the effectiveness of governance in the bank. This is more 
likely in banks where the AC has been established primarily for the purpose of creating 
legitimacy, as these ACs may be less inclined (or less able) to forge strong links with the 
internal audit department. Despite these concerns, the findings suggest that, overall, ACs are 
performing this aspect of their oversight role more effectively than they are performing the 
other aspects. 
 
9.2.1.3 The AC’s Role in the Work of the External Audit 
The questionnaire respondents agreed that ACs review and investigate the findings of the 
annual external audit and that they ensure that audit fees are sufficient to perform the audit 
process effectively. However, there was less support for the suggestions that ACs recommend 
the appointment and replacement of external auditors, that they monitor the activities, 
resources, expertise and independence of external auditors, or that they meet external auditors, 
without managers, to discuss the audit process. Several of the interviewees argued that many 
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ACs play a positive and valuable part in the external audit process by liaising and resolving 
disagreements between external auditors, the board of directors and managers. However, others 
implied that ACs can find it difficult to extract information from external auditors, particularly 
about deficiencies and weaknesses in the control systems, and the communication between AC 
and external auditors is often inadequate (as also indicated by the survey respondents above). 
This significantly undermines their ability to enhance the independence, effectiveness and 
objectivity of the external audit process. Overall, the findings are consistent with some previous 
studies (e.g. Bédard and Compernolle, 2014) in suggesting that ACs play a less significant role 
in the external audit process than they do in the internal audit function (upon which they rely 
for information on financial and operating matters). They support institutional theory’s view 
that ACs in the banking sector are established primarily for the purpose of creating legitimacy 
outside the firm.  
 
9.2.2 The Impact of Factors on Audit Committee Practice 
The second objective of the research was to investigate the factors impacting audit committee 
effectiveness in Libya’s banking sector. This objective was expressed in the third and fourth 
research questions: 
  
Q3. What factors impact on the effectiveness of ACs in this sector? 
Q4. How do these factors affect the role of ACs? 
 
9.2.2.1 Enabling Factors 
As described in the conceptual framework, the literature suggests a number of enabling factors 
which can have an impact on AC practice. Seven of these factors were investigated in this 
study: member independence, diligence and financial expertise, committee size, meeting 
frequency, authority, and access to information. The aim was to gain insight into the extent to 
which ACs in the Libyan banking sector are perceived as being positively influenced by these 
enabling factors.  
 
There was a broad consensus among the participants that the AC’s job is to monitor the 
organisation’s accounting and auditing, as posited by agency theory, and that all of the 
identified factors have a positive impact on its ability to perform this role. The survey 
respondents saw relevant expertise as the most important enabling factor, followed in 
descending order by committee size (i.e. having sufficient members to perform effectively), 
meeting frequency, authority, access to information, member independence and finally 
member diligence. The relatively low importance attached to member independence is perhaps 
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surprising, given the emphasis this is accorded by researchers. As far as member diligence is 
concerned, many survey respondents may have felt less strongly about this factor because they 
saw it as relatively insignificant compared to the larger structural forces that surround ACs. 
The only difference between the survey respondents and the interviewees was that the latter 
placed greater emphasis on authority and access to information as enabling factors, perhaps 
because they are more likely to observe the impact of these factors at first hand.  
 
9.2.2.2 Inhibiting Factors  
The conceptual framework also contains a range of inhibiting factors that are highlighted in the 
literature, including weak board governance, the lack of clear legal requirements governing the 
AC’s responsibilities and duties, the lack of requirement for AC members to be qualified or 
experienced, inadequate compensation, the weak legal and regulatory environment, the weak 
accounting environment and government intervention. These seven factors were tested in an 
attempt to understand the extent to which they are perceived as adversely impacting ACs in 
Libya’s banking sector.  
 
Once again, there was a general consensus among the survey respondents and interviewees on 
the potential of these factors to limit AC effectiveness. The survey respondents ranked the weak 
legal and regulatory environment as the strongest inhibiting factor, followed by weak board 
governance, government intervention, the lack of requirement for AC members to be qualified 
or experienced, the lack of clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities and 
duties, the weak accounting environment (specifically the national lack of expertise in 
accounting, financial reporting and auditing) and finally the inadequate compensation given to 
AC members. The main difference between the survey and interview findings was that the 
latter were more likely to acknowledge inadequate compensation as an inhibiting factor; many 
AC members in the survey were either reluctant to commit themselves to an answer, or 
suggested that poor compensation was a deterrent for others but had no effect on their own 
practice. Several interviewees also expressed concern at the level of government intervention 
in the Libyan banking sector, explaining that government interference in the appointment of 
board members can significantly undermine the ability of the board, and consequently the AC, 
to perform effectively. Institutional theory may give some insight into these interviewees’ 
concerns, in that they may feel they are being obliged to adopt practices and follow externally 
imposed regulations before they are properly prepared. This study is the first to demonstrate 
empirically the impact of a weak accounting and auditing profession on AC effectiveness. The 
perceived weakness of the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association means that the 
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profession does not enjoy high status, but more importantly, poor standards within the 
profession impact on the banking sector by raising the risk of accounting errors and of false 
information being provided to ACs. 
 
9.2.3 Actions for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Audit Committees  
The third research objective was to determine actions to enhance the effectiveness of ACs in 
Libya’s banking sector. This was expressed in the fifth research question: 
Q5. What can be done to enhance the effectiveness of ACs in Libya’s banking sector? 
 
The starting point for this step was the seven inhibiting factors identified in the conceptual 
framework. Seven corresponding corrective actions were suggested to participants, the 
majority of whom (survey respondents and interviewees alike) agreed that they would raise AC 
effectiveness. The most popular suggestion was strengthening the accounting and auditing 
profession. This was followed by the suggestion that AC members should be appointed 
according to their financial experience and professional qualifications. The third-ranked 
measure was the institution of legal requirements governing AC responsibilities, while the 
fourth was that boards should do more to support ACs, including helping them overcome any 
problems and removing any obstacles to their independence. The fifth-ranked action was the 
improvement of Libya’s legal and regulatory environment to bring it into line with good CG 
practice. The view that AC members must be sufficiently compensated was ranked sixth by the 
participants, while preventing damaging government intervention was ranked last. Although 
the survey group agreed that this could improve AC effectiveness, they felt less strongly about 
this than they did about the other suggestions; most saw intervention by the Central Bank of 
Libya as either justified or having only limited impact. 
 
The participants’ support for these measures is consistent with their support for the agency-
oriented view of the AC as a key mechanism for addressing agency problems. The measure 
that drew the strongest support from the survey respondents was the proposal to strengthen the 
accounting and auditing profession in Libya, which they felt would raise the quality of the 
information the AC receives from internal auditors. They wanted to see the formation of a 
professional association or union, the application of international accounting standards, 
updated accounting curricula at universities and better professional training, especially for 
internal auditors. This study is the first to demonstrate empirically that strengthening the 
accounting profession is perceived as the best way of enhancing AC effectiveness in the Libyan 
banking sector.   
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9.3 Contribution of the Research 
This research contributes in several ways to the ongoing discussion about the AC’s role in CG. 
First, by investigating AC effectiveness in a developing country, it addresses an information 
gap as identified in the conceptual framework – this context is still poorly understood. By 
providing new evidence (and a different perspective) from a context that is culturally, socially, 
legally and politically different from other countries, it can enhance our understanding of the 
concept of CG and ACs. The vast majority of studies have focused on AC effectiveness in 
developed countries, but since CG practices may vary between countries (Iswaissi and Falahati, 
2017), the findings may not be transferable to the Libyan environment, which is shaped by its 
own set of legal and political factors. Little is known about CG practice in Libya or how it is 
impacted by these factors. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how 
these and other factors affect CG and particularly AC practice in the Libyan banking sector, 
highlighting, for example, the inhibiting impact it has on AC effectiveness and CG when board 
members are government-appointed. 
 
The second contribution relates more specifically to Libya’s economic development. Little is 
known about the current status of ACs in the country; the two studies conducted so far 
(Abdulsaleh, 2014a; 2014b) examine the potential (not current) role of the committee before 
the Libyan CG Code (2010) made them compulsory in the banking sector. Furthermore, 
Abdulsaleh’s research was conducted in just three banks in Libya and based on questionnaires 
distributed to a very small sample. As the economy moves towards privatisation and the 
broadening of ownership, and the Government looks to attract more foreign investment, it has 
become even more important to review and improve CG mechanisms in Libyan firms. Central 
to this is understanding how AC operate and whether they are given sufficient resources to 
perform their function. This research responds to this need by providing the means to explore 
the current role of ACs in all banks in the Libyan banking sector. The findings may help 
shareholders in their decision making and encourage them to pay greater attention to CG 
mechanisms, including ACs, and they may be especially useful to board members, AC 
members and regulators trying to enhance the effectiveness of these committees. 
 
This study contributes to the literature by attempting to investigate and evaluate the factors that 
influence the effectiveness of ACs. Previous studies, which have for the most part been limited 
to the developed countries, have produced contradictory results regarding the effect of these 
factors on the effectiveness of ACs. This study is the first to categorise the fourteen selected 
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factors in its conceptual framework as either enabling or inhibiting AC effectiveness. Enabling 
factors include independence, financial expertise, meetings, size, authority, access to 
information and diligence, while inhibiting factors include lack of regulations clearly 
governing the committee’s responsibilities and duties, the poor qualifications and experience 
of AC members, inadequate compensation, the weak legal environment, the weak accounting 
environment, government intervention and weak board governance. This last area in particular 
may be impacting on AC practice in Libya’s banking sector, where boards and sub-committees 
are widely seen as lacking independence.  
 
This study makes a unique contribution to the accounting literature with its discussion of a 
number of actions which might be implemented to improve the performance of ACs in the 
Libyan banking sector. These actions include appointing AC members based on their 
experience and qualifications, putting strict legal requirements in place to compel ACs to 
perform their responsibilities and duties effectively, and updating the legal and regulatory 
environment to pay greater attention to ACs. However, the most important of these, according 
to the participants in this study, is strengthening the accounting and auditing profession so that 
ACs can be sure the information they receive is accurate and reliable. Specific suggestions for 
how strengthening this profession might be achieved include the formation of a professional 
association or union, the application of international accounting standards, the development of 
accounting curricula at universities and better training for staff, especially internal auditors.  
 
Finally, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the study is the first to consider the impact 
that a weak accounting and auditing profession has on AC effectiveness. The perceived 
weakness of the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association means that the accounting and 
auditing profession itself does not enjoy high status. More importantly, poor standards within 
the profession impact on the banking sector as a whole and its CG, especially ACs. They may 
lead to serious errors being made in banks’ accounting and auditing practice, while under-
qualified or inexperienced internal auditors risk producing weak or even inaccurate reports for 
the AC. The study is unique in exploring the suggestion that AC effectiveness in Libya could 
be enhanced by developing the country’s accounting and auditing profession. It suggests that 
raising efficiency among accounting and auditing professionals would enhance the quality and 
reliability of the information supplied to the AC, and thus its ability to perform its role 
effectively. 
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9.4 Theoretical Implications  
The results of this study have a number of distinctive theoretical implications can be discussed 
as follows: In regard to the first objective of the research, the results support agency theory’s 
assumption that the theoretical role of ACs in Libya’s banking sector is to monitor financial 
reporting, the internal audit function and the external audit process. However, while some ACs 
do play an important role in the financial reporting process (Lin et al., 2006) and reduce agency 
costs by improving information flows between principals and agents (Beasley et al., 2009; 
Samaha et al., 2012), others do little in practice to enhance the quality of financial reporting 
(Abbott et al., 2004; Soliman and Ragab, 2014). Interviewees expressed concerns that in many 
banks, the AC has too limited a role to have a material impact on the quality of the financial 
statements, it rarely challenges weaknesses in the work of internal auditors, and it seldom 
follows-up or supervises the work of external auditors. This would seem to support institutional 
theory’s assumption that ACs in the sector are primarily designed to create legitimacy outside 
the organisation rather than to actively engage in monitoring within the bank. 
 
In terms of the study’s second objective, the survey respondents and interviewees generally 
supported agency theory in seeing the job of the AC as being to monitor the organisation’s 
accounting and auditing. They agreed that the committee is more likely to perform this task 
effectively if it has at least three members, these members are non-executive/independent 
directors (at least some of whom have expertise in the accounting field), and it meets regularly. 
The interviewees revealed that in practice, over half of AC committees in the Libyan banking 
sector are made up of independent board members. If this is true, it is a positive indicator for 
the current situation of the Libyan banking sector, because it signals the sector’s general 
acceptance (in principle at least) of agency theory’s assumption that including independent 
directors on the audit committee strengthens the monitoring process and reduces information 
asymmetry (Hashim and Rahman, 2011). 
 
There was general consensus among the respondents that the identified inhibiting factors do 
indeed have an adverse impact on banks’ CG and AC effectiveness. A number of interviewees 
highlighted the Central Bank of Libya’s imposition of the AC mechanism as a potential 
problem, explaining that it drives some banks to treat the committee merely as a box-ticking 
exercise (as posited by institutional theory). Others were concerned about government 
intervention in board appointments, given that the sector already struggles with unprofessional 
boards and underperforming directors (Abdou, 2015). Again, institutional theory may give 
some insight into interviewees’ concerns about this particular example of government 
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intervention; some banks feel they are being forced to adopt practices and follow externally 
imposed regulations before they are properly prepared. 
 
The findings reveal that actions need to be taken to raise AC effectiveness in Libya’s banking 
sector. Suggested measures included appointing AC members according to their experience 
and qualifications, establishing legal requirements governing ACs, and ensuring board support 
for ACs. However, the action that drew the strongest support from survey respondents was the 
proposal to strengthen the accounting and auditing profession in Libya. The interviewees 
suggested this could be achieved by providing better training and professional development for 
staff, especially internal auditors, updating and improving university accounting curricula, 
implementing international accounting standards and establishing a professional association or 
union for accountants. These actions are necessary if ACs in the Libyan banking sector are to 
become effective mechanisms of CG; that is, if they are to reduce agency costs by monitoring 
the activities of management and resolving the problems caused by information asymmetry 
(Abed and Al-Najjar, 2016), as posited by agency theory. They are also necessary if these 
committees are to meet the high expectations of shareholders, especially given that the 
implementation of CG is still in its early stages and largely ineffective. 
 
The use of both agency and institutional theories in the study allows a deeper understanding of 
the role being played by audit committees in Libya’s banking sector, though overall, 
institutional theory might provide a better frame for explaining this role as it operates currently. 
Although the Libyan CG Code recognises the crucial role played by the AC in resolving agency 
conflicts and protecting the interests of shareholders, this recognition has not yet spread across 
the banking sector as a whole. For many banks, the motivation to form an AC comes from a 
desire to maintain legitimacy outside the organisation rather than a drive to improve 
organisational effectiveness.  
 
9.5 Practical Implications 
The findings of the current study have some distinctive practical implications for the Libyan 
banking sector, board and audit committee members and regulators, particularly the Central 
Bank of Libya, in their attempts to mitigate the obstacles facing audit committees and to 
enhance their effectiveness. 
 
The findings are of interest to individuals seeking to understand the link between ACs and the 
quality of financial reporting, as these findings indicate that in many firms, the committee plays 
too limited a role to have a material impact on the quality of the financial statements. In terms 
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of the AC’s role within the internal audit function, the findings confirm the importance of the 
relationship between the committee and the internal audit department, and the need for this 
department to produce high-quality reports. In terms of its role within the external audit 
function, they show that ACs seldom follow-up or supervise the work of external auditors. 
These findings have implications for the Libyan CG Code in that they suggest areas where 
further improvements are required. 
 
The findings suggest that there are a number of underlying causes for this state of affairs, which 
have implications at the meso (organisational) and the macro (sector) level. At the meso level, 
the lack of qualifications and experience among AC members was identified as a crucial 
inhibiting factor (though most participants were content with the qualifications and experience 
of their own committee), suggesting the need for further skills training to be made available to 
these individuals. Most importantly, banks should adopt a policy of appointing new AC 
members solely on the basis of their qualifications, experience and skills. The same may hold 
true at board level; most respondents agreed that weaknesses in board governance adversely 
impact AC performance (though again, most were satisfied with the performance of their own 
board). Such weaknesses are more likely where board members are under-qualified or 
inexperienced, but whatever their cause, they limit the board’s ability to support the AC in 
overcoming problems and to remove any factors adversely affecting its independence. There 
was also concern that the low level of compensation given to AC members may impact on both 
the independence and the effectiveness of the committee; most of the interviewees felt that 
committee members in their bank are not compensated adequately for the amount of time and 
energy they spend on their duties. This prompted most survey participants and interviewees to 
suggest that if banks paid AC members more, the committees would be more effective. 
 
The fact that there are no clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities or duties 
(the Libyan CG Code only sets these duties out in general terms) may also have policy 
implications at bank level. The survey participants and interviewees felt that this lack of legal 
requirements significantly inhibits ACs’ effectiveness and that it is up to individual banks to 
clearly identify the duties and responsibilities they expect their audit committee to perform and 
to review and update these duties as necessary. 
 
At the macro level, the respondents were unanimous on the adverse effect the weakness of the 
accounting and auditing profession in Libya has on AC effectiveness. Inadequate professional 
standards can have severe consequences, with mistakes in accounting practice resulting in ACs 
receiving inaccurate information and making poor decisions. A professional association or 
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union is therefore vital to raise standards within the accounting and auditing profession, to train 
and develop bank staff, to apply international standards and to keep pace with the evolution of 
accounting in Libyan universities. 
 
Also at the macro level, the findings may be useful for exploring the effect government 
intervention, particularly from the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), has on banks and their CG. 
A number of interviewees saw the CBL’s intervention as justified because of its role as the 
overall monitor of bank activity, but many argued that this intervention should not be allowed 
to adversely affect CG and AC practice. Particular concern was expressed about the CBL’s 
interference in the appointment of board members and even senior positions such as board 
chairman, which the majority of participants saw as an inhibiting factor because of its potential 
to impact on the decisions and performance of the board, including the selection of AC 
members. This is even more problematic in a banking environment that is already weakened 
by inadequate CG regulation (Abdou, 2015; Iswaissi and Falahati, 2017). 
 
Finally, the study reveals that CG, and consequently AC practice, are being adversely affected 
by the weakness of the legal/regulatory environment. A large proportion of interviewees 
complained that laws are not being enforced as they should be, and most wanted the legal and 
regulatory environment to pay greater attention to CG and ACs, and for current rules and 
guidelines regarding these committees to be reviewed. 
 
9.6 Limitations of the Study 
Although the study has achieved the research aims and objectives and answered the research 
questions, it is nevertheless necessary to acknowledge its limitations. The first of these is the 
relatively small size of the sample: just 218 completed questionnaires were received and 
analysed and only 20 interviews were conducted. Given that these individuals were offering 
only their own perceptions and personal experiences, the gathered data may not reflect the 
views of the population as a whole. Furthermore, the representativeness of the sample may 
have been affected by the fact that most board and audit committee members tend not to have 
permanent offices in the bank or even attend regularly, making it more difficult to find 
respondents from these two groups. 
 
Many of those who were approached were reluctant to be interviewed or even to complete the 
questionnaire survey, arguing that they were too busy or did not understand the research topic.  
Among those who did volunteer, some were careful or hesitant about answering certain 
questions, preferring to answer uncertain to these questions, despite assurances that their 
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answers would remain confidential. Some may have even misrepresented their views or not 
told the truth because they did not want to present a negative impression of their firms. 
Alternatively, some respondents may have been hesitant about answering questions because 
they lacked knowledge about CG or ACs. This is not implausible, given that CG is still a 
relatively new concept in Libya and that its implementation is still at an early stage. If so, the 
results may not accurately reflect the current role being played by these committees or the 
factors affecting them.  
 
9.7 Directions for Future Research 
As noted above, ACs are at an early stage of development in the Libyan banking sector, and 
further investigation is required of their role as a mechanism of corporate governance. 
Longitudinal research should also be conducted to examine whether the practice of these 
committees becomes more closely aligned with corporate governance recommendations over 
time. 
 
An in-depth assessment of the audit committee’s role as the main mechanism of good 
governance and how to increase its effectiveness would exceed the scope of this thesis. 
However, such an investigation is certainly justified, given the severe shortage of research in 
developing countries, particularly Libya, and the audit committee’s importance in creating a 
good governance environment and protecting the interests of shareholders. This study has only 
looked at Libya’s banking sector, but further research is required that covers other companies 
listed on the Libyan Stock Market and other sectors in the Libyan economy.  
 
The results of the current study indicate that audit committee members’ lack of qualifications 
and experience may be adversely impacting audit committee practice. Consequently, research 
is needed to examine in more detail the role that members’ skills and training, along with other 
personal characteristics and background, play in determining committee effectiveness. Given 
that the results also highlight the damaging impact of poor performance across the accounting 
profession as a whole, research is also needed to investigate whether better staff training within 
banks, especially in the internal audit department, would make audit committees more 
effective. 
 
As discussed in section 5.3.7, the study’ findings, while generalisable to the banking sector, 
cannot be generalised to other sectors of the Libyan economy. Future research might compare 
AC effectiveness and the factors influencing this effectiveness in the banking sector with those 
in other Libyan listed companies, or with those in other developing (particularly MENA) 
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countries. In the latter case, different countries assign different levels of importance to CG, it 
is impacted by different cultural, social, legal and political factors, and the nature of the AC’s 
legal obligations varies. 
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Dear Participant, 
 
I am a PhD student in the Division of Accounting and Finance at Nottingham Business 
School at Nottingham Trent University. I am interested in knowing your perceptions of 
the current role of audit committees in the banking sector in Libya. 
 
I would be grateful for your participation in a research survey by responding to the 
attached questionnaire.  Your experience could contribute valuable insight which would 
be of benefit to the development of the current study, namely, to examine the current role 
of audit committee in the banking sector in Libya, and then to investigate the impact of 
any factors on these practices, so that action can be taken to improve the practices and 
effectiveness of audit committees. 
 
Finally, I would like to assure you that the information and personal opinion which you 
provide will be kept strictly confidential. I would be extremely grateful if you would 
complete this questionnaire, and I will come personally to collect it in the next few days 
at your bank. Please accept in advance my best wishes and appreciation for your 
cooperation and attention. 
 
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
 
     Mr Abdulhakim Masli  
        Principal Investigator 
              PhD Student 
   Nottingham Trent University  
hakm2005@yahoo.co.uk: liamE   
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Section (1) - General Information    
A) Please indicate your job by ticking (✓) in the appropriate place (please choose one): 
2 • Member of AC  1 • Member of the board of directors 
4 • Internal auditor  3 • Executive manager 
 • (Other) Please specify……………...  5 • External auditor 
B) Please tick (✓) in the appropriate place according to your level of academic qualification: 
2 • Master  1 • PhD 
4 • (Other) Please specify….................  3 • First degree 
C) Please tick (✓) to indicate the major of your last educational degree: 
2 • Finance     1 • Accounting  
4 • Management  3 • Economic 
  5 • (Other) Please specify…………… 
D) Please tick (✓) to indicate how many years of experience you have: 
2 • From 5 years to less than 10 years  1 • Less than 5 years 
4 • More than 15 years  3 • From 10 years to less than 15 years 
 
 
Section (2) - Present Status of Audit Committee Practice 
1. The AC’s Role in Monitoring Financial Statements  
Please indicate whether the following statements reflect current practice at your bank (not 
hypothetical best practice). Can you choose one score from the following options: 
(1): Strongly disagree,     (2): Disagree,    (3): Uncertain,     (4) Agree or      (5): Strongly agree 
 
Q1:    The AC’s Role in Monitoring Financial Statements 
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews significant accounting policies, any changes to them and 
any significant estimates. 
1.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC monitors the extent to which the financial statements process 
complies with accounting standards. 
2.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews and monitors external audit reports concerning financial 
statements. 
3. 
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews and monitors corrections made by management 
concerning financial statements reported by internal auditors. 
4.  
 
Please add any comments: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………….………. 
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2. The AC’s Role in Internal Auditing 
Please indicate whether the following statements reflect current practice at your bank (not 
hypothetical best practice). Can you choose one score from the following options: 
(1): Strongly disagree,     (2): Disagree,    (3): Uncertain,     (4) Agree or      (5): Strongly agree 
 
 
The AC’s Role in Internal Auditing    Q2: 
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews the objectives, plan, functions and terms of reference of 
the internal audit. 5.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews the internal audit reports and any actions taken as a 
result. 
6.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC ensures that the internal audit has the necessary resources and 
access to information. 
7.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC receive reports on the results of the work of internal auditors. 
8.  
5 4 3 2 1 The AC meets with the chief of internal audit at least once a year without 
the presence of management. 
9.  
5 4 3 2 1 The AC promotes the independence of the internal auditors 10.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC can recommend the appointment or replacement of an internal 
auditing director.  
11.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews and examines the effectiveness of internal controls and 
its evaluation by auditors. 
12.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. The AC’s Role in External Auditing 
Please indicate whether the following statements reflect current practice at your bank (not 
hypothetical best practice). Can you choose one score from the following options: 
(1): Strongly disagree,     (2): Disagree,    (3): Uncertain,     (4) Agree or      (5): Strongly agree 
 
The AC’s Role in External Auditing    Q3: 
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews and monitors the activities, resources, expertise and 
independence of the external auditors. 13.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews and investigates the findings of the annual audit provided 
by the external auditors. 14.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC reviews that the audit fees are adequate to perform the audit 
process effectively 15.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC meets with the external auditors without the presence of the 
management to discuss issues related to the audit process. 16.  
5 4 3 2 1 
External auditors are appointed and replaced at the recommendation of the 
AC. 17.  
 
Please add any comments: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………….………. 
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Section (3) - Factors Affecting Audit Committee Practice 
1. Enabling Factors: 
The following statements describe enabling factors that may impact on audit committee practice. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these obstacles affect AC practice at the bank.  
Can you choose one score from the following options: 
(1): Strongly disagree,     (2): Disagree,     (3): Uncertain,      (4) Agree   or      (5): Strongly agree 
 
Enabling Factors Q4: 
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC has adequate authority and influence to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities. 
18.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The AC can easily access information and get appropriate responses from 
all management levels. 
19.  
5 4 3 2 1 
AC members devote adequate time and effort to the work of the 
committee. 
20.  
 4 3 2 1 Some AC members have adequate expertise in the accounting field. 21.  
5 4 3 2 1 AC members are independent and non-executive directors. 22.  
5 4 3 2 1 The AC meets regularly enough to perform its responsibilities and discuss 
all the relevant issues. 
23.  
5 4 3 2 1 The committee has enough members to perform its duties and 
responsibilities properly. 
24.  
Please add any comments: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………….………. 
 
2. Inhibiting Factors 
The following statements describe inhibiting factors that may impact on audit committee practice. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these obstacles affect AC practice at the bank.  
Can you choose one score from the following options: 
(1): Strongly disagree,    (2): Disagree,    (3): Uncertain,     (4) Agree    or      (5): Strongly agree 
 
 
Inhibiting Factors   Q5: 
5 4 3 2 1 Weaknesses in board governance 25.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The lack of clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities 
or duties 
26.  
5 4 3 2 1 The poor qualifications and experience of AC members 27.  
5 4 3 2 1 The inadequate compensation paid to AC members 28.  
5 4 3 2 1 The weak legal and regulatory environment in Libya 29.  
5 4 3 2 1 The weakness of the accounting and auditing profession in Libya  30.  
5 4 3 2 1 
Government intervention in the banking sector, especially from the 
Central Bank 
31.  
 
Please add any comments: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………….………. 
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Section (4) - Actions to Enhance the Effectiveness of the ACs 
The following statements describe actions that could be taken to promote the effectiveness of ACs. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these actions would enhance AC effectiveness.  
Can you choose one score from the following options: 
(1): Strongly disagree.     (2): Disagree.    (3): Uncertain,    (4) Agree or      (5): Strongly agree 
 
Actions to Enhance the Effectiveness of the ACs   Q6: 
5 4 3 2 1 
Board should do more to support AC in performing their responsibilities 
and duties. 
32.  
5 4 3 2 1 
Strict legal requirements should be put in place to compel AC to perform 
its responsibilities and duties effectively. 
33.  
5 4 3 2 1 
AC members should be appointed based on their experience and 
qualifications. 
34.  
5 4 3 2 1 
ACs should be given sufficient compensation to carry out all their 
responsibilities. 
35.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The legal and regulatory environment in Libya should pay more attention 
to corporate governance and ACs; current rules and guidelines regarding 
ACs should be reviewed. 
36.  
5 4 3 2 1 
The accounting and auditing profession in Libya needs to operate to a 
higher standard to help governance function more effectively. 
37.  
5 4 3 2 1 
Political intervention should not be permitted in order to not impact 
negatively on corporate governance and AC practice. 
38.  
 
Please add any comments: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………….….………. 
 
 
Q7: Finally, please add any other comments that you think are relevant to AC practice in 
Libya’s banking sector: 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Would you like to receive a copy of the summary and findings from this survey?  
If so, please write your email address below: 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR INTEREST 
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Section (1) General Information 
……………………………..…………….………… • Name of Participant 
…………………………………..……….………… • Name of Organisation  
………………………………………...…………… • Educational Qualification 
……………………………………………………… • Current Position 
……………………………………...……………… • Number of Years of Experience 
 
 
Section (2) - Present Status of AC Practice 
Q1:   The Roles of the AC  
1. Can you tell me what you believe the roles of the AC are? 
2. What roles and responsibilities does the AC undertake regarding internal audit?  
3. Does the AC have contacts and meetings with internal auditors? If so, are these meetings 
without the presence of management? 
4. Does the AC have any role in recommending the appointment and replacement of the 
director of internal audit? 
5. What roles and responsibilities does the AC undertake regarding external audit? 
6. Does the AC have contacts and meetings with external auditors? If so, are these meetings 
without the presence of any members of the board? 
7. Does the AC have any role in recommending the appointment and replacement of the 
external auditor? 
8. What roles and responsibilities does the AC undertake regarding financial statements? 
9. What roles and responsibilities does the AC undertake regarding internal control? 
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Section (3) Enabling Factors 
Q2:   Enabling factors which may affect the practices of the AC 
10. Do you think that the AC has sufficient authority and influence to carry out its 
responsibilities? Please explain your view. 
11. Can the AC easily access the required information in the bank?  
12. Do AC members devote adequate time and effort to perform its duties and 
responsibilities? Please explain how. 
13. In your view, do the AC members have adequate experience in accounting 
practices? Do AC members have adequate knowledge about the firm's business?   
14. How are AC members chosen and appointed? How do you evaluate the 
independence of the AC in your bank? 
15. Do you think that the AC in the bank has enough members to perform its duties 
and responsibilities adequately? 
16. In your view, does the AC meet often enough to perform its duties and 
responsibilities properly, and to discuss all relevant issues?? Please explain. 
 
 
Section (4) – The Obstacles 
 Q3:  Inhibiting factors which may affect the practices of the AC 
17. In your opinion, what are the inhibiting factors impacting the AC practices in Libyan 
banks? Please explain 
A. Weaknesses in board governance. 
B. The lack of clear legal requirements governing the AC’s responsibilities or 
duties. 
C. The poor qualifications and experience of AC members. 
D. The inadequate compensation paid to AC members. 
E. The weak legal and regulatory environment in Libya. 
F. The weakness of the accounting and auditing profession in Libya.  
G. Government intervention in the banking sector, especially from the Central 
Bank. 
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Section (5) – Steps to Enhance the Effectiveness of ACs 
  Q4:   How to Enhance the Effectiveness of ACs 
18. Can you explain how you would address the issues above mentioned to enhance AC 
effectiveness? 
19. Are there any other actions which can be taken to eliminate obstacles and enhance the 
effectiveness of ACs?  
20. Who is responsible for performing these actions and how? How to perform them 
properly? 
 
 
Q5: Finally, please feel free to highlight any other issues that you think 
relate to AC practice in Libya, which have not been addressed in this 
interview. 
 
 
 
Would you like to receive a copy of the summary and findings from this study?  
If so, please provide me your email address: 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION  
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Appendix C                           
Consent Form 
 
 
The Role of Audit Committees in Corporate Governance:  
The Case of the Banking Sector in Libya 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
Name of Site……………………………………............ 
 
Please read and confirm your consent to being interviewed for this project by initialling the 
appropriate box(es) and signing and dating this form 
 
 
1. I confirm that the purpose of the project has been explained to me, that I have been 
given information about it in writing, and that I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions about the research.           
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason and without any implications for my legal 
rights.               
 
3 I give permission for the interview to be tape-recorded by research staff, on the 
understanding that the tape will be destroyed at the end of the project.    
  
 
4. I agree to take part in this project          
     
 
___________________    __________  __________________ 
Name of respondent    Date   Signature 
 
 
___________________    ___________  __________________ 
Name of researcher taking consent  Date   Signature 
 
 
 
 
PROJECT ADDRESS: 
Mr Abdulhakim Masli, Principal Investigator. A PhD Student at Nottingham Trent University. 
Email: abdulhakim.masli2012@my.ntu.ac.uk 
  Or hakm2005@yahoo.co.uk 
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Appendix D                          
  
Participant Information Sheets 
 
 
The Role of Audit Committees in Corporate Governance:  
the Case of the Banking Sector in Libya 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEETS 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research project. Before you decide whether to 
grant me an interview, it is important that you understand the reason why this research is being 
carried out, and what your participation will involve. I shall be grateful if you will take the time 
to read the following information carefully, and discuss it with colleagues or other people if 
you wish. Please feel welcome to get back to me if anything is unclear, and to take as much 
time as you need to decide whether or not to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study is being undertaken as part of a PhD degree in Accountancy at Nottingham Trent 
University, UK. The purpose of this study is to investigate the perceptions of the current roles 
and responsibilities of audit committees in Libya’s banking sector. It also seeks to explore the 
factors affecting the effectiveness of these committees and to identify ways in which their 
effectiveness might be enhanced. 
Recent episodes of corruption and collapse in a number of major corporations across the world 
have revealed weak control mechanisms and highlighted the need for greater transparency in 
order to protect shareholders and stakeholders alike. The Enron collapse in particular led 
regulators and governments throughout the world to pay renewed attention to the audit 
committee as a key governance mechanism. These examples of corruption have resulted in the 
creation of corporate governance guidelines which give a prominent role to audit committees. 
As the Libyan economy moves towards privatisation, broadening of ownership and attraction 
of foreign investment, it has become important to review and improve the ways in which 
corporate governance operates, as well as the effectiveness of audit committees in Libyan 
corporations. The results of some previous studies indicate that there are several challenges 
and obstacles facing both corporate governance in general, and audit committees in particular, 
in Libya. This research seeks to contribute to this process by analysing the role played by audit 
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committees in corporate governance in the country’s banking sector, which is the most 
important sector in Libya’s economy. Corporate governance is very important in this sector 
because it provides a structure and guidelines for stakeholder rights and sets out the 
responsibilities of banks’ executive bodies. 
 
The key research objectives 
1. To explore the current role of AC in the Libyan banking sector. 
2. To investigate the factors that affect the effectiveness of ACs in this sector. 
3. To identify ways of enhancing the effectiveness of ACs in this sector. 
The project commenced on 4th November 2013 and is due to complete by 3rd November 2017. 
 
Research questions 
 These aims and objectives lead to the following main questions: 
1. What role do ACs currently play in the Libyan banking sector? 
2. How do these committees perform their role?  
3. What factors impact on the effectiveness of ACs in this sector? 
4. How do these factors affect the role of ACs? 
5. What can be done to enhance the effectiveness of ACs in this sector? 
 
Who is running this study? 
The study is being run by Mr Abdulhakim Masli, a PhD Student at Nottingham Trent 
University (Principal Investigator), and supervised by: Dr Donald Harradine, Principal 
Lecturer of accounting, and Professor Malcolm Prowle and Professor Musa Mangena, 
professors of accounting, all of whom are faculty members at Nottingham Business School at 
Nottingham Trent University. 
 
Who is funding this study? 
The study is funded by both Misurata University and the Libyan Higher Education Ministry. 
This project is part of an education development program in Libya. 
 
Why have I been chosen to take part? 
I am asking you to give me an interview because you are one of the members of the five groups 
who have a working relationship with the audit committee. These groups include members of 
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the board of directors, audit committee members, executive managers, internal auditors and 
external auditors. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you are therefore free to take part or not, as you 
choose. If you do decide to take part, you will be given an information sheet to keep, and you 
will also be asked to sign a consent form. You will still be free to withdraw at any time; this 
includes the right to withdraw your interview from the study after it has taken place.  
 
If you decide not to take part, or to withdraw at any stage, you will not be asked to provide any 
reasons. 
 
What do you want me to do? 
I would like you to take part in an interview lasting approximately 1:00 hour. It will take place 
in your workplace, if appropriate, or another location designated by yourself or the researcher, 
and will be arranged at a time convenient to yourself. The topics to be covered have been 
identified in the section of this document titled 'What is the purpose of the study?'. There will 
also be plenty of scope for discussing issues around the area of the study. 
I will ask for your written permission to tape the interview, to ensure that the information you 
give me is accurately recorded. 
 
What will happen to the information I give in my interview? 
The tape of your interview will be transcribed. I will then analyse the information and feed it 
into our results. The recording and transcript will be handled only by the researcher, in line 
with data-protection principles and our approved research protocol. 
 At the end of the study, all the transcripts will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in my desk at 
NTU in a safe and secure place. The data collected from the interviews will also be transferred 
from Libya to the UK and will be kept in a safe place. Also, electronic files are kept on 
password-protected computers which are not accessible to any other university staff. While this 
is usual practice, because it makes valuable research data available to other researchers, the 
transcripts will be fully anonymised before they are archived. Any information that identifies 
you or your organisation, or that gives any clues to your identity, will be removed. I am 
confident that these precautions will ensure that no-one will be able to trace your transcript 
back to you or your organisation. 
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How will you protect my confidentiality and anonymity? 
You will not be named in any publication arising from this project unless your role forms part 
of a narrative that is already in the public domain, for example, if you were the named author 
of a published document or gave evidence to a public inquiry relevant to the study. No 
unpublished opinions or information will be attributed to you, either by name or position, 
without your express consent.  
 
I will, unless consent is given, exercise all possible care to ensure that you cannot be identified 
by the way we write up our findings. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks in taking part? 
The main cost to you will be the time needed to be interviewed. The main risk is that you might 
give me information that is detrimental to you or your organisation, or that runs counter to data-
protection laws.  
I am confident that the arrangements described above will prevent any of your information 
being shared with anyone outside the research team. For this reason, we believe that the risk of 
any detriment is extremely low. 
 
What are the possible benefits? 
I hope that you will find the interview interesting, and will take satisfaction from helping to 
develop knowledge of this important topic. I also hope that you will find the results of the 
project helpful to your work. 
 
What will happen to the results? 
I will write up the results in a PhD thesis at Nottingham Trent University, and will publish 
academic articles on my research in journals that are widely read by managers in the banking 
sector and other sectors in Libya, identifying actions which can be taken to enhance the 
effectiveness of audit committees in Libyan firms. 
 
How can I find out more about this project and its results? 
I will send a copy, if requested, of the executive summary to all our interviewees, so you will 
be able to read about our findings. The researcher will be happy to discuss any aspect of the 
study with potential participants prior to or following their involvement. 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 222 
 
Has anyone reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the supervisory team, and has been accepted by the College 
Research Degrees Committee at Nottingham Trent University, and my research project has 
been registered for MPhil with the possibility of a transfer to PhD. 
The project has received ethical approval from the College Research Ethics Committee 
(CREC), under arrangements for research governance at Nottingham Trent University. 
 
Who is responsible if anything goes wrong?  
This project is being administered by Nottingham Trent University, which is therefore 
responsible for the conduct of the project. 
 
Contacts for further information 
Please feel very welcome to contact the researcher for further information at the following 
address: 
abdulhakim.masli2012@my.ntu.ac.uk 
 
Also, the supervisory team can also be contacted at the following addresses: 
Dr Donald Harradine                                                         
Principal Lecturer in Accounting                                   
Nottingham Business School                                          
Division of Accounting and Finance                             
Email:  donald.harradine@ntu.ac.uk 
   
 
Professor Malcolm Prowle 
Professor of Accounting 
Nottingham Business School 
Division of Accounting and Finance 
Email:  malcolm.prowle@ntu.ac.uk 
 
 
Professor Musa Mangena 
Professor of Accounting 
Nottingham Business School 
Division of Accounting and Finance 
Email:  musa.mangena@ntu.ac.uk 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION  
     Mr Abdulhakim Masli  
        Principal Investigator 
              PhD Student 
  Nottingham Trent University 
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 :دور لجان المراجعة في حوكمة الشركات
 حالة القطاع المصرفي في ليبيا
 
 )القطاع المصرفي في ليبيا-  نيةالميدا(صحيفة استبيان للدراسة  
 
 ..………………………………………………………  السيد/
 
 ،،،السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته
 
أنا كباحث أقوم بإعداد رسالة دكتوراه في قسم المحاسبة والمالية بجامعة نوتنجهام ترنت ببريطانيا، لذلك فأنا 
 الي للجان المراجعة في القطاع المصرفي في ليبيا.كم وتصوراتكم الخاصة للوضع الحئراأمهتم بدراسة ومعرفة 
 
وسأكون ممتنا لمشاركتكم في هذا البحث من خلال الستبيان المرفق. كما أن خبرتكم يمكن أن تساهم في إثراء 
البحث العلمي والتي من شأنها أن تكون ذات فائدة في تطوير الدراسة الحالية، من خلال دراسة الوضع الحالي 
جان المراجعة في القطاع المصرفي في ليبيا، وبعد ذلك للتحقيق في تأثير أي من العوامل على هذه لممارسات ل
 .الممارسات، ومن ثم يمكن اتخاذ الإجراءات لتحسين فعالية لجان المراجعة
 
 أخيرا، أود أن أؤكد لكم أن المعلومات والآراء الشخصية التي تقدمها ستعامل بمنتهى السرية. وسأكون ممتنا
للغاية إذا قمت باستكمال هذا الستبيان، وسوف أقوم شخصيا باستلامه منكم. أرجو أن تتقبلوا مني مقدما أطيب 
 تحياتي وتقديري لكم لتعاونكم واهتمامكم.
 
 شاكرين حسن تعاونكم معنا وإنفاق جزء من وقتكم الثمين لخدمة البحث العلمي،،،،
 
 والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته،،،
 
 باحث: عبدالحكيم محمد مصلي  ال
   ku.oc.oohay@5002mkah
 
 
 
 
 
 معلومات عامة -) 1القسم (
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 مارسات الحالية للجنة المراجعةالم -) 2القسم (
  . دور اللجنة في مراقبة البيانات المالية1
يرجى بيان ما إذا كانت العبارات التالية تبين الممارسات الحالية للجنة المراجعة بالمصرف (ل يقصد بذلك أفضل 
 الممارسات). يمكنك اختيار درجة واحدة من بين الخيارات التالية:
 أوافق بشدة) 5(أوافق          )4(غير متأكد         ) 3(ل أوافق         ) 2(       ل أوافق بشدة  )1(  
 
 دور لجنة المراجعة في مراقبة القوائم المالية  1س
  .1
لجنة المراجعة تفحص وتراجع السياسات المحاسبية بالمصرف 
 وأي تغييرات عليها والتقديرات الهامة.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .2
دى توافق القوائم المالية للمصرف مع لجنة المراجعة تراقب م
 المعايير المحاسبية.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .3
لجنة المراجعة تراجع وتراقب تقارير المراجعة الخارجية بشأن 
 القوائم المالية للمصرف.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .4
لجنة المراجعة تفحص وتراقب التصحيحات التي قامت بها الإدارة 
 عنها المراجعون الداخليون.فيما يتعلق بالقوائم المالية التي أبلغ 
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 ..……...…………………………………………...………………………………….....…………………: ........الرجاء إضافة أي تعليقات
 .…………………………………………………………………..……………………………………….…………...…………………………………
 
 
 ) في المكان المناسب وفقا لوظيفتك:✓يرجى وضع علامة ( )أ
 عضو مجلس الإدارة  •
 عضو لجنة مراجعة •  
 
 قسام)(يشمل مدراء الفروع ورؤساء الأمدير تنفيذي  •
 مراجع داخلى •  
 
 مراجع خارجي •
 (أخرى) يرجى تحديد................... •  
 
 ) في المكان المناسب وفقا لمؤهلك العلمي:✓يرجى وضع علامة ( )ب
 دكتوراه  •
 
 ماجستير  • 
 
 (أخرى) يرجى تحديد ....................... •   بكالوريس •
 
 ) للإشارة إلى مجال تخصصك:✓يرجى وضع علامة ( )ج
 حاسبةم •
  
 تمويل • 
 
 اقتصاد •
 إدارة •  
 
 (أخرى) يرجى تحديد ....................... •
    
 ) لبيان عدد سنوات الخبرة في مجال العمل:✓يرجى وضع علامة ( )د
 سنوات 5أقل من  •
 
 سنوات 01سنوات إلى أقل من  5من  • 
 
 سنة   51سنوات إلى أقل من  01من  •
 سنة  فأكثر 51 •  
 
 522 |  e g a P
 
 الداخليةالمراجعة في وظيفة المراجعة . دور لجنة 2
انت العبارات التالية تبين الممارسات الحالية للجنة المراجعة بالمصرف (ل يقصد بذلك أفضل يرجى بيان ما إذا ك
 الممارسات). يمكنك اختيار درجة واحدة من بين الخيارات التالية:
 أوافق بشدة) 5(أوافق          )4(غير متأكد         ) 3(ل أوافق         ) 2(ل أوافق بشدة         )1(  
 
 ر لجنة المراجعة في المراجعة الداخليةدو  2س
لجنة المراجعة تفحص أهداف وخطة ومهام واختصاصات المراجعة   .5
 الداخلية بالمصرف.
 5 4 3 2 1
لجنة المراجعة تراجع تقارير المراجعة الداخلية بالمصرف وأي   .6
 إجراءات يتم اتخاذها بشأن ذلك.
 5 4 3 2 1
ة الداخلية بالمصرف لديها الموارد لجنة المراجعة تتأكد من أن المراجع  .7
 المعلومات. إلى اللازمة وإمكانية الوصول
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 لجنة المراجعة تتلقي تقارير عن نتائج أعمال المراجعين الداخليين.  .8
لجنة المراجعة تجتمع مع مدير المراجعة الداخلية بالمصرف مرة واحدة   .9
 رة.على الأقل في السنة دون وجود الإدا
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 لجنة المراجعة تعزز استقلالية المراجعين الداخليين بالمصرف.  .01
  .11
يمكن للجنة المراجعة التوصية بتعيين أو استبدال مدير المراجعة 
 الداخلية بالمصرف.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .21
لجنة المراجعة تفحص وتراقب مدى فعالية الرقابة الداخلية بالمصرف 
 مراجعين.وتقييمها من قبل ال
 5 4 3 2 1
 ..……...…………………………………………...………………………………….....…………………: ........الرجاء إضافة أي تعليقات
 .…………………………………………………………………..……………………………………….…………...…………………………………
 
 
 . دور لجنة المراجعة في عملية المراجعة الخارجية3
ية تبين الممارسات الحالية للجنة المراجعة بالمصرف (ل يقصد بذلك أفضل يرجى بيان ما إذا كانت العبارات التال
 الممارسات). يمكنك اختيار درجة واحدة من بين الخيارات التالية:
 أوافق بشدة) 5(أوافق          )4(غير متأكد         ) 3(ل أوافق         ) 2(ل أوافق بشدة         )1(  
 عملية المراجعة الخارجيةدور لجنة المراجعة في   3س
  .31
لجنة المراجعة تراجع وتراقب أنشطة وموارد وخبرات واستقلالية 
 المراجعين الخارجيين.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .41
 للمصرف،لجنة المراجعة تفحص وتتحقق من نتائج المراجعة السنوية 
 المقدمة من قبل المراجع الخارجي.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .51
 راجعة كافية لتنفيذ عملية المراجعةلجنة المراجعة تتأكد من أن أتعاب الم
 على نحو فعال. بالمصرف
 5 4 3 2 1
  .61
لجنة المراجعة تجتمع مع المراجعين الخارجيين دون حضور الإدارة 
 5 4 3 2 1 .لمناقشة القضايا المتعلقة بعملية المراجعة
  .71
 5 4 3 2 1 لجنة المراجعة توصي بتعيين واستبدال المراجعين الخارجيين.
 ..……...…………………………………………...………………………………….....…………………: ........إضافة أي تعليقاتالرجاء 
 .…………………………………………………………………..……………………………………….…………...…………………………………
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 العوامل التي تؤثر على ممارسات لجنة المراجعة -) 3القسم (
 عوامل التمكين -1
  تؤثر على ممارسات لجنة المراجعة في المصرف. واملأن هذه الع يرجى الإشارة إلى أي مدى أنت توافق على
 أوافق بشدة) 5(أوافق          )4(غير متأكد         ) 3(ل أوافق         ) 2(ل أوافق بشدة         )1(
 التي قد تؤثر على ممارسات لجنة المراجعةعوامل التمكين (التحفيز)   4س
  .81
 النفوذ الكافي لتنفيذ واجباتها ومسؤولياتهالجنة المراجعة لديها السلطة و
 .بالمصرف
 5 4 3 2 1
  .91
يمكن للجنة المراجعة الوصول بسهولة إلى المعلومات بالمصرف 
 والحصول على الردود المناسبة من كل المستويات الإدارية.
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 .أعضاء لجنة المراجعة يكّرسون الوقت والجهد الكافي لعمل اللجنة  .02
 5 4 3 2 1 .بعض أعضاء لجنة المراجعة لديهم خبرة كافية في مجال المحاسبة  .12
  .22
لجنة المراجعة بالمصرف تتكون من المديرين المستقلين وغير 
 التنفيذيين
 5 4 3 2 1
  .32
لجنة المراجعة بالمصرف تجتمع بانتظام لتنفيذ مسؤولياتها، ومناقشة 
 جميع القضايا ذات الصلة.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .42
لمراجعة بالمصرف لديها عدد كافي من الأعضاء لأداء واجباتها لجنة ا
 ومسؤولياتها بفعالية.
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 ..……...…………………………………………...………………………………….....…………………: ........الرجاء إضافة أي تعليقات
 .…………………………………………………………………..……………………………………….…………...…………………………………
 
 
 
 بيط عوامل التث -2
 يرجى الإشارة إلى أي مدى أنت توافق على أن هذه العوامل تؤثر على ممارسات لجنة المراجعة في المصرف.
 أوافق بشدة) 5(أوافق          )4(غير متأكد         ) 3(ل أوافق        ) 2(ل أوافق بشدة         )1(
 المراجعة التي قد تؤثر على ممارسات لجنةعوامل التثبيط (العقبات)   5س
 5 4 3 2 1 ضعف ممارسات الحوكمة في مجلس الإدارة   .52
  .62
عدم وجود متطلبات قانونية صارمة تنظم مسؤوليات وواجبات لجنة 
 المراجعة.
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 عدم وجود مؤهلات وخبرات كافية لأعضاء لجنة المراجعة.  .72
 5 4 3 2 1 عدم كفاية المكافآت المدفوعة لأعضاء لجنة المراجعة.  .82
 5 4 3 2 1 ضعف البيئة القانونية والتنظيمية في ليبيا.  .92
 5 4 3 2 1 ضعف مهنة المحاسبة والمراجعة في ليبيا.  .03
  .13
تدخل الحكومة في عمل القطاع المصرفي، خاصة من المصرف 
 المركزي.
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 ..……...…………………………………………...………………………………….....…………………: ........الرجاء إضافة أي تعليقات
 .…………………………………………………………………..……………………………………….…………...…………………………………
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 إجراءات تعزيز فعالية لجان المراجعة -) 4القسم (
 يرجى الإشارة إلى أي مدى توافق على أن هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تعزز من فعالية لجنة المراجعة بالمصرف.
 أوافق بشدة)5(أوافق           )4(غير متأكد         )3(ل أوافق         )2(ل أوافق بشدة         )1(
 إجراءات تعزيز فعالية لجان المراجعة  6س
  .23
يجب على مجلس الإدارة بالمصرف بذل المزيد من الجهد والدعم للجنة 
 المراجعة في أداء مسؤولياتها وواجباتها.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .33
لإلزام لجنة المراجعة  بالمصرفينبغي وضع متطلبات قانونية صارمة 
 بأداء مسؤولياتها وواجباتها على نحو فعال.
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 ينبغي أن يعين أعضاء لجنة المراجعة على أساس خبراتهم ومؤهلاتهم.  .43
  .53
ينبغي منح أعضاء لجنة المراجعة تعويضات كافية للقيام بمهامهم 
 وجه. أكملومسؤولياتهم على 
 5 4 3 2 1
  .63
حداث وتعديل القوانين والتشريعات الليبية بما يتماشى مع حوكمة است
 الشركات عموما ولجان المراجعة خصوصا.
 5 4 3 2 1
  .73
تعزيز ودعم مهنة المحاسبة والمراجعة في ليبيا بما يضمن تطوير 
 ممارسات حوكمة الشركات. وتحسين مستوى
 5 4 3 2 1
  .83
باً على حوكمة الشركات التأثير سلينبغي أل يسمح للتدخل الحكومي ب
 وممارسات لجنة المراجعة.
 5 4 3 2 1
 ..……...…………………………………………...………………………………….....…………………: ........الرجاء إضافة أي تعليقات
 .…………………………………………………………………..……………………………………….…………...…………………………………
 
اجعة في القطاع نها تتعلق بممارسات لجان المر: وأخيرا، الرجاء إضافة أي تعليقات أخرى تعتقد أ7س
 المصرفي في ليبيا
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 هل ترغب في الحصول على نسخة من ملخص ونتائج هذه الدراسة؟
 :إذا كان الأمر كذلك، يرجى كتابة عنوان بريدك الإلكتروني
 ...............................................................................................................
 
 شكرا جزيلا ًلكم على اهتمامكم وتعاونكم معنا لخدمة البحث العلمي
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 الحالة الراهنة لممارسات لجنة المراجعة  -) 2القسم (
 : أدوار لجنة المراجعة1س
 ؟هل يمكن لك أن تتحدث عن أدوار لجنة المراجعة بالمصرف .1
 ما هي أدوار ومسؤوليات لجنة المراجعة بشأن المراجعة الداخلية بالمصرف؟ .2
؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك، بالمصرف هل لدى لجنة المراجعة اتصالت ولقاءات مع المراجعين الداخليين .3
 هل هذه الجتماعات دون حضور أي من أعضاء مجلس الإدارة؟
 عيين واستبدال مدير المراجعة الداخلية بالمصرف؟هل لدى لجنة المراجعة أي دور في التوصية بت .4
 ما هي أدوار ومسؤوليات لجنة المراجعة بشأن عملية المراجعة الخارجية بالمصرف؟ .5
هل لدى لجنة المراجعة اتصالت ولقاءات مع المراجعين الخارجيين؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك، هل هذه  .6
 الجتماعات دون حضور أي من أعضاء مجلس الإدارة؟
 هل لدى لجنة المراجعة أي دور في التوصية بتعيين واستبدال المراجع الخارجي للمصرف؟ .7
 ما هي أدوار ومسؤوليات لجنة المراجعة بشأن القوائم المالية للمصرف؟ .8
 ما هي الأدوار والمسؤوليات التي تقوم بها لجنة المراجعة بشأن الرقابة الداخلية بالمصرف؟ .9
 
 
 
 كين والتحفيز) عوامل التم3القسم (
 : عوامل التمكين والتحفيز التي قد تؤثر على ممارسات لجنة المراجعة2س
هل تعتقد أن لجنة المراجعة لديها ما يكفي من السلطة والنفوذ إلى الضطلاع بمسؤولياتها  .01
 بالمصرف؟ يرجى توضيح وجهة نظركم.
 بالمصرف؟إلى المعلومات المطلوبة بسهولة هل يمكن للجنة المراجعة الوصول  .11
هل أعضاء لجنة المراجعة يكرسون الوقت والجهد الكافي لأداء واجبات ومسؤوليات اللجنة  .21
 بالمصرف؟ يرجى شرح كيفية القيام بذلك.
من وجهة نظرك، هل أعضاء لجنة المراجعة لديهم خبرة كافية عن الممارسات المحاسبية  .31
 بالمصرف؟ وهل لديهم معرفة كافية عن كل أعمال المصرف؟
 كيف يتم اختيار وتعيين أعضاء لجنة المراجعة؟ وكيف تقيم استقلال لجنة المراجعة بالمصرف؟ .41
هل تعتقد أن لجنة المراجعة في المصرف لديها ما يكفي من الأعضاء لأداء واجباتها ومسؤولياتها  .51
 على نحو كاف؟
تها كما ينبغي، من وجهة نظرك، هل تجتمع لجنة المراجعة ما يكفي لأداء واجباتها ومسؤوليا .61
 ومناقشة جميع القضايا ذات الصلة؟ يرجى التوضيح.
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 عوامل التثبيط  –) 4القسم (
 : عوامل التثبيط (العقبات) التي تؤثر على ممارسات لجنة المراجعة3س
في رأيك، ما هي عوامل التثبيط أو العقبات التي تؤثر على ممارسات لجنة المراجعة في المصارف  .71
 التوضيح الليبية؟ يرجى
 أكثر فيما يلي: وهل يمكنك أن توضح وجهة نظرك
 ضعف ممارسات حوكمة الشركات بالمجلس )أ
 عدم وجود مواد قانونية صارمة بشأن مسؤوليات وواجبات لجنة المراجعة )ب
 عدم وجود شروط لعضوية لجنة المراجعة من حيث المؤهلات والخبرة )ج
 المكافآت لأعضاء لجنة المراجعة غير كافية )د
 يئة القانونية والتنظيمية غير كافيةالب )ه
 ضعف مهنة المحاسبة والمراجعة في ليبيا )و
 التدخل الحكومي خاصة من المصرف المركزي في عمل المصارف )ز
 
 
 خطوات تعزيز فعالية لجان المراجعة -) 5القسم (
 : كيفية تعزيز فعالية لجان المراجعة4س
 علاه لتعزيز فعالية لجنة المراجعة بالمصرف؟هل يمكن أن توضح كيف ستعالج القضايا المذكورة أ .81
 هل هناك أي إجراءات أخرى يمكن اتخاذها لتذليل العقبات وتعزيز فعالية لجان المراجعة بالمصرف؟  .91
 ومن هو المسؤول عن تنفيذ هذه الإجراءات؟ وكيف يتم أداؤها بشكل صحيح؟ .02
 
والتي تعتقد أنها تتصل بممارسات لجنة  : وأخيرا،ً لا تتردد في تسليط الضوء عن أي قضايا أخرى،5س
 المراجعة في ليبيا، والتي لم يتم تناولها في هذه المقابلة.
 
يرجى إذا كان الأمر كذلك،  هل ترغب في الحصول على نسخة من ملخص ونتائج هذه الدراسة؟
 عنوان بريدك الإلكتروني: كتابة
 .......................................................................................................................................
  
 "شكرا ًجزيلا ًلتعاونك في انجاز هذا البحث"
